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Resumo 
Esta tese inclui cinco ensaios sobre empreendedorismo. O primeiro ensaio 
descreve o modo como os tópicos relacionados com o empreendedorismo ganharam uma 
relevância crescente na investigação em economia ao longo do último século, e como a 
ciência económica contribuiu para o desenvolvimento gradual do empreendedorismo 
enquanto área de investigação. Os restantes quatro ensaios estudam diferentes questões 
relacionadas com as dinâmicas do empreendedorismo, com recurso a uma grande base de 
dados que combina informação detalhada do trabalhador e da respectiva empresa para 
Portugal. 
No segundo e terceiro ensaios, o indivíduo é a unidade de análise. No segundo 
ensaio estudam-se as dinâmicas de entrada e saída de mais de 157,000 indivíduos que 
deixam o seu emprego por conta de outrem e se tornam empregadores durante o período 
1992-2007. Destacam-se nomeadamente dois contributos: em primeiro lugar, este estudo 
avalia como determinadas experiências passadas no mercado de trabalho influenciam as 
decisões de entrada e saída dos empreendedores nascentes; em segundo lugar, a análise 
presta particular atenção à natureza heterogénea dos empreendedores e tenta explicar as 
suas diferentes escolhas no que respeita ao modo de entrada e de saída.  
O terceiro ensaio analisa os efeitos de aprendizagem e de auto-selecção entre os 
“empreendedores em série”, utilizando uma estratégia empírica inovadora baseada em 
modelos de duração em tempo contínuo com selecção. Tendo sido identificados 
aproximadamente 220,000 indivíduos que deixam a primeira experiência como 
empreendedores, entre os quais cerca de 35,000 reentram uma segunda vez no 
empreendedorismo, este estudo avalia se a experiência adquirida no primeiro negócio 
melhora a sobrevivência dos empreendedores na segunda empresa, tendo em 
consideração os potenciais efeitos de auto-selecção na amostra.  
O quarto e quinto ensaios concentram-se nas empresas start-up, e em particular 
nas spin-offs. O quarto ensaio compara a sobrevivência das spin-offs de tipo pushed e 
pulled, tendo em conta um conjunto de condições iniciais onde estes dois tipos de 
empresas podem diferir. A análise cobre 50,656 spin-offs que entram durante o período 
1992-2007 e utiliza técnicas de decomposição multivariada aplicadas a modelos de 
sobrevivência que permitem decompor o diferencial de sobrevivência observado entre as 
pushed e as pulled spin-offs em diferenças relacionadas com as suas 
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dotações/características observadas e diferenças relacionadas com os retornos das 
mesmas.    
Por fim, o quinto ensaio estuda de que forma o crescimento do emprego, os fluxos 
de trabalhadores e a sobrevivências das spin-offs se relacionam com as suas dotações 
iniciais de capital humano. O estudo concentra-se em três medidas de capital humano à 
entrada – o nível médio de skills da força de trabalho, a dispersão de skills dos 
trabalhadores à entrada e a proporção de co-workers na força de trabalho inicial –, e 
mede os skills dos trabalhadores através de um índice multidimensional que tem em 
conta características observadas e não observadas do trabalhador.  
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Abstract 
This thesis comprises five essays on entrepreneurship. The first essay describes 
how entrepreneurship topics gained an increasing importance within economic research 
over the last century and reviews how the gradual development of the entrepreneurship 
research field is backed in economic science. The remaining four essays study different 
issues on entrepreneurship dynamics, using a large longitudinal matched employer-
employee dataset for Portugal.  
The second and third essays consider the individual as the unit of analysis. The 
second paper studies the entry and exit dynamics of over 157,000 individuals who leave 
paid employment and become business-owners during the period 1992-2007. The 
contribution of this essay is two-fold: first, it evaluates how particular past experiences in 
the labor market influence the entry and exit decisions of nascent business-owners;  
second, it pays attention to the heterogeneous nature of business-owners and tries to 
explain their different modes of entry and exit.  
The third essay analyzes learning by doing and self-selection effects among serial 
entrepreneurs, using a novel empirical strategy based on continuous time duration models 
with selection. After identifying about 220,000 individuals who have left their first 
entrepreneurial experience and over 35,000 ex-business-owners who reenter again and 
become serial entrepreneurs, the study evaluates whether entrepreneurial experience 
acquired in the previous business improves serial entrepreneurs’ survival, after taking 
into account self-selection issues. 
The fourth and fifth essays focus on start-up firms, particularly on spin-offs. The 
fourth essay compares the survival of pushed and pulled spin-offs, taking into account a 
set of start-up conditions where they may differ. The analysis covers 50,656 spin-offs 
entering during the period 1992-2007 and uses novel multivariate decomposition 
techniques applied to hazard models to decompose the pushed-pulled survival gap into 
differences in endowments and differences in effects.  
Finally, the fifth essay investigates how spin-offs’ employment growth, worker 
flows and survival are associated to their initial human capital endowments. The study 
focuses on three measures of human capital at entry – workers’ average skills, their skill 
dispersion and the share of co-workers in the initial workforce –, and measures workers’ 
skills through a multidimensional skill index that takes into account both observed and 
unobserved characteristics of the worker.  
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Economics and the invisible entrepreneur:
Tracing the path towards a new research
eld
Essay 1
May 30, 2014
Abstract
For long time, the entrepreneur was an invisible gure in the eco-
nomics literature. The theoretical rm remained entrepreneurless,
and the terms entrepreneur and entrepreneurship were virtu-
ally nonexistent in the leading graduate textbooks in micro, macro
and industrial organization. From the early 20th century onwards,
owing to the works of some key economists on the importance of
entrepreneurship phenomena, the entrepreneur has gained a more
relevant space in economics. This paper thus aims at contribut-
ing to both economics and entrepreneurship literature, by outlining
how the gradual development of the entrepreneurship research eld
is backed in economic science. Firstly, we provide a wider vision
on the economists necessity, over the last century, to include the
entrepreneur gure as a potential explanatory agent of several eco-
nomic phenomena. Secondly, by identifying the footprints of some
key economists in subsequent developments of the eld, we explore
how the economists(re)discovery of the entrepreneur during the last
century may have worked as a platform to gradually develop a new,
and increasingly independent, institutionalized and recognized eld
of research.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Entrepreneur, Economics, Eco-
nomic Thought
JEL Codes: B1; L26
1
(. . . ) one can say of the role of the entrepreneur in the main-
stream mathematical writings of the rm much what Mark Twain
said of the weather  everyone talks about the subject but no one
does anything about it. Every economist surely must be prepared to
concede that entrepreneurs are (even if for reasons not fully spec-
ied) of great importance. But in standard microtheory they are
completely invisible.Baumol (2003: 57)
1 Introduction
Most people who are not economists would probably expect to nd economics
literature full of analyses of entrepreneurship, as economics is, in fact, the
social science that deals most directly with contemporary economic reality.
However, for long time economics literature had relatively little to say about
entrepreneurship. Rewording Baumol (2010: 11), the really important part
of the story of economic well-being. . . was exorcised from the (theoretical) lit-
erature. Despite the early attempts of Richard Cantillon to recognize the role
of the entrepreneur gure to economic phenomena early in the 18th century,
the entrepreneur had virtually disappeared from mainstream economics by the
end of the 19th century (Baumol, 1993, 2010).
The theorys failure to include the entrepreneur in the mathematical rep-
resentations of economic reality was a consequence of the extreme simplifying
assumptions of neoclassical models, where all agents had perfect information
and their economic objectives were clearly stated (Casson, 2003; Bianchi and
Henrekson, 2005; Montanye, 2006). These assumptions, which reduced the
economic process to clocklike mechanics, overlooked the need for specialized
individuals to perform the discovery, coordination, decision-making and risk-
bearing functions (Schumpeter, 1934; Barreto, 1989; Landström, 2005). As
a result, the rm was assumed to run itself, leaving no room for the entre-
preneur in those models (van Praag, 1999). The theoretical rm has, thus,
remained entrepreneurless for long time (Bianchi and Henrekson, 2005), which
was compared to a performance of Hamlet with the Danish prince missing
in the words of Baumol (1968: 66).
As a natural consequence  and conrming that the ideas that cannot
be modeled formally tend to be ignored in economics (Bianchi and Henrek-
3
son, 2005) the terms entrepreneurand entrepreneurshipare practically
nonexistent in the leading graduate textbooks in micro, macro and industrial
organization (Johansson, 2004). However, this neglect of the entrepreneur was
often alleged to be a source of embarrassment to economists (Cosgel, 1996), as
the importance of the entrepreneur in the real world became more and more
di¢ cult to ignore (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).
From the early 20th century onwards, there was a renaissanceof the en-
trepreneur gure within economics and academics started to look at entrepre-
neurship phenomena through di¤erent perspectives. Almost all the branches
of economics had something to say about the entrepreneur and his respective
importance for some economic problem. Even so, there is, perhaps, no other
area of economic analysis where there still is less agreement than on the en-
trepreneurship denition, the identication of the entrepreneur gure and the
nature of the entrepreneurial function.
In economic thought literature, we already nd valuable interpretations of
the ideas of particular economists about the entrepreneur gure (see, for in-
stance, Martin, 1979; Kanbur, 1980; Santarelli and Pesciarelli, 1990) or even
about the reasons behind the entrepreneurs disappearance from mainstream
economic analysis (e.g., Barreto, 1989; Cosgel, 1996; Casson, 2003). Nonethe-
less, a deeper knowledge about how the entrepreneur (re)entered into eco-
nomics through its several branches, and how the economists (re)discovery
of the invisible entrepreneur may have worked as a platform to build an in-
creasingly autonomous and recognized eld of research, is still lacking in the
literature.
This paper, thus, aims at contributing to both economics and entrepre-
neurship literature, by outlining how the gradual development of the entrepre-
neurship research eld is backed in economic science. More than focusing on
4
particular visions of specic authors, or confronting similar or opposing views
of di¤erent authors, this paper tries to, rstly, provide a wider vision on the
economistsnecessity, over the last century, to include the entrepreneur gure
as a potential explanatory agent of several economic phenomena and, secondly,
explore how early economistsresearch on entrepreneurship topics might have
contributed to develop a new, and increasingly independent, institutionalized
and recognized eld of research.1
The following sections of the paper are organized as follows. As a starting
point, section 2 pays homage to some of the most inuential economists who
helped to bring the entrepreneur back into economics over the 20th century,
summarizing their main ideas and contributions in this regard. Section 3 goes
through the main economics elds where the (re)discovery of the entrepre-
neur gure was most remarkable namely Labor Economics; Microeconomics
and Industrial Organization; and Macroeconomics, more precisely Economic
Growth and Development searching for the rationality to include the entre-
preneur gure into the analyses of some economic problems. Section 4 provides
a brief bibliometric analysis in order to provide a more quantitative overview
of the evolution of entrepreneurship research and to highlight its roots in eco-
nomics. More than showing the growing relevance of entrepreneurship research
in economics journals, we identify the footprints of some key economists in
subsequent developments of the eld, besides uncovering the main signs of in-
creasing institutionalization of entrepreneurship as an academic eld. Section
5 concludes.
1By an "increasing (...) institutionalized (...) eld of research" we mean the development
of an institutional infrastructure that comprises new institutes and foundations promoting
research on entrepreneurship, new journals and outlets attracting and publishing entrepre-
neurship studies, and emerging mechanisms that recognize and reward individual research
on entrepreneurship topics (see also Aldrich, 2012).
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2 Economists founding fathers of entrepreneur-
ship research
There are few issues in economics which are backed up by such a rich historical
knowledge base as entrepreneurship (van Praag, 1999). The crucial role of the
entrepreneur in economic theory was rst and foremost recognized in the 18th
century by Richard Cantillon (1755, 1931), who became the founding father
of the ideas that subsequent economists explored. Cantillon recognized that
discrepancies between demand and supply in a market create opportunities
for buying cheaply and selling at a higher price, and that this sort of arbi-
trage would bring equilibrium to the competitive market. People who took
advantage of these unrealized prot opportunities, even under the lack of per-
fect foresight of future impacts, were called entrepreneurs(Landström, 2005;
Hébert and Link, 2006).
After Cantillon, throughout the 19th century, a number of economists recog-
nized the merit of entrepreneurial activity and of the entrepreneur gure, in
particular Mill, Say and Marshall (see, for instance, van Praag (1999) for a
more detailed survey of these classic views on entrepreneurship). Nevertheless,
even if the entrepreneurs appearance was frequent in the writings of classical
economists, he remained a shadowy entity without clearly dened form and
function, for whom there was no room in economic theories, namely in the the-
oretical rm (Baumol, 2010). In consequence, by the end of the 19th century,
the entrepreneur had virtually disappeared from the sphere of economic de-
bates and mainstream economics (Baumol, 1968; Swedberg, 2000; Landström
et al., 2012).
However, the reason for this disregard of the entrepreneur by economists
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was not a denial of his relevance for economic development, or for the orga-
nization of economic activity, but mainly the methodological di¢ culties asso-
ciated to the lack of analytical tractability of the entrepreneur gure and his
function(s) (Bianchi and Henrekson, 2005). Accordingly, from the early 20th
century onwards, a number of valuable e¤orts were made in order to infuse
some life to the "invisible entrepreneur" in the several branches of economics.
Hébert and Link (1989) suggest that the taxonomy of entrepreneurial the-
ories in economics can be condensed into three major intellectual backgrounds
German, Chicago and Austrian traditions each one tracing its origin to
Richard Cantillon. Within each of them, we emphasize the contributions of
Joseph Schumpeter, Frank Knight and Israel Kirzner, respectively. Addition-
ally, we highlight the noteworthy work of William Baumol, who has been
struggling over the most recent decades to develop a framework for introduc-
ing entrepreneurship into mainstream microeconomic theory. We may sus-
pect that without these contributions and confronts of ideas, entrepreneurship
would have not get its deserved space in economics.
2.1 Joseph Schumpeter
In the words of Reisman (2004: 3), Schumpeter means entrepreneurship. In
The Theory of Economic Development (1934), he unveiled his own concept
of entrepreneurship by giving a particular role to the entrepreneur gure in
the innovation process. The entrepreneur was, thus, treated as endogeneous
for the rst time. For Schumpeter, the economic system was regarded as a
closed circular ow where the stationary equilibrium was attained through the
continuous reiteration of the ows between buyers and sellers. Development, in
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turn, was understood as a dynamic process that would require the disruption
of the economic status quo the so-called creative destruction.
Basically, Schumpeter realized that economic growth and development re-
sulted not from capital accumulation, but from innovation and new combi-
nations(Landström, 2005; Hébert and Link, 2006). This fundamental role of
innovating through the introduction of new products, markets or methods of
production was given to the entrepreneur, who became responsible for the dis-
turbance of the equilibrium in the economy. Precisely, he defended that the
carrying out of new combinations we call enterprise; the individual whose
function is to carry them out we call entrepreneurs(1934: 74).
In summary, for Schumpeter, entrepreneurship was the expression of the
human impulse to be creative (Khalil, 2007), the prime endogeneous cause of
change (or, more precisely, development) in the economic system (van Praag,
1999), and, consequently, the source of permanent disequilibrium (i.e., crises)
(Shane, 2003). Shumpeterian entrepreneurial rewards, however, are not per-
manent, owing from the temporary monopoly rents that eventually arise
from the successful introduction of those new combinations of ideas and
resources. Following the same reasoning, entrepreneurship was understood by
Schumpeter as a temporary condition for any person, unless s/he keeps on
innovating.
2.2 Frank Knight
After Schumpeter, Frank Knight (1921) stimulated one of the pioneer economic
approaches of entrepreneurship of the 20th century. With his thesis Risk,
Uncertainty and Prot, strongly inspired by Cantillon (Hébert and Link, 2006),
he stressed the distinction between risk, uncertainty and true uncertainty,
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defending that entrepreneurship is mainly characterized by action under true
uncertainty.2
In few words, the Knightian entrepreneur is the uncertainty-bearer and the
judgmental decision-maker that assumes the uninsurable business hazard (van
Praag, 1999). Opportunities arise out of the uncertainty related to change
and entrepreneurs are assumed to receive a return for making decisions under
conditions of true uncertainty (Landström et al., 2012). Knights insights,
hence, inuenced many economists in their analyses of entrepreneurship as an
occupational choice problem (Parker, 1996, 2005, 2009; Montanye, 2006).
In summary, Knight and Schumpeter had clearly contrasting interpreta-
tions of the entrepreneur, as well as of the risk and uncertainty he is exposed
to. While the Knightian entrepreneur is essentially dened as the uncertainty-
bearer, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is the dynamic innovator. For Schum-
peter, risk-taking is no case an element of the entrepreneurial function (Schum-
peter, 1934: 137), and even though entrepreneurs may risk their reputation,
the direct responsibility of failure never falls on them (Martin, 1979; Kanbur,
1980).
2.3 Israel Kirzner
The Austrian School also made a notable e¤ort to introduce the entrepreneur
in mainstream economics. Restating Baumol (2003), all economists recognized
the importance of entrepreneurship, but until the work of the Austrians, little
2According to Knight (1921), risk exists when outcomes are uncertain but can be pre-
dicted with some probability, being insurable; uncertainty arises when the probability of
outcomes cannot be calculated; true uncertainty, instead, occurs when the future is not
only unknown, but also unknowable with unclassiable instances and a non-existent distri-
bution of outcomes.
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was done about it. Early inspired by the Knightian uncertainty, the Austri-
ansview on entrepreneurship (e.g., von Mises, 1949; Menger, 1950; Kirzner,
1973) also defended that the entrepreneurs success or failure depends on the
precision of his anticipation of uncertain events. Therefore, entrepreneurial
prots would be the result of entrepreneursability to anticipate better than
other people the future demand of consumers(von Mises, 1949: 290).
Later, Kirzner (1973, 1997), one of von Mises students, introduced the
key concepts of spontaneous learningand alertness, two requirements for
the entrepreneurial discoveryto occur. He explored the entrepreneurial el-
ement in a Crusoe situation (Kirzner, 1979: 168-169) in order to illustrate
both concepts as Robinson Crusoe (and every entrepreneur) becomes aware
of his so-called entrepreneurial vision, he learns. However, this learning is not
planned, but subconscious, and the state of mind that enables this sponta-
neous learningabout the unrecognized entrepreneurial vision (what Kirzner
calls the "subconscious hunch") is alertness. This refers to an attitude of
receptiveness and preparedness to recognize unnoticed or unexploited prof-
itable exchange (i.e., arbitrage) opportunities, corroborating the importance
of the entrepreneurs information-transformingfunction already defended by
Hayek (1948).
In addition, for the Austrian School, the opportunities for entrepreneurial
prot are only available in disequilibrium, and the attainment of market equi-
librium requires entrepreneurial action (Kirzner, 1971; Hébert and Link, 1989;
Casson 2005; Endres and Woods, 2006; Khalil, 2007). Hence, the Austrian
entrepreneur understood as the equilibrating force in the economic system
 is the antithesis of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who instead destroys
the equilibrium and moves the economy towards a higher equilibrium position
(Shane, 2003).
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2.4 Towards a theory of entrepreneurship William
Baumol
After the insights of Schumpeter, Knight and Kirzner (among others), the
importance of the entrepreneur became more and more di¢ cult to ignore in
economics. The peak of the discussion was achieved by William Baumol in a
highly inuential article published in the American Economic Review, in 1968.
His often quoted observation that the theoretical rm is entrepreneurless 
the Prince of Denmark has been expunged from the discussion of Hamlet
(Baumol, 1968: 66) became the classic statement of the gap in economic theory
regarding the (in)attention paid to the entrepreneur gure.
Baumols view on entrepreneurship pays homage to the insights of Schum-
peter, namely on his ideas about the entrepreneur as an innovator and as the
potential source of disequilibrium. Throughout his career, Baumol has urged
the economists to pay attention to the instrumental role of entrepreneurship in
economic renewal and growth (Elliasson and Henrekson, 2004), which may be
both positive (productive) and negative (destructive), depending on the social
benets of entrepreneursinnovations (Baumol, 1990, 1993, 2003).
This led Baumol to work for years on the incentives under which judgmen-
tal decision-making takes place, with special reference to the issue of how far
rent-seekingdominates entrepreneurial motivation under perverse incentive
systems (Casson, 2005). His most recent works have been emphasizing the
need for the correct incentives and the right institutional environment to pro-
mote productive and creative entrepreneurship understood as the ultimate
determinant of economic growth (Baumol, 2010).
Over the most recent decades, Baumol has succeeded where many gener-
ations of economists since Richard Cantillon have failed nding the entre-
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preneurs rightful place in economic theory. The last chapter of his recent
book The Microtheory of Innovative Entrepreneurship, published in 2010,
perfectly summarizes his achievement Yes, the theory of entrepreneurship is
on its way.
3 (Re)Discovering the invisible entrepreneur
in di¤erent elds of economics
During the second half of the 20th century, many other economists started
paying an increasing attention to the entrepreneurship phenomena. In this
section, we highlight three economics elds where the entrepreneur has been
gaining a more relevant space over time  labor economics, microeconomics
and industrial organization, and nally macroeconomics, particularly economic
growth and development. In each case, we identify a di¤erent unit of analysis
the individual entrepreneur, the entrepreneurial rm and the entrepreneurial
function, respectively. Relying on the occupational, structural and functional
approaches proposed by Klein (2008), we summarize the main paths through
which the entrepreneur has been gaining ground in each of the aforementioned
elds of economic research over the last decades.
3.1 Labor Economics the occupational approach
Greater e¤orts to formally include the entrepreneur in economic models be-
came more visible from the late 1970s onwards, rstly by focusing the attention
on the individual deciding between remaining employed (or eventually unem-
ployed) and becoming self-employed (Parker, 2009: 31). Entrepreneurship
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was, hence, rst understood as a matter of choice, an activity where individu-
als work for themselves and trade-o¤ risks and returns, rather than opting for
safer revenues in a di¤erent occupation typically, paid employment.3
It was mainly Frank Knight and his concepts of risk and uncertainty that
motivated economistsattention to the problem of the individual to be or
not to be an entrepreneur, considering that every entrepreneurial decision is
risky and that individuals must respond to the risk-adjusted relative earn-
ings opportunities associated with employment and self-employment (Evans,
1949; Parker, 1996, 2005, 2009). The rst occupational choice models, thus,
emerged, using the prospective entrepreneur as the unit of analysis and as-
suming homogeneous agents an assumption later relaxed in order to account
for individualsheterogeneity in entrepreneurial ability or risk attitudes. Lu-
cas (1978), Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979) and Holmes and Schmitz (1990)
were among the classic occupational choice models forming the foundations
of entrepreneurship as an occupational choice problem in economic theory,
particularly in labor economics.
Using individuals skills (in particular, innate entrepreneurial ability) as
the source of individual-level heterogeneity, Lucas (1978) established that
the less talented individuals remain as employees, while the most able (i.e.,
those positioned above a certain ability threshold level) become entrepreneurs.
Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979), inspired by Knight, instead modeled entrepre-
neurial choice as a trade-o¤ between higher returns with greater levels of risk,
and safer but lower earnings. By assuming that individuals are heterogeneous
in their risk aversion, they predicted that more risk-averse individuals become
3These ideas on occupational choice problems had some roots in Roys (1951) sectoral
choice model, according to which people predict the earnings on two alternative sectors and
choose the one that provides a higher utility.
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employees, while more risk-tolerant agents enter entrepreneurship.
Holmes and Schmitz (1990), in turn, assessed the circumstances under
which an entrepreneur should continue operating a venture or transfer it to
a possibly less able entrepreneur in order to release time and resources to
explore new opportunities. Individuals were, over again, assumed to be het-
erogeneous in their ability, which a¤ects the survival of new ventures. Their
seminal results postulate that the least able individuals manage existing rms,
while the most able ones specialize in setting up new businesses. Those with
intermediate ability are indi¤erent between managing the business they have
started and replacing them by higher quality businesses acquired from more
able entrepreneurs.
Subsequent contributions, besides formalizing the occupational choice of
heterogeneous individuals, have also started analyzing potential factors inu-
encing such decision. The role of credit rationing and nancial constraints was
one of the rst real forces that economists tried to introduce in their models
on entrepreneursentry (see, for instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), de Meza
and Webb (1987) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989)). In summary, all these
models were crucial to stimulate the economistsinterest on particular ques-
tions such as why do some people become entrepreneurs and others do not
(see, for instance, Blanchower and Oswald, 1998; Blanchower, 2000; Parker,
1996, 2009).
3.2 Microeconomics and Industrial Organization the
structural approach
Alongside the increasing attention devoted to the entrepreneur, microecono-
mists and industrial organization (IO) specialists also started to be concerned
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with the entrepreneurs rm itself, namely with its success, survival and growth.
More than looking at the entrepreneurs as those who leave paid employment
(or unemployment) to create their own job, run risks and exploit a (poten-
tially protable) business opportunity, the economic literature also started to
see the entrepreneur as the small rms owner, the responsible for establish-
ing new rms and the job creator, thus having a more structural concept of
entrepreneurship in mind (Klein, 2008).
In this regard, Lucass (1978) seminal paper had a twofold inuence be-
sides calling the economistsattention to the occupational choice problem of
the entrepreneur, he also put forward the rst theory of the size distribution
of rms based on the relative endowment of entrepreneurial talents, establish-
ing that the most talented entrepreneurs employ others and end up running
the largest rms (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Since then, and also owing
to the subsequent work of Jovanovic (1982) on the post-entry evolution of
newborn rms, economics literature started to redirect the attention from the
entrepreneur to his rm.
Jovanovics (1982) model is surely amongst the most inuential studies on
rm growth and survival, by linking innovation, entry, exit and the evolution
of the industry in the same model. Entrepreneurs are assumed to have incom-
plete information at the start-up and to learn about their e¢ ciency as they
operate in the industry. Able entrepreneursrms grow and survive, while
those owned by less able entrepreneurs decline and fail. In line with Lucas
(1978), Jovanovic showed that rm size and entrepreneurial talent are not in-
dependent. His results propose that rms di¤er in size not because of any
xed capital accumulation per se, but due to some learning that they are more
e¢ cient (and owned by more talented entrepreneurs) than others. Jovanovics
premises that newer and smaller rms have higher and more variable growth
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rates, and also higher exit rates than older and larger rms, have also opened
the doors to the entrepreneur and his rm(s) in IO.
By that time, the rst signs of the declining interest in the entrepreneurs
personal characteristics and intentions became evident, in favor of a growing
focus on their outcomes at the rm and industry-levels, the contextual aspects
surrounding entrepreneursentry and the entrepreneurial process itself (Land-
ström, 2005; Landström et al., 2012). Gartner (1988) explicitly claimed that
Who is the entrepreneur?was the wrong question and that there were more
relevant and unanswered questions as How are new organizations created?.
The economic context of the late 1970s, namely the twin oil crises after
which many large companies were hit by severe economic di¢ culties, being
gradually understood as inexible and slow to adjust to new market condi-
tions (Landström, 2005: 48) has also motivated the discussion around small
rms and entrepreneurship more than ever.
In addition, the pivotal work of David Birch The Job Generation Process
(1979) , proposing that the majority of new jobs were created by young rms
with twenty or less employees, was published under this turbulent environ-
ment. This report, only sold in twelve copies, had a huge inuence both on
policy makers and the research community, providing the intellectual foun-
dation for researchers throughout the world to incorporate smaller rms into
their analyses of industrial evolution and economic development. Margaret
Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US also contributed to this shift
in the economistsmindset, by changing their political ideology and pursuing
policies strongly in favor of small business and entrepreneurship (Landström,
2005; Landström et al., 2012). Accordingly, besides innovators, risk-takers
and arbitrageurs, entrepreneurs started being viewed as job creators and small
businessesowners as well.
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New areas of interest emerged after the second half of the 1980s. The
relationship between entrepreneurship, innovation, industrial dynamics and
job creation started to dominate the public debate. The increasing access to
rm-level data contributed to the development of Empirical Industrial Orga-
nization (Einav and Levin, 2010), where entrepreneurship started occupying
a greater room over the most recent decades.4 Policy-oriented work on en-
trepreneurship and small businessesdynamics (e.g., Storey, 1994; Storey and
Tether, 1998; van Stel et al., 2007; Audretsch et al. 2007) and the relation-
ship between small rms and innovation (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1988, 1990)
were among the most common entrepreneurship-related topics under a more
structural approach over the subsequent decades.
3.3 Macroeconomics: Economic Growth and Develop-
ment the functional approach
A third line of analysis has been rather concerned with the entrepreneurial
function as the basis for economic change and progress. Since Schumpeter
(1934), the entrepreneur emerged as the persona causa of economic develop-
ment (Hébert and Link, 1989; Santarelli and Pesciarelli, 1990). Among the
several proles attributed to the entrepreneur gure, two main functions had
been highlighted as the key ones linking entrepreneurship to economic growth
and development innovation and the creation of new rms and jobs. First,
by innovating and transforming inventions and ideas into economically vi-
able products and services, entrepreneurs were expected to push technological
4Meanwhile, entrepreneurshipentered the list of Journal of Economic Literature (JEL)
classication system and was precisely included in the sub-eld Industrial Organization
(L26-Entrepreneurship).
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progress, promote growth and improve economic development (e.g., Wennekers
and Thurik, 1999). Second, by founding and operating new businesses even
if there is nothing innovative in these acts the entrepreneur was also expected
to create value and new jobs, intensify competition and potentially increase
productivity, which in turn may impact positively on the overall economy (e.g.,
Acs, 2006).
However, despite this widespread belief that entrepreneurship was a key
factor in economic growth and development, few attempts were made to in-
corporate entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial function in particular 
in formal growth and development models until the early 1990s. Entrepre-
neurship did not t in theoretical neoclassical growth models not only because
perfect competition assumptions implied that there was no prot opportuni-
ties for entrepreneurs left, but also because the models of general equilibrium
did not take into account the dynamics of the Schumpeterian i.e., innovator
entrepreneur (Schmitz, 1989; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).
Endogenous growth theory has created new possibilities for tting entre-
preneurship (or entrepreneurial activities) into growth models, namely by em-
phasizing the role of knowledge and innovation for the growth of nations (e.g.,
Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988). Knowledge externalities and increasing re-
turns to scale were two of the key cornerstones of those new endogeneous
growth models. These two processes appeared as a black box in the main-
stream growth theory, which did not go very far toward illuminating the
process by which knowledge externalities produce growth, or by which in-
creasing returns can be manifested in the production process. The discovery
of the crucial entrepreneurs functions in the market process thus lled this
gap (Holcombe, 1998; Acs et al., 2004).
More precisely, knowledge and innovation spillovers were recognized to not
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befall automatically, requiring instead some channel(s) through which they
could work and promote growth. Some mechanism was necessary to serve as
a conduit for the spillover to occur. Hence, the entrepreneurial function in
particular, entrepreneursinnovation and start-up activities started being in-
troduced in endogeneous growth models. Entrepreneurs, by being responsible
for the conversion of knowledge into economically relevant knowledge, were
thus declared to be the missing link in earlier models (Acs et al., 2004, 2009).
Schmitz (1989) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) provided key advances by that
time. The former developed a theory where the activity of entrepreneurs and
particularly the activities of imitating, rather than innovating was shown to
drive the growth of nations. The latter, instead, showed that industrial in-
novations conducted by entrepreneurs, by leading to quality improvements of
products, were the key channel to induce progress and growth in the economy.
In summary, incorporating entrepreneurship into the framework of eco-
nomic growth helped to develop endogeneous growth theory mainly by shed-
ding some light on the nature of increasing returns to scale, knowledge exter-
nalities and the role of human capital. Knowledge externalities arise when the
entrepreneurial insights of some individuals produce entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities for others; increasing returns occur because the more entrepreneurial
activity an economy displays, the more entrepreneurial opportunities it creates
(e.g., Holcombe, 1998). Moreover, the new focus on entrepreneurship pushed
the economic growth theory forward, towards the institutional setting within
which growth occurs (Baumol, 1990), and away from neoclassical theories that
focused on production processinputs, as labor and capital.
Entrepreneurship is already considered one of the key growth components
in new growth theory(e.g., Audretsch et al., 2006; Henrekson, 2005). More
recent concerns on the entrepreneurship-growth relationship have been related
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to the quality of the entrepreneurship. Some of the latest extensions to existing
models have been suggesting the need to encourage high-ability entrepreneurs,
as low quality entrepreneurship is argued to retard growth (e.g., Jiang et al.,
2010; Jaimovich, 2010). These new results stress the need to provide the right
incentives to the most able entrepreneurs, in order to promote productive and
growth-enhancing entrepreneurship, and avoid unproductive or even destruc-
tive entrepreneurial activities, in line with Baumol (1990, 2010).
4 Tracing the recent development of Entre-
preneurship research
This section provides a brief quantitative overview of the evolution of entre-
preneurship research over the last decades, highlighting its roots in Economics.
The analysis is based on thousands of articles from Scopus database published
since the early 1970s and explores: i) how entrepreneurship topics have been
achieving their space in Economics academic research over the years; ii) how
the insights of some of the economists founding fathersof the entrepreneur
have remained inuent in more recent entrepreneurship research; and iii) how
fragmented entrepreneurship research currently is as a new research eld.
4.1 Entrepreneurship research in Economics journals
According to Landström et al. (2012), the recent evolution of entrepreneur-
ship research can be described in three phases: a rst take-o¤ phase during
the 80s, a second growth phase after the early 1990s, and a nal phase mainly
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characterized by a search for the maturity of the eld since the early 2000s.
In order to illustrate this evolution, we started by performing a search in the
Scopus database, by requiring the appearance of, at least, one of the following
words or expressions in the publicationstitle, abstract and/or keywords: en-
trepreneur, entrepreneurship, small rm, start-up, self-employment,
new ventureand new rm.5 This allowed us to identify a total of 42,593
articles published between 1970 and 2013. Out of these, 15,701 belong to the
Scopus subject area Economics, Econometrics and Finance (or 8,444 arti-
cles if we exclude those who are also classied in Business, Management and
Accounting).6
Figure 1.1 illustrates the overall evolution of the total number of articles
satisfying the criteria imposed in the search, both in absolute and relative
terms. Figure 1.2 provides comparable data for the subject area of Eco-
nomics, Econometrics and Finance. Overall, we conrm that, despite the
early e¤orts of a signicant number of economists to claim for more atten-
tion to the entrepreneur gure, research on entrepreneurship topics remained
5Despite this seems to be somewhat restrictive, by imposing these criteria on the search
process we are allowing to capture two particular aspects. First, by using these di¤erent
combinations of keywords, it is more likely to include a wider number of studies using di¤er-
ent denitions of entrepreneurship. As previously discussed, many studies have been linking
entrepreneurship either to self-employed individuals (i.e., the entrepreneur in particular),
or to the entrepreneurial rm which is commonly understood as being a small rm, a
start-up or a new venture, or even to innovation activities conducted by entrepreneurs and
their rms. Besides this, it is possible that di¤erent Economics elds give a di¤erent rel-
ative importance to these di¤erent perceptions of the entrepreneurship phenomenon (for
instance, IO may be more concerned with the new/start-up rm, while Labor Economics
may be more focused on the entrepreneur in particular), so by imposing these wider criteria
we try to avoid a potential overrepresentation of one of these visions about entrepreneurship.
Second, by imposing these keywords to appear in the publicationstitle, abstract and/or
keywords, we are increasing the probability of collecting the publications that are really
dealing with entrepreneurship topic, thus minimizing the inclusion of marginal publications
(i.e., publications whose main focus is not directly related to entrepreneurship phenomena).
6These results were last accessed in February 2014.
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relatively scarce until the late 1980s.
After the mid-90s, we observe a boomin entrepreneurship research, over-
all and in Economics journals in particular. By 2000, around 1,400 articles
fullling the criteria described above were published (about 300 in Economics
journals). Ten years later, the respective numbers had already doubled. More
than 4,000 articles (almost 800 in Economics journals) were published only in
2013.
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Fig. 1.1. Evolution of entrepreneurship research in absolute and relative
terms - All Subject Areas (42,593 articles)
In relative terms, we also conrm that entrepreneurship topics have been
occupying a more relevant space in academic research, and especially in Eco-
nomics. By the early 80s, the articles focused on entrepreneurship topics
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accounted for less than 1% of all publications in Economics journals. In most
recent years, about 4% of all Economics articles have been concerned with
the entrepreneurship phenomena, a much more signicant share than that
observed in other areas (see Figure 1.1).
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Fig 1.2. Evolution of entrepreneurship research in absolute and relative
terms - Economics, Econometrics and Finance (8,444 articles)
Table 1 reports the journals identied in Scopus database publishing the
largest number of articles on entrepreneurship since 1970. The leading Eco-
nomics journal publishing on entrepreneurship is Small Business Economics
(SBE), a journal founded by David Audretsch and Zoltan Acs in the late 1980s.
SBE has become one of the outlets of recognized reputation for researchers in-
terested in entrepreneurship topics, currently presenting a broad scope that
includes multiple analyses and perspectives of entrepreneurship phenomena.
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The foundation of SBE is actually recognized as one of the rst signs of the
gradual institutionalization of entrepreneurship as a eld of research (Land-
ström et al., 2012).
Table 1. Economics journals publishing more papers on entrepreneurship
Journal Total # Articles Share
Small Business Economics 503 6.0%
Journal of Banking and Finance 220 2.6%
World Development 205 2.4%
Industrial and Corporate Change 193 2.3%
International Journal of Industrial Organization 145 1.7%
Applied Economics 137 1.6%
European Economic Review 134 1.6%
Economics Letters 124 1.5%
Journal of International Economics 116 1.4%
Journal of Development Economics 110 1.3%
Journal of Public Economics 100 1.2%
Applied Economics Letters 97 1.1%
Journal of Comparative Economics 79 0.9%
Total 2163 25.6%
Notes: All articles (8,444) published in 1970-2013, in the Scopus category Economics,
Econometrics and Finance(excluding Business, Management and Accounting), with at
least one of the following expressions in their title, abstract or keywords: entrepreneur,
entrepreneurship, small rm, start-up, self-employment, new venture, new rm.
Besides SBE and some general-interest journals (as Applied Economics,
EER and Economics Letters), we identify a number of more specialized jour-
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nals particularly in the areas of economic development (e.g., World Develop-
ment and JDE), industrial organization (e.g., ICC and IJIO) and even nance
(namely the Journal of Banking and Finance) and international economics 
accounting for a signicant part (over 25%) of the entrepreneurship research
published in Economics journals over the last decades.
Table 2 complements these data and summarizes the total number of ar-
ticles on entrepreneurship published, so far, in some highly ranked general-
interest Economics journals, as well as in some relevant eld journals.7 The
results conrm that entrepreneurship questions have deserved signicant at-
tention within top academic journals, as American Economic Review, Review
of Economics and Statistics, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic
Theory and Quarterly Journal of Economics, among others. Even during the
last decade, a very signicant number of articles dealing with entrepreneurship
issues were published in these journals, conrming that the entrepreneur g-
ure, the entrepreneurial rm and/or the entrepreneurial function have, nally,
found its deserved space in mainstream Economics journals.
At the same time, since the early 2000s a number of specialized Economics
journals started to pay a greater attention to entrepreneurship. Development
Economics and IO journals have played a prominent role, with Labor Eco-
nomics journals somewhat lagging behind. These patterns may actually con-
rm the aforementioned shift in the economists research interests from the
individual entrepreneur towards the entrepreneurial rm and the aggregate
outcomes of entrepreneurial process.
7Among the journals identied in Scopus database, we tried to identify both general-
ist and specialized highly ranked-journals following some of the most known international
rankings, as Thompson Reuters JCR Impact Factor, ISI Web of Science h-index and SJR
(SCImago Journal & Country Rank).
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Table 2. Top Economics journals publishing on Entrepreneurship
(generalist and specialized/eld journals)
Selective Top Journals # Papers 1970-2013 # Papers 2000-2013
Journal of Economic Theory 73 45
Economic Journal 52 40
Review of Economics and Statistics 46 39
American Economic Review 42 36
Review of Economic Studies 40 33
Economic Theory 37 31
Quarterly Journal of Economics 31 25
Journal of Political Economy 27 22
Econometrica 18 17
Labor Economics Journals
Labour Economics 45 37
Journal of Labor Economics 33 20
Industrial Organization Journals
Industrial and Corporate Change 193 152
J. of Econ. Behavior & Organization 155 96
Intern. J. of Industrial Organization 145 72
Review of Industrial Organization 111 68
RAND Journal of Economics 69 52
Journal of Industrial Economics 61 51
Macroeconomics and Economic Development Journals
World Development 205 101
Journal of Development Economics 110 79
Journal of Comparative Economics 79 48
Economic Development Quarterly 76 64
Journal of Macroeconomics 38 26
Developing Economies 14 13
Notes: The rst column reports the total number of articles published in each journal,
out of the 8,444 articles included in the Scopus category Economics, Econometrics and
Finance(excluding Business, Management and Accounting). The total number of articles
published since 2000 in the same category (last column) was 6,658.
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Finally, Figure 2 summarizes the main keywords of the entrepreneurship
publications identied in Scopus database since the early 70s.8 As expected,
Entrepreneurshipand Entrepreneurare two of the most frequent keywords
of those publications, conrming that the criteria that we impose in the search
is mostly picking up those publications closely related to entrepreneurship
topics either in a more occupational approach, or following a more structural
or functional approach. Actually, the three approaches discussed above seem
to be clearly identied.
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Fig. 2. Top keywords of economics articles on entrepreneurship
8The analysis is based on 12,686 articles classied in the category Economics, Econo-
metrics and Finance, published between 2000 and 2013. Almost half of these articles are
also classied into the category Business, Management and Accounting. The overall pat-
tern of the main topics and keywords covered remains qualitatively unchanged when we
exclude them from the database.
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The high frequency of particular keywords as self-employmentor human
capital/educationindicates the existence of a line of research mainly focused
on the individual, the entrepreneurs traits and the occupational choice prob-
lem of the prospective entrepreneur, thus conrming the strong presence of
the occupational approach in the economistsanalyses of entrepreneurship
phenomena. The great incidence of the terms SMEs, rm size, em-
ployment and industrial performance, in turn, ts the more structural
approachtypically followed in IO research. The functional approachmore
frequently followed in economic development and growth studies is also evi-
dent, given the regular use of keywords as innovation, R&D, economic
developmentand economic growth.
Finally, new questions seem to have emerged over the last decades, with
di¤erent Economics elds becoming concerned with entrepreneurship phenom-
ena. From Figure 2, we would point out that Financial Economics and Interna-
tional Economics are two of the elds where such concern is becoming obvious.
While entrepreneurs or small businesses investment decisions, credit risks,
relationships with banks and venture capital funders are probably interesting
research questions for the former, the latter are surely paying an increasing
attention to born-global rms and to the internationalization of small/new
rms.
In summary, the evolving patterns identied for the last four decades leave
no doubt that entrepreneurship studies gained a considerable sway within Eco-
nomics. We nd strong concerns with the entrepreneur individually, with the
entrepreneurial rm and its nancial and global challenges, as well as with
the e¤ects of entrepreneurial action in the labor market, in industries, regions
and in the economy as a whole. Very di¤erent questions have been addressed,
very diverse approaches have been employed and, overall, entrepreneurship
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phenomena have been studied from many di¤erent angles in Economics. This
conrms the (still) high degree of fragmentation in the entrepreneurship eld
(Teixeira, 2011; Aldrich, 2012; Landström et al., 2012; Rehn et al., 2013).
4.2 The footprints of economists founding fathers in en-
trepreneurship research
From the previous discussion, we are now aware of the increasing relevance
of entrepreneurship in Economics journals. In this section, we look at overall
entrepreneurship research, in order to appraise whether and how those key
economists who, throughout the 20th century, helped to infuse some life and
to give a shape to the invisible entrepreneur, have remained inuent in more
recent developments of this new research eld. Besides the founding fathers
identied in Section 2 (Schumpeter, Knight, Kirzner and Baumol), we also
explore the inuence of Lucas, Birch and Jovanovic.
We started by analyzing the volume of articles that have been linking the
entrepreneur gure to the insights of each of those economists. Using again
Scopus database, we have identied the total number of articles, in each year,
using the term entrepreneur jointly with each authors name throughout
the article (e.g., entrepreneur AND Schumpeter; entrepreneur AND
Knight). Figure 3 illustrates the pattern identied in the search.
The results suggest that Joseph Schumpeter has been, by far, the most
inuent founding father of the entrepreneur gure, followed by Frank Knight.
The association of the entrepreneur to Israel Kirzner seems now to be as fre-
quent as the connections made to William Baumol, possibly due to Baumols
recent attempts to establish a microtheory of entrepreneurship (e.g., Bau-
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mol, 2010). Entrepreneurship research published during the last decade seems
to link the entrepreneur gure relatively less frequently to Lucas, Birch and
Jovanovic, as their insights are more recent and more focused on the entre-
preneurial rm. However, the footprints of each of these economists may be
more prominent in particular journals, in specic lines of study within en-
trepreneurship research, and among some groups of researchers, as we next
explore.
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Fig. 3. Number of articles associating the entrepreneur gure to particular
economists
Table 3 lists the ten journals publishing the largest number of articles link-
ing the entrepreneur gure to each of those key economists. In all cases, we
verify that most of the journals specialized in entrepreneurship topics are in-
cluded in this top 10, as JBV, SBE, ET&P, among others.9 The fact that
9In alternative, we have checked, whenever possible, which journals present the greatest
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the footprints of those economists are relatively more evident on these spe-
cialized journals whose foundation was relatively recent actually conrms
that entrepreneurship research has becoming an increasingly independent and
recognized eld of research with strong roots in Economics. Moreover, we ver-
ify that while the insights of some of those economists about the entrepreneur
gure are much more concentrated in journals specialized in small businesses
and entrepreneurship topics (e.g., Kirzner or Birch), the ideas of others seem to
be more dispersed across di¤erent types of journals (e.g., Lucas or Jovanovic),
thus suggesting that their seminal works have been equally important in other
elds than entrepreneurship.
Table 3. The footprints of key economists in entrepreneurship research
Journal # Articles Share
"Entrepreneur" & "Schumpeter" - 2598 articles
Journal of Business Venturing 100 3.8%
Small Business Economics 98 3.8%
Research Policy 62 2.4%
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 56 2.2%
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business 51 2.0%
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 50 1.9%
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 37 1.4%
Journal of Small Business Management 36 1.4%
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 36 1.4%
Technovation 33 1.3%
Total 559 21.5%
(It continues in the next page)
number of Scopus citations of those economistsseminal works (e.g., the Schumpeters book
The Theory of Economic Development). Despite the limitations of Scopus database to
quantify the citations of (some) books, we still verify that most of the citations of those key
economists appear in journals specialized in entrepreneurship and small businesses.
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Table 3. The footprints of key economists in entrepreneurship research
Journal # Articles Share
"Entrepreneur" & "Knight" - 1898 articles
Journal of Business Venturing 59 3.1%
Journal of International Entrepreneurship 40 2.1%
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 39 2.1%
Small Business Economics 35 1.8%
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business 34 1.8%
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 33 1.7%
International Business Review 28 1.5%
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 28 1.5%
Journal of World Business 24 1.3%
International Small Business Journal 22 1.2%
Total 342 18.0%
"Entrepreneur" & "Kirzner" - 1049 articles
Journal of Business Venturing 63 6.0%
Small Business Economics 54 5.1%
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 44 4.2%
Review of Austrian Economics 34 3.2%
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business 31 3.0%
International Small Business Journal 25 2.4%
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 24 2.3%
Journal of Management Studies 24 2.3%
Journal of Small Business Management 22 2.1%
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 19 1.8%
Total 340 32.4%
"Entrepreneur" & "Baumol" - 892 articles
Small Business Economics 66 7.4%
Journal of Business Venturing 40 4.5%
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 34 3.8%
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 22 2.5%
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business 15 1.7%
Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 14 1.6%
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 14 1.6%
(It continues in the next page)
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Table 3. The footprints of key economists in entrepreneurship research
Journal # Articles Share
Journal of Management Studies 13 1.5%
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 12 1.3%
Industrial and Corporate Change 12 1.3%
Total 242 27.1%
"Entrepreneur" & "Lucas" - 818 articles
Small Business Economics 43 5.3%
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 11 1.3%
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 10 1.2%
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10 1.2%
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business 10 1.2%
Journal of Business Venturing 9 1.1%
World Development 8 1.0%
Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 7 0.9%
Review of Economic Dynamics 7 0.9%
Industrial and Corporate Change 7 0.9%
Total 122 14.9%
"Entrepreneur" & "Birch" - 451 articles
Small Business Economics 30 6.7%
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 15 3.3%
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 14 3.1%
Journal of Business Venturing 14 3.1%
Journal of Small Business Management 13 2.9%
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business 12 2.7%
International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research 12 2.7%
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 11 2.4%
Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 11 2.4%
International Small Business Journal 10 2.2%
Total 142 31.5%
"Entrepreneur" & "Jovanovic" - 774 articles
Small Business Economics 101 13.0%
Journal of Business Venturing 28 3.6%
Industrial and Corporate Change 17 2.2%
(It continues in the next page)
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Table 3. The footprints of key economists in entrepreneurship research
Journal # Articles Share
Economic Journal 15 1.9%
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 14 1.8%
Management Science 13 1.7%
Labour Economics 13 1.7%
Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 10 1.3%
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Busines 10 1.3%
International Small Business Journal 10 1.3%
Organization Science 10 1.3%
Total 231 29.8%
A brief analysis of the keywords mostly used in each case conrm the
legacy left in terms of lines of research by each of those economists. Most
of the articles linking the entrepreneur gure to Schumpeter deal with topics
related to innovation, economic growth and development. Those relying more
on the Knightian entrepreneur frequently include uncertaintyand decision
making in their keywords. Moreover, more recent research on international
entrepreneurship, small businessesinternationalization and globalization also
seems to be inspired by Knightian uncertainty not only due to the profu-
sion of these keywords in the articles referring to the Knightian entrepreneur,
but also due to the Knightian footprints identied in journals as Journal of
International Entrepreneurship and International Business Review (see Table
3).
"Opportunity recognition", "knowledge" and "innovation" are among the
keywords of those linking the entrepreneur to Kirzner, while those stimu-
lated by Baumol typically pay attention to innovation, economic development,
growth and the importance of the institutional framework. Lucasfollowers,
in turn, are more concentrated in self-employment and occupational choice
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problems, besides their attention paid to human capital, education and labor
market issues. Last but not least, both Birchs and Jovanovics ideas about the
entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial rm seem to have stimulated new lines
of research more concerned with Small and Medium Enterprises, rm growth
and the industrial performance of small businesses.
Finally, we identify a number of authors who have been contributing to the
development of the entrepreneurship research eld and who have been rela-
tively more inspired by the insights of those key economists given the volume
of articles where they associate the entrepreneur gure to particular founding
father(s) (see Figure 4). Following the taxonomy of Landström (2005), we can
classify these authors as belonging to the Core Group of researchers, as they
became over the last decade highly productive researchers in entrepreneurship
and whose work has a substantial impact in the eld.10
Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch are two of those core researchersor
stars, as Teixeira (2011) designates in the entrepreneurship eld. Besides
the foundation of Small Business Economics journal, they have been working
for several years on small rms and innovation, as well as on regional policy and
on the role of entrepreneurship to economic growth. Their works are frequently
based on the Schumpeterian innovative entrepreneur, and their analyses
of small rms also follow the insights of more recent inuential economists as
Lucas and Jovanovic, as Figure 4 illustrates.
10According to Landström (2005: 67), the researchers who have been publishing about
entrepreneurship constitute a rather heterogeneous group, being possible to identify Ad-hoc
transients, i.e., researchers who appear only once and whose publication within the eld
of entrepreneurship is a one-o¤ event; Inuential transients, i.e. transient researchers who
appear only once, but whose work is inuential for entrepreneurship research; Craftsmen,
which are the researchers whose names tend to appear more frequently in entrepreneurship
articles, meaning that they have stayed within the eld for a longer period of time; and
nally a Core Group of high-impact researchers.
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Similarly, Roy Thurik has been mainly focused on small businesses and in-
dustrial dynamics, as well as the link between entrepreneurship and the macro
economy  thus following the approaches of several economists as Schum-
peter, Baumol, Lucas and Jovanovic. Magnus Henreksons research interests,
in turn, include the relationship between entrepreneurship, economic growth,
and structural and technical change, which justies his relatively stronger re-
liance on the ideas of Schumpeter and Baumol.
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Fig 4. Researchers from the Core Group following the footprints of key
economists
Some of these core researchers have been working on several di¤erent
questions at the same time. Maria Minnitti has been concerned with entre-
preneurs entry decision among women and minority groups, as well as with
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the relationship between entrepreneurship, economic growth and institutions,
being thus inspired by di¤erent seminal works. Scott Shane, instead, has
been working on theory building and in the conceptualization of the entre-
preneurship eld, virtually covering all major aspects of the entrepreneurship
phenomena the individual(s), the opportunity, the organizational context,
the environment and the entrepreneurial process thus relying on the insights
of many inuential economists in his works. Simon Parker, despite having
been relatively more interested in individual-level analyses of the entrepre-
neurship phenomena for long time, has been providing diverse contributions
to the development of the eld with strong roots in Economics, as his recent
book Economics of Entrepreneurship (Parker, 2009) conrms.
From our analysis, these were among the core researchersfollowing more
closely the footprints left by some of the key economists discussed throughout
the paper. A number of other starsin entrepreneurship research also seem to
frequently rely on some of those economistsviews about the entrepreneur and
the entrepreneurship phenomena. From Figure 4, we still identify the works of
Mike Wright, Dean Shepherd, Marco Vivarelli, Je¤ery McMullen, Saras Saras-
vathy and Shaker Zahra. Wrigths research has been concerned with venture
capital, buyouts, habitual entrepreneurs and related topics. Shepherds re-
search interests include entrepreneurial opportunity, entrepreneurial strategy
and the failure of entrepreneurial businesses, while McMullen and Sarasvathy
have been more concerned with the cognitive aspects of entrepreneurial action.
Vivarelli has been covering several aspects of the dynamics and the innovation
of newborn rms and, nally, Zhara has been provided important contribu-
tions on entrepreneurial knowledge and capability development in emerging
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global industries, and, more recently, on international entrepreneurship.11
The list of core researchers or stars in the entrepreneurship eld is
far from being completed, as other names would deserve to be mentioned,
as Mirjam van Praag, André van Stel, Per Davidsson, among many others.
According to Teixeira (2011), entrepreneurship is an increasingly autonomous,
legitimate and cohesive (in)visible college that may encompass from 50 (stars
and inuential) up to 99 (reasonably inuential, including some stars)
researchers. Some of them are among the winners of the Global Award for
Entrepreneurship Research, others have been emerging over the most recent
years, making the entrepreneurship eld increasingly formalized and anchored
in a small set of intellectual bases (Aldrich, 2012). One of them is certainly
Economics.
4.3 The increasing institutionalization of entrepreneur-
ship as a research eld
The growth of entrepreneurship as an academic eld has been furthermore
supported by the emergence of institutes and foundations promoting research
on entrepreneurship topics, the creation of specialized entrepreneurship jour-
nals, the establishment of research awards distinguishing academic super-
starsdoing research on entrepreneurship and small businesses, as well as the
development of high-prole conferences encouraging further research on this
subject.
11This information was collected, whenever possible, from the authorspersonal webpages
and CVs, and/or by inspection of their main publications.
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Not only scholars, but also governments and policy systems became increas-
ingly interested in entrepreneurs and small rms over the last years. In 2011,
OECD launched Entrepreneurship at a glance, a new yearly publication that
collects and discusses a number of indicators measuring the state of entrepre-
neurship around the world. European Commission has also been extremely
attentive to entrepreneurship issues, continuously developing new programs
and funding mechanisms to support small businesses and to encourage further
research on the topic.12 In the United States, Kau¤man Foundation has been
playing a crucial role over the last decades, by increasing funding and creating
new opportunities for the development of institutional structures supporting
entrepreneurship research and collecting high quality data.13 Since 2008, U.S.
Small Business Administration has also been conducting and promoting re-
search on entrepreneurship topics.
Several international institutions and research centers became aware of the
importance of entrepreneurship and started promoting research on the topic.
NBER created an Entrepreneurship Working Group in 2003, with the support
of Kau¤man Foundation, to conduct several projects related to the so-called
economics of entrepreneurship. In Europe, the ZEWs Industrial Economics
research group has been strongly involved in the study of start-ups and entre-
preneurship dynamics, promoting regular workshops and conferences on the
topic. Max Planck Institute of Economics had also a temporary research group
focused on entrepreneurship, growth and public policy, where both Zoltan Acs
and David Audretsch played key roles as founders and directors, respectively.
Some research centers specialized in entrepreneurship research have also been
12See, for example, the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Program, recently launched
under the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Program running since 2007.
13For instance, the recent e¤orts of The World Bank to construct The Entrepreneurship
Database have been highly supported by Kau¤man Foundation.
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emerging around the world, as the Center for Entrepreneurship and Public Pol-
icy in US; the LMU Entrepreneurship Center and the TUM Entrepreneurship
Research Institute, both in Germany; the Amsterdam Center for Entrepre-
neurship and the Erasmus Center for Entrepreneurship Research, both in the
Netherlands; and the Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research Institute
in Sweden, just to name a few.
As entrepreneurship research became more institutionalized and sophisti-
cated, new academic journals dedicated to entrepreneurship research started
being established from the early 80s onwards, becoming the main outlet for
entrepreneurship papers. If, in the past, there were several journals in main-
stream economics publishing about entrepreneurship issues, during the 90s
and 2000s most of them either disappeared or declined in the rankings as new
specialized journals have been founded. As Table 4 shows, at least 20 jour-
nals specialized in entrepreneurship and small businesses issues were launched
during the last three decades.
High-quality works also started being prized. The best-known award is the
Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research (early known as the International
Award for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research), granted by the
Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum since 1996. Table 5 lists the winners of
the 19 prizes bestowed so far. Some of the aforementioned founding fathers
and core researchers were already distinguished by this prize, namely Baumol,
Kirzner, Birch, Acs, Audretsch, Shane and Zahra.
Other core researchers have been contributing to the development of entre-
preneurship as an academic eld, either by highlighting the macro importance
of new and small rms (namely Storey, Reynolds, Beccatini and Sabel, Klepper
and Feldman), or for their micro-level analyses of entrepreneurship and small
businesses (in particular, Cooper, MacMillan, Aldrich, Gartner, Johannisson,
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the Diana group, Lerner and Eisenhardt). Despite, overall, they come from an
eclectic mix of disciplines (including management, sociology, political science
and psychology), the great majority of them have their roots in economics.
This conrms, once more, the signicant contribution of economic science in
the gradual development of the entrepreneurship research eld.
Table 4. Selected journals specialized in entrepreneurship research
Foundation Year Impact Factor
Journal of Small Business Managementa 1962 1.333
International Small Business Journal 1982 1.469
Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship 1983 n.a.
Journal of Business Venturing 1986 2.976
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 1988b 2.242
Small Business Economics 1989 1.130
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 1989 1.333
Journal of Entrepreneurship 1992 n.a.
Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal 1995 n.a.
Journal of Development Entrepreneurship 1996 n.a.
International Journal of Entrepreneurship 1996 n.a
Journal of Entrepreneurship Education 1997 n.a.
Int. J. of Entrepren. and Innovation Management 2001 n.a.
Journal of International Entrepreneurship 2003 n.a.
Int. J. of Entrepreneurship and Small Business 2004 n.a.
Int. Entrepren. and Management Journal 2005 5.053
Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship 2005 n.a.
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 2007 1.205
Journal of Social Entrepreneurship 2010 n.a.
Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 2012 n.a.
Notes: aJournal published on behalf of The International Council for Small Business
(ICSB). bIn 1988, the American Journal of Small Business changed its name to Entrepre-
neurship Theory & Practice. n.a.: not applicable.
In summary, entrepreneurship started out as a young  and even mar-
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ginalized eld, where a mix of economists, psychologists, geographers and
also the occasional anthropologist came together to study the wonder and
weirdness that is entrepreneurship, in a wide range of fashions and with a
few prior assumptions (Rehn et al., 2013), being thus considered to be a mere
sub-discipline of management or economics (Teixeira, 2011). Nowadays, de-
spite the eld still shows strong signs of eclecticism and fragmentation, it has
matured and became popular and increasingly institutionalized, revealing a
greater legitimacy as a valid academic research area.
Table 5. Winners of the Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research
Year Winner
1996 David Birch
1997 Arnold Cooper
1998 David Storey
1999 Ian MacMillan
2000 Howard Aldrich
2001 Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch
2002 Giacomo Becattini and Charles Sabel
2003 William Baumol
2004 Paul Reynolds
2005 William Gartner
2006 Israel Kirzner
2007 The Diana Projecta
2008 Bengt Johannisson
2009 Scott Shane
2010 Josh Lerner
2011 Steven Klepper
2012 Kathleen Eisenhardt
2013 Maryann Feldman
2014 Shaker Zahra
Notes: aThe Diana Project was composed by Candida Brush, Nancy Carter, Elizabeth
Gatewood, Patricia Greene and Myra Hart.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Entrepreneurship is a concept that has gone through many changes, devel-
oped greatly during the last decades, and achieved an exceptionally important
place both in contemporary academia and in modern public discourse (Rehn
et al., 2013). In this paper, we have reviewed the main paths through which
the entrepreneur gure entered into Economics throughout the 20th century,
outlining how the gradual development of the entrepreneurship research eld
is backed in economic science.
In spite of its rich historical base (van Praag, 1999), entrepreneurship re-
mains the phenomenon which is most emphasized but least understood by
economists (Kanbur, 1980; Montanye, 2006). Though the rst debates about
the entrepreneur gure have emerged in the 18th century, mainstream eco-
nomics and microeconomic theory in particular omitted the entrepreneur
gure for long time, leaving no room for an active entrepreneur in neoclassi-
cal models (Baumol, 1993; Johansson, 2004). However, throughout the 20th
century, the relevance of the entrepreneur became more di¢ cult to ignore, es-
pecially after a number of highly inuential economists have recognized his role
in the labor market and industry dynamics, innovation, economic development
and growth. The entrepreneur, by being endowed with creative talent and in-
nate ability (Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982), learning capacity and alertness
(Kirzner, 1979, 1997) to the protable opportunities in the market, started
being understood as the responsible for economic progress (Schumpeter, 1934)
and job creation (Birch, 1979), though facing true uncertainty and uninsurable
risks (Knight, 1921).
As a result, the entrepreneur hitherto treated as an invisible gure in
economic models  has gradually gained a more signicant space of analy-
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sis in several elds of Economics, as labor economics, industrial organization
and development economics. From the late 1970s onwards, none of these
elds remained indi¤erent to the entrepreneur gure and each of them started
studying entrepreneurship phenomena in a serious way, though from di¤erent
perspectives. Over the last two decades, entrepreneurship research not only
has experienced an exponential growth, as also became more institutionalized,
independent and legitimate. Entrepreneurship studies have gained consider-
able respect, new mechanism have emerged to recognize and reward individual
contributions to the eld, reinforcing the identity of entrepreneurship as a re-
search eld and attracting new scholars into it. Nevertheless, the footprints of
those key economists who helped to bring the entrepreneur gure back to eco-
nomic debates and economic theory, and the legacy that they left in terms of
particular lines of research, are obvious. The economists(re)discovery of the
entrepreneur during the last century may actually have worked as a platform
to build a progressively autonomous and recognized research eld.
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Abstract
This paper uses a large longitudinal matched employer-employee
dataset to conduct a comprehensive study on the dynamics of nascent
business-owners. We identify and follow about 157,500 individuals who
leave paid employment and become business-owners during the period
1992-2007. The aim of the paper is two-fold. First, we evaluate how
particular labor market experiences in the past inuence the entry and
exit decisions of nascent business-owners. Second, we pay attention to
the heterogeneous nature of business-owners and try to explain their
di¤erent modes of entry and exit. At entry, we distinguish between
start-up entrepreneurs, acquisition entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs. At
exit, we use discrete-time hazard models to study two cause-specic
hazards: dissolutions and ownership transfers. We nd that start-up
entrepreneurs entering alone are more prone to dissolve the business,
while ownership transfers are more incident among acquirers and shared
ownerships. A recent job loss is found to push individuals into entrepre-
neurship and to improve their survival in the rm. A past job in a large
or foreign-owned rm, instead, seems to increase the opportunity cost
of entering and persisting in entrepreneurship. Business-ownersunob-
served heterogeneity is also found to play a relevant role, particularly
in the duration dependence of each exit mode.
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1 Introduction
The widespread belief that entrepreneurs are the engine of the market economy,
by introducing new innovations, fostering economic growth and creating new
jobs (e.g., van Praag and Versloot, 2007), has been motivating great waves of
government support around the world encouraging entrepreneurship and the
creation of new businesses (e.g., Román et al., 2013). This trend became even
more evident during the most recent years, especially since the nancial and
economic crisis of 2008, under a general consensus among academics and policy
makers that entrepreneurship may be a promising response to the growing
unemployment rates, particularly among the youth (Congregado et al., 2010;
Fairlie, 2013; Millán et al., 2014a).
Nevertheless, many policies have been focused on the necessity to pro-
ducemore entrepreneurs, but not so much on the necessity to preserve the
stock of entrepreneurs (European Commission, 2011). Moreover, while there is
already widespread scientic research on entrepreneurial entry decision (Parker,
2009a), data limitations have forced most of this literature to disregard what
happens after entry, thus leaving out the dynamic aspects of entrepreneurship
(Parker and Belghitar, 2006; DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne and Cardon, 2012).
Besides, there still are two particular gaps in this scarce literature on
nascent entrepreneurship dynamics. First, despite seminal theories claim that
prior labor market experience may motivate entrepreneurial entry (e.g., Lucas,
1978; Lazear, 2004), little is known about how particular experiences in paid
employment may shape nascent entrepreneursentry and exit decisions. To
date, the literature has been mostly concerned with the e¤ect of past unem-
ployment experiences (see Evans and Leighton, 1990; Carrasco, 1999; Earle
and Sakova, 2000; Reize, 2000; Millán et al., 2014b). However, as the entre-
preneurial process consists of distinct activities, including opportunity identi-
cation and resource mobilization (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), we also
expect that individualspath in the labor market might enable them to ac-
cumulate specic knowledge and resources, to recognize market opportunities
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and, consequently, to engage in entrepreneurial initiatives. Job shifting and
past employment experiences in large-sized and/or foreign-owned rms are two
of the aspects of individualscareer history that may a¤ect entrepreneurship
dynamics, and about which we still have limited knowledge from the literature.
Second, most of the entrepreneurship literature has been treating nascent
entrepreneurs as a homogenous group of individuals, with entrepreneurial entry
commonly corresponding to the start-up of a new venture (with or without
employees) (see Parker, 2009a; Parker and van Praag, 2012), and considering
entrepreneurial exit to be equivalent to rm exit. However, starting a new
rm is not the only way individuals can become entrepreneurs  they can
also take over an existing rm , and entrepreneurs exit does not necessarily
correspond to rm closure, as entrepreneurs can exit their business while the
rm continues operating under the ownership of other entrepreneur(s).
Hence, this paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of
ways. First, we overcome most of the data limitations faced by previous stud-
ies by using Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth, QP), a large longitudinal matched
employer-employee administrative dataset that allows us to track 157,587 in-
dividuals who have left paid employment and became business-owners (BOs)
during the period 1992-2007.
Second, we pay particular attention to the role played by individualspast
experiences in the labor market in their entrepreneurial entry and exit deci-
sions. Finally, we analyze both entry and exit dynamics and recognize that
nascent BOs are not homogeneous, by allowing their entry and exit to assume
di¤erent forms. At entry, we distinguish between BOs entering via start-up
and those entering by acquiring an existing business. Among these, owing to
the linked employer-employee nature of our data, we also distinguish between
entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs. At exit, we employ discrete-time duration
models to study cause-specic hazard rates namely dissolutions and owner-
ship transfers.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. Section 2
summarizes prior ndings of existing literature on entrepreneursentry and exit
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and establishes the objectives of the paper. Section 3 describes the data, the
methodological procedures to identify BOsentry and exit, and the empirical
strategy. Empirical results on BOsentry and exit are presented and discussed
in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous research on entrepreneurial entry
and exit
2.1 Past experiences in the labor market and BOsdy-
namics
The decision of entering entrepreneurship has been analyzed during the last
decades by an extensive literature under the framework of occupational choice
models (see Parker, 2009a). More recent studies have been emphasizing the im-
portance of several variables that may a¤ect the decision of running a business
instead of receiving a more stable wage in paid employment, including numer-
ous individual-level specicities as gender, age, education (e.g., Livanos, 2009;
Berglann et al., 2011) or ability (e.g., Joona and Wadensjö, 2013; Poschke,
2013), unemployment episodes (e.g., von Grei¤, 2009), prior employers char-
acteristics (e.g., Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008; Parker, 2009b) and macroeco-
nomic conditions (e.g., Koellinger and Thurik, 2012).
Entrepreneurial exit, in turn, was a topic systematically disregarded in
many studies for long time, not only due to data limitations, but also because
a great part of entrepreneurship literature suggested that the entrepreneurial
process is complete as soon as the new venture is created and ready to operate
in the market (DeTienne, 2010). However, the entrepreneurial process is more
than just the creation (or acquisition) of a business and does not end with
entrepreneurs entry, but rather with entrepreneurs exit.
Over the last years, a number of studies have been trying to ll this gap by
searching for potential explanations on why some entrepreneurs survive longer
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in the business than others, using the individual as the unit of analysis. En-
trepreneursage, gender and education (e.g., Block and Sandner, 2009), their
past experiences in unemployment (e.g., Carrasco, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Ander-
sson and Wadensjö, 2007), some characteristics of their businesses (Parker and
Belghitar, 2006; Stam et al., 2010) and the overall economic environment (e.g.,
Haapanen and Tervo, 2009; Millán et al., 2012) are some of the determinants
that have been found to a¤ect the length of time an individual persists as an
entrepreneur.
Even so, we still lack substantial knowledge on other types of determi-
nants, as those related with individualspast experiences in the labor market.
Individualscareer history, by allowing the absorption of specic knowledge,
the accumulation of contacts and networks, and by potentially a¤ecting both
future labor market prospects and the identication of business opportunities,
may also shape entrepreneurial entry and exit.
So far, the literature has paid particular attention to unemployment experi-
ences, arguing that entrepreneurship is frequently regarded as an alternative to
uncertain future career prospects or even to escape from unemployment (Evans
and Leighton, 1990; Storey, 1991; von Grei¤, 2009; Millán et al., 2014b). How-
ever, while there is widespread evidence that unemployment episodes push
individuals towards entrepreneurship, many studies have also reported that
entrepreneurs with past unemployment periods are more likely to fail (e.g.,
Carrasco, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Andersson and Wadensjö, 2007; Millán et al.,
2012). Thus, in this study, we analyze how a recent job loss (caused by pre-
vious employers closure or signicant downsizing) a¤ects nascent BOsentry
and exit decisions.
Additionally, we pay particular attention to the role of job shifts in the
past and employment experiences in large-sized or foreign-owned rms. There
is already evidence that the ow of people between organizations and di¤er-
ent contexts works as an important mechanism for knowledge transfers and
skill development (e.g., Song et al., 2003; Frederiksen and Wennber, 2011).
In view of that, job shifting may endow individuals with a more diversied
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set of skills, information and social capital, which not only may make them
more likely to become entrepreneurs (Lazear, 2004), but also more able to
survive longer in the business. Conversely, a larger number of di¤erent em-
ployers in the past may, instead, signal an unstable or unsuccessful path in paid
employment, possibly associated to low human capital or ability, which may
also motivate entrepreneurial entry, but possibly harm post-entry persistence
if entrepreneurship is viewed as a last resort solution (Millán et al., 2014b).1
Accordingly, we test whether and how the number of di¤erent jobs/employers
in the past inuences the individualsprobability of entering into and exiting
from entrepreneurship.
Finally, we also explore the role of previous jobs in large-sized or foreign-
owned companies. Though the literature has been suggesting that previous
employers size matter, with smaller rms being understood as places of entre-
preneurial learning (e.g., Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008; Parker, 2009b), other
studies also argue that entrepreneurial opportunities and resources accrue to
incipient entrepreneurs as a function of the structural position and visibility
of their prior employers (e.g., Burton et al., 2002).
Accordingly, on the one hand, we could expect that an employment experi-
ence in a large or foreign rm, by possibly providing the new entrepreneur more
knowledge, reputation and legitimacy, supports entrepreneurial entry and im-
proves post-entry persistence. On the other hand, such type of experiences
in the labor market, by frequently being appreciated by subsequent employers
(Sørensen, 2007; Sørensen and Phillips, 2011; Balsvik, 2011), may increase the
opportunity cost of leaving paid employment, thus reducing the propensity
of entering entrepreneurship and/or accelerating nascent BOsexit. The lack
of empirical evidence on these relationships does not allow the formulation of
precise expectations on the e¤ect of these variables.
1In this regard, there is increasing evidence that both high-ability and low-ability agents
become BOs (e.g., Joona and Wadensjö, 2013; Poschke, 2013).
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2.2 The heterogeneous nature of nascent BOs: entry
routes and exit modes
The literature has been largely dening entrepreneurship as self-employment
or new venture creation. However, starting a new rm from scratch is not the
only way individuals can get into entrepreneurship. Budding entrepreneurs can
also take over an existing rm, though very few studies have been concerned
with this issue.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that entrepreneurs enter-
ing via start-up di¤er from those entering by acquiring an existing business.
Acquisition can be viewed as an easy mode of penetrating a new market, be-
sides allowing the potential entrant to take advantage of existing facilities,
customer base and networks. In contrast, those who decide to install a new
venture are faced with time-consuming and risk-taking activities, like building
plants, learning the market or training employees (Tarola et al., 2011; Tarola,
2013), besides being more exposed to the liability of newness and smallness
(Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990). Also, problems of asymmetric information are
more acute in new venture start-ups compared with established rms, which
can be acquired by an outside investor or even by one of the rms employees
(Parker and van Praag, 2012). Furthermore, we may also expect that di¤er-
ent learning opportunities (Jovanovic, 1982) about the whole entrepreneurial
process are associated to each of those entry alternatives.
Accordingly, entrepreneurial entry should not be understood as a homo-
geneous phenomenon, as di¤erent entry routes may signal di¤erent proles of
BOs, driven by di¤erent motivations and having distinct post-entry behaviors.
A few recent studies actually show that the mode of entry into entrepreneurship
is inuenced by individual characteristics, as human, social or nancial capital
(see Parker and van Praag, 2012; Bastié et al., 2013; Block et al., 2013). Thus,
in this paper, we distinguish between new entrepreneurs entering via start-up
or acquisition, also paying attention to intrapreneurs, a particular group of
BOs more frequently neglected by the literature on entrepreneurial entry (see
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Parker, 2011; Martiarena, 2011).
Similarly, regarding BOsexit, most of the existing studies on entrepre-
neurial survival have been conceptualizing exit as a utility-maximizing choice
and, consequently, have associated exit with the failure of rms or individual
entrepreneurs (DeTienne and Cardon, 2012). Nonetheless, inuential models
on entrepreneurship and business transfers have early recognized that many
individuals may successfully develop a business and leave it to another BO
later on for other reasons than failure (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990, 1995).
Those theories suggest that the decision behind small business dissolution
or sale may be, in part, a problem of match between each rm and each
BO. While good matches make BOs to persist longer in their businesses, bad
matches typically make individuals to leave their rms earlier, either by clos-
ing them or by selling them to others. In this regard, the models developed
by Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995) and, more recently, by Plehn-Dujowich
(2010) propose that high-quality businesses owned by low-quality BOs tend to
be sold, while low-quality businesses owned by low-skill BOs tend to be shut
down. However, the lack of empirical evidence on these relationships does not
allow, so far, the conrmation of these results.
In summary, though there is an increasing recognition that exit is not
always a negative outcome (see also Wennberg et al., 2010; Yusuf, 2012), only
a few studies have allowed entrepreneursexit to assume other modes than rm
closure (see, for instance, Taylor, 1999; Stam et al., 2010). Therefore, we pay
attention to the way nascent BOs leave their businesses and to which factors
may contribute to explain their exit mode. We distinguish exits by dissolution
from exits by ownership transfer (OT), and evaluate how past experiences in
the labor market and entry choices impact on BOsexit decision. Furthermore,
we take into account BOsunobserved heterogeneity, which, according to the
aforementioned theories, may also inuence the way individuals leave their
rms.
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3 Data and Methodological Issues
3.1 Data
This study uses data from QP, a matched employer-employee administrative
dataset from the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. QP is an annual manda-
tory employment survey that all rms in the private sector employing at least
one wage earner are legally obliged to ll in. Requested data cover the estab-
lishment (e.g., location, employment and economic activity), the rm (e.g.,
location, employment, sales, economic activity, ownership, number of estab-
lishments and legal setting) and each of its workers (e.g., gender, age, ed-
ucation, qualications, occupational category, employment status, earnings,
tenure and hours of work).
All rms, establishments and workers entering QP dataset have a unique
identication number. Data are available for the period 1986-2009. Owing to
the longitudinal dimension of the dataset, we can track rms/establishments
and workers over time and match workers with their respective employers.
Thus, the longitudinal nature of the dataset, besides its high degree of coverage
and reliability, makes QP a suitable database for a comprehensive study on
entrepreneurship dynamics.
For the years 1990 and 2001, data on workers are not available. As this
missing data poses some limitations in the identication of individualsentry
into entrepreneurship, we have restricted our analysis to transitions from the
paid employeestatus to the business-ownercategory occurring during the
period 1992-2007, excluding 2001 and 2002.2 Data for the period 1986-1991
was only used to characterize workerspast experiences in the labor market.
Finally, we must recognize two limitations of QP data. First, self-employed
2We restrict our analysis to transitions occurring from 1992 onwards because we need
data on the year prior to transition to verify where each worker comes from. For the same
reason, we have to exclude from our analysis all the transitions occurring in 2002. Besides,
we exclude transitions occurring after 2007 because, given the criteria adopted to identify
business-ownersexits, we need at least two years of available information after they enter
to clearly identify their exit from the rm.
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individuals without employees are not covered by QP, as the survey is manda-
tory only for rms employing at least one paid employee. Accordingly, the
entrepreneur denition used in this study corresponds to BOs of rms with
at least one wage earner (i.e., employers). Second, exits of workers from the
dataset are possible, but we are not able to precisely identify the reason for
these absence periods. They may correspond to periods of unemployment,
inactivity, self-employment without employees, or transitions into the public
sector. We will adopt particular procedures in order to better identify unem-
ployment experiences caused by recent displacements.
3.2 Identifying transitions from paid employment into
business-ownership
We started by working with raw data les covering the period 1986-2009. Indi-
viduals were classied according to their employment status at each moment
in time: BO or paid employee.3 Individuals with no record as BOs during
the whole period covered by QP were classied as Never BOs, correspond-
ing to our control group when analyzing the determinants of transitions into
business-ownership.
For those workers who leave paid employment and become BOs, we have
followed them in the dataset until the moment of their transition, in order to
track their career history and identify where they come from.4 During this
procedure, we have identied two main cases:
3We restrict the analysis to workers aged between 16 and 65 years old. However, in order
to reduce potential left censoring issues regarding individualsexperiences in the labor mar-
ket and/or eventual entrepreneurial experiences prior to 1986, we perform several robustness
checks throughout the paper for a sub-sample of younger individuals with a maximum age
of 30 years old.
4As we are interested in transitions from paid employment to entrepreneurship, we focus
on transitions of individuals who become BOs in t and who were employed in the year(s)
immediately prior to transition. We allow for a maximum interval of two years of absence
between the last record in paid employment and the rst record as BO, and adopt particular
procedures to identify potential unemployment spells in between.
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 Individuals who were paid employees in a particular rm and become
BOs within the same rm were classied as nascent intrapreneurs;5
 Individuals who were previously identied in paid employment and who
become BOs in a di¤erent rm were classied as nascent entrepreneurs.
Among these nascent entrepreneurs, we still identify two subgroups, ac-
cording to the way they enter into entrepreneurship:
 If the rms rst record in QP les coincides with the individuals year
of transition into entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur enters via start-up
and is classied as a start-up entrepreneur;
 If the individual becomes an entrepreneur in a pre-existing rm, the
transition occurs via takeover and s/he is classied as an acquisition
entrepreneur.
Altogether, our criteria allowed the identication of 157,587 nascent BOs
59,688 start-up entrepreneurs; 27,155 acquisition entrepreneurs and 70,744
intrapreneurs.6 Young BOs (aged up to 30) account for 37% of all these transi-
5The literature has been using the terms Intrapreneurship, Corporate Entrepreneurship
and Corporate Venturing interchangeably, commonly referring to the practice of developing
a new venture within an existing organization (see Parker, 2011; Martiarena, 2013). We
use a wider denition of Intrapreneurship in this study: a worker becomes an intrapreneur
if s/he becomes the unique BO of the rm where s/he was already employed (employee
buyout), or if s/he leaves the paid employeestatus and enters the ownership of the busi-
ness, becoming one of the BOs of the employer rm (partnership). A signicant share of
these transitions into intrapreneurship probably corresponds to ownership transfers within
family rms. Unfortunately, QP data do not allow the identication of family businesses in
particular.
6We have also identied a residual group of individuals who become BOs in two or more
di¤erent rms in the same year (portfolio BOs). Such multiple entries could include both
start-up and acquisition experiences, or simultaneous entrepreneurship and intrapreneur-
ship transitions, which complicates any attempt of classication of these transitions into the
groups of BOs previously identied. Given the relative few number of such multiple transi-
tions (less than 1% of the total number of transitions identied for the period 1992-2007),
we also prevented ourselves to extend the analysis in order to classify these portfolio BOs
into an independent group of nascent BOs. For this reason, we have excluded these cases
from the current analysis.
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tions (26,920 entering via start-up; 10,777 entering via acquisition and 20,141
becoming intrapreneurs). Regarding the juridical nature of BOsrms, about
95% of them are either limited liability companies (Sociedades por Quotas)
or single ownerships (Empresário em Nome Individual), always employing at
least one paid employee. Overall, our denition of BOs corresponds to owners
of micro or small businesses.
3.3 Identifying the exit of business-owners and rms
Following the procedures of previous studies also using QP data (e.g., Blan-
chard and Portugal, 2001; Portugal and Cardoso, 2006), a rm was classied
as an exiting rm in year t if it is present in QP les in year t-1, but absent in t
and in all the subsequent years. Similarly, in order to identify BOs exit year,
we have also required an absence of the BO from the rm (or from the BO
category) larger or equal to two consecutive years.7 These criteria explain why
we restrict our analysis to BOs entering until 2007. Data for 2008 and 2009
were only used to check the presence/absence of each BO in the respective
rm(s), as well as the presence/absence of each rm in QP les.
Each BO was then tracked over time, since the year of entry until his/her
last record as BO in the rm, which may correspond to the year of BOs exit or,
7Temporary exits from the dataset may occur for a number of reasons, a very likely
reason being that the survey form was not received in the Ministry of Employment before
the date when the recording operations were closed. Temporary absences of one year were,
therefore, not classied as denitive exits of the BO. Such temporary exits were easily lled
in, as most of the variables to be included in the empirical analysis are time-invariant. For
time-varying variables (e.g., individuals age) the reconstruction of those particular missing
records was possible owing to the available information for the adjacent years. For the sake
of consistency, we have excluded from our database those BOs who were temporarily absent
from the same rm for two or more years. On the one hand, these absence periods may
have corresponded to periods of self-employment without employees, so they should not be
considered as real exits. On the other hand, we prevented ourselves from lling individual-
level gaps larger than one year. As a result, we restrict our analysis to the entry and exit
of those BOs with complete spells, since their entry year until they leave the rm or until
the end of the period covered by QP.
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alternatively, to the last year with available information about the individual.
This last case corresponds to a right-censored observation (Singer and Willett,
1993; Hosmer et al., 2008), thus requiring a proper empirical strategy that
takes into account right-censoring issues.
Finally, besides identifying BOsexits, we furthermore distinguish amongst
two alternative exit modes dissolution and ownership transfer. In the former
case, the BOs exit year coincides with rm exit year. Exit by ownership
transfer, in turn, is dened as the BOs exit from a rm (or from the BO
category) that continues operating in the market after such exit.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 The choice of becoming a BO
We use discrete choice models to study which factors may inuence the decision
of becoming a BO. Following most of the literature on entrepreneurial entry,
the analytical framework used to identify the drivers of such decision is that
of random utility, according to which an individual will transit into business-
ownership if the expected utility of becoming a BO exceeds the expected utility
of the other alternatives.
In this study, we focus primarily on the e¤ect of individualsprevious ex-
periences in the labor market while paid employees  namely employment
experiences in large-sized and foreign-owned rms, job shifts between di¤erent
employers and recent displacement events. In addition, following the previous
literature (see, for instance, Uusitalo, 2001; Lazear, 2004; Hyytinen and Mali-
ranta, 2008; Livanos, 2009; Parker, 2009b), we also control for the e¤ect of
particular individual characteristics (gender, age and education), a number of
characteristics of the previous employer and of the last job (e.g., previous em-
ployer size and sector, tenure in the prior job, previous wage and management
experience, among others) and macroeconomic conditions.
As some of these factors may a¤ect individuals entry choice in a di¤erent
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way depending on the type of BO they become, we estimate a multinomial logit
model, where the outcome y for individual i may be one of four alternatives:
1) Never BO; 2) Start-up entrepreneur; 3) Acquisition entrepreneur; or 4)
Intrapreneur. Thus, and assuming independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) extreme value distributed error terms, the probability that the outcome
for individual i is alternative j, conditional on a vector of variables Xi is
pij =
eX
0
ij
4P
l=1
eX
0
il
; j = 1; :::; 4: (1)
Table A.I in the Appendix provides a detailed description of the variables
included in vector Xi.
3.4.2 The persistence and the exit mode of the BO
To study BOspersistence and exit decisions, we rely on duration models to
study cause-specic hazards (dissolution and OT). Over again, we focus on the
e¤ects arising from BOsprevious experiences in the labor market while paid
employees, in addition to the BOsentry mode. Individual-level characteristics
and several characteristics of BOsrms (namely size, sector, age and location)
are also taken into account in our estimations (see Table A.I for a detailed
description of these variables).
As survival spells are recorded in an annual basis, discrete time duration
models were considered. The length of each individuals spell as BO (Ti) is
therefore assumed to be a discrete non-negative random variable. Moreover,
we go beyond most of the previous research on entrepreneurial survival using
discrete hazard models (e.g., Carrasco, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Nziramasanga and
Lee, 2001; Block and Sandner, 2009; Millán et al., 2012) by incorporating the
e¤ect of individualsunobserved heterogeneity, which is known to mainly a¤ect
the inuence of time dependence on the exit rate (e.g., Heckman and Singer,
1984; Lancaster, 1990; Jenkins, 2005).
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Formally, we observe BO is spell from period j = 1 (the year of BOs
entry) until the end of the jth period, at which BO is spell is either complete
(ci = 1) or right-censored (ci = 0) (ow sample). The overall probability of
exit at discrete time tj, j = 1; 2; : : :, given survival until time tj, can be dened
as
hij = Pr(Ti = jjTi  j) = F ((t) +X 0i(t) + "i); (2)
where hij is the probability of individual i persisting as BO in the rm for
exactly j years; (t) describes the pattern of duration dependence (the baseline
hazard); Xi(t) is the vector of time dependent and independent variables;  is
a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; "i is a disturbance term that
includes the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (also known as individual
frailty) and that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the observable variables
of vector Xi(t) (Jenkins, 1995; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 613); and, nally,
F () denotes the complementary log-logistic distribution function.
We do not impose any functional form for (t). We instead estimate a
piecewise constant hazard model, where exit rates are assumed to be constant
within each interval (year) but di¤erent between intervals. Thus, in order to
estimate the full set of s, we have added an indicator variable per duration
time t to the model. This exible (non-parametric) modeling has been recog-
nized to be preferred in order to avoid serious misspecications. Moreover,
such hazard formulation with a exible baseline hazard function makes an
attractive model with which to combine a specic heterogeneity assumption
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 620). Accordingly, following usual conventions
(e.g., Hougaard, 1995; Jenkins, 2005), we assume an Inverse Gaussian distrib-
ution for the unobserved heterogeneity term, so that "i is normally distributed
with zero mean and unitary variance.
Summing up, the discrete time hazard function in (2) may be rewritten as
follows:
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hij = 1  expf  exp[(t) +Xi(t)0 + log("i)]g: (3)
We then extend this model in order to estimate cause-specic hazards
for dissolutions and OT. Following the procedures of some previous studies
(e.g., Carrasco, 1999; Reize, 2000; Georgarakos and Tatsiramos, 2009), the
parameters of a given cause-specic hazard are estimated by the single-risk
methods exposed above, treating durations nishing in other states as right-
censored at the last year of available information (Jenkins, 1995; 2005).8
4 Empirical results on entrepreneurial entry
4.1 Characterizing the di¤erent groups of BOs
Table 1 briey characterizes the di¤erent types of BOs identied in the data,
as well as the control group composed by Never BOs. The variables listed in
the table correspond to the vector of variables included in the estimation of
the multinomial logit model for BOsentry.9
8Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) show that, if distinct destination states depend
upon disjoint subsets of parameters - which are functionally independent (so far as the
inference about j(t) and  is concerned) - the parameters of a cause-specic hazard can be
estimated by treating durations nishing into other states as censored at the time of exit.
However, if the unobserved characteristics are common to or correlated across the states, this
simplication may have an e¤ect on the overall hazard rate. Even so, this is a minor issue in
our analysis, as we are mainly interested in cause-specic hazards, rather than on the overall
rate. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we have alternatively estimated the competing-
risks model proposed by Fine and Gray (1999), which did not produce qualitatively di¤erent
results for the main variables of interest, comparatively to those obtained with the estimation
of cause-specic hazard functions with unobserved heterogeneity. However, given the lack of
available programs allowing the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity which is shown
to have signicant e¤ects on the duration dependence of dissolutions and OTs in Fine and
Grays model, we decided to focus on the results from cause-specic hazard functions. All
these additional results are available upon request from the authors.
9Additionally, estimation also includes the variable Lagged Unemployment Rate (with
one-year lag), to take into account potential e¤ects of the business cycle. Year dummies are
also included in all estimations.
68
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, by groups of nascent BOs
(Portugal, 1992-2007)
Never Start-up Acquis. Intra-
BOs Entrepr. Entrepr. preneur
(Number of cases) (5,484,866) (59,688) (27,155) (70,744)
Prior experiences in the labor market as paid employee
Experience in a large rm (%) 0.343 0.229 0.279 0.118
Experience in a foreign rm (%) 0.121 0.118 0.127 0.061
Number of di¤erent employers 1.749 2.946 2.863 1.738
Recent displacement (%) 0.024 0.157 0.081 n.a.
Previous wage job characteristics
Overeducation (%) 0.304 0.386 0.359 0.407
Tenure (months) 93.93 59.31 71.09 62.39
Management position (%) 0.018 0.053 0.064 0.257
Hourly wage (in logs, 2005 euros) 1.375 1.360 1.379 1.321
Foreign rm (%) 0.092 0.058 0.068 0.014
Micro rm (%) 0.197 0.407 0.309 0.671
Small rm (%) 0.274 0.327 0.318 0.248
Medium rm (%) 0.244 0.156 0.203 0.064
Large rm (%) 0.285 0.110 0.170 0.017
Urban location (%) 0.528 0.483 0.534 0.448
Primary sector (%) 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.029
Manufacturing (%) 0.338 0.254 0.284 0.235
Energy & Construction sectors (%) 0.118 0.129 0.110 0.122
Services sector (%) 0.520 0.600 0.584 0.614
Individual-level characteristics
Male (%) 0.572 0.693 0.649 0.642
Age (years) 36.47 33.01 34.60 37.88
Less than 9 years of schooling (%) 0.628 0.492 0.515 0.537
9 years of schooling (%) 0.135 0.183 0.169 0.161
12 years of schooling (%) 0.162 0.208 0.183 0.173
College education (%) 0.075 0.117 0.133 0.129
Notes: n.a.: Not Applicable.
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Regarding the key variables of interest, Never BOs had more frequently a
past employment experience in a large-sized rm. In opposition, past expe-
riences in large or foreign-owned rms were much less common among those
becoming intrapreneurs. Both start-up and acquisition entrepreneurs seem to
have more diverse past experiences while paid employees, by having worked in
a larger number of di¤erent rms. Recent job losses were also more frequently
su¤ered by those who became entrepreneurs, especially among those entering
via start-up.
Nascent BOs overall come from micro and small rms with lower partic-
ipation of foreign capital. This is particularly evident among intrapreneurs.
Education-job mismatches, captured by overeducation in the previous job,
were also more common among those becoming BOs.10 Notable di¤erences
are also found regarding previous management positions, which were more
usually occupied by workers becoming intrapreneurs. Data also show a larger
proportion of males, as well as a larger share of individuals with higher ed-
ucational attainment, among those who became BOs. Intrapreneurs are, on
average, the oldest group of individuals, while start-up entrepreneurs are the
youngest ones.
4.2 Empirical results
4.2.1 Multinomial logit estimation results
Table 2 reports the results for the nal specication of the multinomial logit
model, including all variables in Table 1 (except Recent Displacement)11, as
10Using one of the three most conventional ways of measuring overeducation (see, for
instance, Kiker et al., 1997), an individual was considered to be overeducated if s/he had an
educational attainment higher than the mode of the educational attainment of recently hired
workers in the same occupation (according to the 3-digit International Standard Classica-
tion of Occupations) in the same year. These comparisons were performed after converting
the years of schooling of each individual and the modal years of schooling in the respec-
tive occupation in categories of educational attainment (namely into 4, 6, 9, 12 years of
schooling, plus college education).
11Given that, by denition, intrapreneurs never su¤er a job loss immediately before their
transition, we cannot include this variable in this specication. Otherwise, the model would
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well as Lagged Unemployment Rate. Table A.II in the Appendix reports the
estimation results obtained for the sub-sample of individuals aged up to 30
years old, as a robustness check. Never BOs are used as the reference group
for the transitions occurring in each year.
After the estimation of this specication, we tested whether some of the
di¤erent types of BOs under consideration could be pooled together into a
common category. A Wald test under the null hypothesis of equalizing the
estimated coe¢ cients associated with any given pair of outcomes or choices 
strongly rejects the pooling of any of these categories of BOs. Therefore, these
groups of BOs must be analyzed separately.12
Regarding the role of past experiences in the labor market, the results sug-
gest that a past job in a large or in a foreign company reduces the individuals
propensity to leave paid employment and become entrepreneurs, regardless
their mode of entry (start-up or acquisition). As expected, by potentially
improving future labor market prospects, such experiences may increase by
more the individuals expected utility of remaining in paid employment than
that obtained as BOs. In contrast, an experience in a foreign-owned rm in
the past increases the log-odds of choosing intrapreneurship rather than paid
employment by about 0.08, suggesting that workers who have accumulated
knowledge from foreign companies may have a better career progress inside
subsequent rms (e.g., Balsvik, 2011). These results remain consistent for the
sub-sample of younger individuals.
The diversity of experiences in the labor market also seems to matter, as a
su¤er from identication problems. We study the e¤ect of recent displacement experiences
in section 4.2.2, after excluding intrapreneurs from the estimation of the extended model.
12Additionally, we have also tested the validity of the Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives (IIA), one strong assumption of multinomial logit models. This assumption is less
of a problem when the alternatives are reasonably distinct (Amemiya, 1981). The fact that,
according to the Wald test, we are unable to combine any pair of choices emphasizes the
dissimilar structure of the alternatives under study. Even so, we have performed a series of
Hausman tests, by sequentially omitting each of the categories of BOs from the choice set,
re-estimating the model, and then comparing the results from the full model and the several
restricted models. We do not obtain systematic evidence to reject the IIA assumption.
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larger number of job shifts in the past is found to increase individualspropen-
sity to become BOs, especially among the youngest individuals. On the one
hand, the mobility of workers especially at younger ages across di¤erent
rms may work as a mechanism for knowledge transfers, accumulation of spe-
cic skills, resources and networks, which may either help them to progress
within a subsequent rm (by becoming intrapreneurs) or give them a more
balanced and diversied skill mix that induce them into business-ownership,
in line with the Lazears (2004) Jack-of-all-trades theory of entrepreneurship.
On the other hand, as previously discussed, a larger number of di¤erent
jobs may also indicate some instability in the labor market, which may moti-
vate the transition into entrepreneurship as a solution for the lack of (stable)
alternatives in paid employment. For prospective intrapreneurs in particular,
the e¤ect of such diversity of jobs apparently reverses with individualsage
 the e¤ect of number of di¤erent employers is negative and statistically
signicant for entries into intrapreneurship in the global sample, which may
actually suggest that individualsmobility across di¤erent employers may be
favorable at younger ages, though potentially indicating a more negative (i.e.,
unstable) employee prole at older ages.
Regarding the remaining variables, the results show that particular speci-
cities of the previous job also inuence BOsentry decisions. Education-job
mismatches related to overeducation, by potentially signaling some under-
utilization of workersknowledge and skills, increase the propensity to progress
in the rm hierarchy through intrapreneurship, discouraging the exit towards
entrepreneurship, especially among the youngest workers. Workers engaged
in management positions in the previous job are also more likely to become
BOs than those in other occupations. Exits from paid employment towards
entrepreneurship become less likely as job tenure gets longer (the estimated
e¤ect is inverted U-shaped for transitions into start-up and acquisition entre-
preneurship, with the estimated peak occurring after three months in the job),
while the reverse e¤ect is found for transitions into intrapreneurship.
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Table 2. Multinomial logit estimation results (Portugal, 1992-2007)
Start-up Acquisition Intrapreneur
Entrepreneur Entrepreneur
Prior experiences in the labor market as paid employee
Experience in a large rm -0.6146*** -0.5501*** -0.1062***
(0.0122) (0.0163) (0.0158)
Experience in a foreign rm -0.1793*** -0.1605*** 0.0822***
(0.0151) (0.0206) (0.0203)
Number of di¤erent employers 0.8373*** 0.8742*** -0.0263***
(0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0053)
Previous wage job characteristics
Overeducation 0.0081 -0.0575*** 0.3148***
(0.0101) (0.0149) (0.0101)
Tenure 0.0094*** 0.0096*** -0.0019***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Tenure squared/100 -0.0018*** -0.0017*** 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Management position 0.6946*** 0.7680*** 3.0495***
(0.0243) (0.0341) (0.0154)
Hourly wage -0.0057 -0.1108*** -0.1969***
(0.0130) (0.0195) (0.0125)
Foreign rm -0.0075 -0.0192 -0.9288***
(0.0189) (0.0254) (0.0356)
Small rm -0.6005*** -0.3768*** -1.2394***
(0.0107) (0.0168) (0.0106)
Medium rm -1.1634*** -0.6867*** -2.4505***
(0.0139) (0.0196) (0.0181)
Large rm -1.4307*** -0.8183*** -4.0157***
(0.0167) (0.0221) (0.0350)
Urban location -0.1200*** -0.0220 -0.0408***
(0.0097) (0.0143) (0.0096)
Primary sector -0.4044*** -0.1267*** -0.3801***
(0.0371) (0.0486) (0.0293)
(It continues in the next page...)
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Table 2. Multinomial logit estimation results (Portugal, 1992-2007)
Start-up Acquisition Intrapreneur
Entrepreneur Entrepreneur
Previous wage job characteristics
Energy & Construction sectors 0.0115 -0.0560** -0.1467***
(0.0159) (0.0240) (0.0164)
Services sector 0.1158*** 0.1048*** -0.1033***
(0.0117) (0.0166) (0.0118)
Individual-level characteristics
Male 0.5596*** 0.3028*** 0.2897***
(0.0107) (0.0152) (0.0104)
Age -0.0278*** -0.0938*** 0.1285***
(0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0030)
Age squared/100 -0.0443*** 0.0726*** -0.1376***
(0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0037)
9 years of schooling 0.6765*** 0.5324*** 0.4172***
(0.0142) (0.0208) (0.0143)
12 years of schooling 0.7083*** 0.6277*** 0.4028***
(0.0139) (0.0210) (0.0149)
College education 1.2906*** 1.4269*** 0.5918***
(0.0224) (0.0327) (0.0226)
Macroeconomic Environment
Lagged unemployment rate -0.0311*** -0.2845*** -0.1940***
(0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0053)
Constant -6.8725*** -5.2670*** -6.4640***
(0.0801) (0.1021) (0.0633)
N 26,449,546
Log Pseudo-likelihood -838,135.9
Pseudo R2 0.1421
Notes: *, **, and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Worker-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. The model also includes time dummies. Reference
categories: Micro Firms for rm size; Manufacturing for sector; "Less than 9 years of school-
ing" for individuals education.
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Higher wages in the previous job seem to discourage entrepreneurial entry,
by increasing the opportunity cost of leaving paid employment. For intrapre-
neurs, this result may rather conrm that the transitions into intrapreneurship
identied in our data mainly correspond to ownership transfers within family
rms, where wages tend to be lower.13
Our results also conrm that smaller rms spawn new entrepreneurs among
their employees more often than larger rms do (see also Hyytinen and Mali-
ranta, 2008; Parker, 2009b; Berglann et al., 2011). Large-sized rms, instead,
by o¤ering better opportunities for the development of internal labor markets
(Brown and Medo¤, 1989), reduce the workersincentive to leave paid employ-
ment and become BOs. For intrapreneurs in particular, results show that rm
size and foreign ownership both play a strong negative e¤ect on their transi-
tion, conrming that intrapreneurship (as we dene it) is more common within
very small domestic rms over again, the typical family rm. Individuals
working in large urban centers also seem to be less prone to leave paid employ-
ment to become BOs, possibly because these regions are both characterized
by relatively erce market competition and better employment opportunities.
Regarding the set of individual characteristics that we control for, results
conrm that men are more prone to become BOs and especially start-up en-
trepreneurs than women (e.g., Uusitalo, 2001; Livanos, 2009; Parker, 2009b).
Individuals age, in turn, exerts di¤erent e¤ects according to the entry route
chosen as workers become older, they are more likely to become intrapre-
neurs and less likely to become entrepreneurs. Education is also associated
with a greater likelihood of transiting into business-ownership, in line with the
argument that education enhances individualsentrepreneurial talent (Lu-
cas, 1978; Calvo and Wellisz, 1980), improving as well their ability to identify
and evaluate business opportunities.
Finally, despite our results overall conrm the so-called prosperity-pull
13Additional estimations using an alternative measure of hourly wages that also includes
overtime payments (divided by the sum of normal and overtime hours of work) yielded
qualitatively similar results.
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hypothesis (Evans and Leighton, 1990; Carrasco, 1999; Parker, 2009a: 143-
144), some types of BOs seem to be particularly sensitive to macroeconomic
conditions. An increase of one percentage point in the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate decreases the log-odds between acquisition entrepreneurship (in-
trapreneurship) and paid employment by 0.28 (0.19), all other variables held
constant. The e¤ect of macroeconomic conditions seems to be weaker for start-
up entrepreneurs the log-odds between start-up entrepreneurship and paid
employment is estimated to decrease only by 0.03 due to a one-unit increase in
the unemployment rate. Younger start-up entrepreneurs seem to be even more
reactive to the economic environment, apparently entering counter-cyclically
(see Table A.II).
Overall, the results suggest that di¤erent motivations may propel individ-
ualstransition into business-ownership, as well as the route they choose to
become BOs. Some individuals may decide to run their own business due to
the lack of better alternatives in the labor market, while others may decide
to become BOs owing to the identication of a great business opportunity or
of a better alternative to paid employment. An additional important driver
that may contribute to explain such transitions may be a recent job loss. We
extend the analysis in the next subsection in order to evaluate how recent
unemployment episodes might have inuenced the entry of individuals into
entrepreneurship.
4.2.2 The e¤ect of recent displacements
We now extend the previous estimated model with the inclusion of an indicator
variable accounting for recent displacement events. In QP dataset, if a worker
is temporally absent from the annual records, it is not certain that s/he is
unemployed. Accordingly, for a worker to be classied as recently displaced,
we have imposed that s/he denitively leaves the previous rm and that the
rm simultaneously su¤ers a process of downsizing (larger or equal to 30% of
its workforce, with a minimum of ve separations see OECD, 2013) or closes
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operations (i.e., exits the dataset).
In Table 3, we summarize the results obtained from the extended model.14
A recent displacement experience is found to signicantly increase the prob-
ability of becoming an entrepreneur. Moreover, the e¤ect is noteworthy for
those becoming entrepreneurs by establishing a start-up venture. In particu-
lar, the results show that after a recent displacement episode, individuals are
about six (three) times more likely to become entrepreneurs via start-up (ac-
quisition) than to reenter into paid employment. Similar results were obtained
for the sub-sample of young individuals. Our results are, thus, in line with the
belief that entrepreneurship is frequently chosen as a solution for individuals
unemployment and uncertainty in the labor market (Carrasco, 1999; Uusitalo,
2001; Georgarakos and Tatsiramos, 2009; Berglann et al., 2011).
Table 3.The e¤ect of a recent displacement on the transition into
entrepreneurship
Start-up Acquisition
Entrepreneur Entrepreneur
Recent displacement 1.9114*** 1.1335***
(0.0125) (0.0212)
Prior experiences in the labor market YES YES
Previous wage job characteristics YES YES
Individual-level characteristics YES YES
Macroeconomic environment YES YES
N 26,378,802
Log Pseudo-likelihood -506,154.9
Pseudo R2 0.1390
Notes: *** denotes signicant at 1% level. Worker-clustered standard errors in paren-
theses.
14Intrapreneurs were excluded from the estimation of this specication as, by denition,
recent displacements are never veried before the transition of this particular group of BOs.
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As a robustness check, given that our recent displacementvariable mainly
captures collective dismissals implying that displaced individuals are not nec-
essarily lemonswe have re-estimated the model using a broader denition
of recent displacement, by considering as potentially unemployed workers all
those individuals who were absent from the database in the two years after
leaving the previous job. In this case, both collective and individual dismissals
occurring during the years preceding the potential transition are certainly in-
cluded in the set of individuals su¤ering a recent displacement. However,
in this case, displacement episodes become over-estimated, as individuals be-
ing absent from the les for other reason than unemployment are also in-
evitably classied as unemployed. Even so, the results remained qualitatively
unchanged even after enlarging the pool of potential unemployed individuals
transiting into business-ownership (the estimated coe¢ cients were 1.9102 for
entries into entrepreneurship via start-up and 1.7803 for entries through ac-
quisition, being both statistically signicant at the 1% level), so we believe
that the narrower denition of recent displacement used in this study does not
signicantly inuence the results and the derived conclusions.
5 Empirical results on BOsexit
5.1 Descriptive statistics and non-parametric analysis
Using Kaplan-Meier (KM) survivor function (Kalbeish and Prentice, 1980),
we start by estimating the unconditional probability of an individual surviving
as BO beyond time t, regardless the exit mode chosen, as follows:
dS(tj) = tQ
j=t0
(1  dj
nj
); (4)
where dj is the number of exits in each time interval and nj is the number
of BOs at risk of exit. Figure 1 compares the estimated survivor function of
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start-up entrepreneurs, acquisition entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs, without
controlling for any di¤erences in their observed and unobserved characteristics.
In Figure 2 we adopt the same procedure to check whether any signicant
di¤erences exist, unconditionally, among those who decide to enter in business-
ownership alone and those who choose to share the ownership of the rm with
other BO(s).
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Fig. 2. KM survivor function, by mode of entry
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The median duration of nascent BOsspells is just two years for intrapre-
neurs and acquisition entrepreneurs, and three years for start-up entrepreneurs.
Figure 1 actually suggests that, on average, start-up entrepreneurs have higher
survival rates and persist for longer periods in the same business comparatively
to the other two groups of BOs. The di¤erences are statistically signicant at
the 1% level according to both Log-rank and Wilcoxon tests. Figure 2 also
indicates that, without distinguishing between alternative exit modes, sharing
the risk with others may postpone the decision of leaving the business and
thus increase BOspersistence in the rm.
In order to distinguish exits by dissolutions from exits by OT, Figure 3
illustrates the estimated cumulative incidence function (CIF) (see Coviello
and Boggess, 2004) for each alternative exit mode k and for each group of
BOs. Formally, the non-parametric cumulative incidence for the exit mode k
is estimated as:
dCIFk(t) = X
jjtjt
bS(tj   1)dkj
nj
; (5)
where bS(tj 1) is the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the overall survival function,
and the second factor is an estimate of the cause-specic hazard of type k.
Similarly, Figure 4 compares the dissolution and OT CIFs for single BOs and
shared ownerships.
From Figure 3, we observe that, unconditionally, the incidence of exits by
dissolution is larger in the group of start-up entrepreneurs. Even so, exits
by OT seem to be relatively more frequent than exits by dissolution for the
three types of BOs under analysis. The disparity between the two CIFs is
particularly signicant for acquisition entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs. The
di¤erences are statistically signicant at the 1% level for all groups of BOs,
according to the test of Pepe and Mori.
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Fig. 3. Dissolution and OT Cumulative Incidence Functions, by BO type
Nevertheless, the incidence of each exit mode also seems to be a¤ected by
the ownership structure chosen at entry. From Figure 4 we verify that disso-
lutions (OT) are much more incident among single BOs (shared ownerships).
Without controlling for any observed or unobserved characteristics of BOs, the
probability of dissolving (transferring) the business before ve years is about
29% (41%) for single BOs and 15% (50%) for those sharing the ownership of
the business with others at the moment of entry.
Table 4 briey characterizes BOs according to their exit mode. The vari-
ables listed in the table correspond to the vector of explanatory variables
included in the estimation of cause-specic hazard models. Prior experiences
in the labor market now additionally include the accumulated experience (in
years) in the sector where BOs enter. Standard individual-level and rm-level
characteristics of the new business are also controlled for (see Table A.I).
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structure
Given the potential survival di¤erences between single BOs and those shar-
ing the ownership of their rm (Figures 2 and 4), we now split the three pos-
sible entry modes taking also into account the ownership structure chosen at
entry (single or shared).15 In our data, 58% of the individuals becoming BOs
share the business with someone else by the time of their transition into entre-
preneurship. The relative importance of shared ownerships seems to be even
higher among younger BOs (about 61% of them share the rm with others at
entry). Overall, the proportion of shared ownerships is larger in the subgroup
of intrapreneurs (64%) and lower among start-up entrepreneurs (51%).
15We did not take into account this disaggregation of BOs in Section 4, when studying
entry patterns, because additional estimations showed that no signicant di¤erences exist
between the entry determinants of BOs entering alone and those sharing the ownership of
their business with others.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics, by BOsexit mode (Portugal, 1992-2007)
Survivors Exits by Exits by
Dissolution OT
Entry mode
Start-up entrepr. - single ownership (%) 0.228 0.294 0.119
Start-up entrepr. - shared ownership (%) 0.242 0.218 0.157
Acquisition entrepr. - single ownership (%) 0.054 0.079 0.079
Acquisition entrepr. - shared ownership (%) 0.084 0.068 0.139
Intrapreneur single ownership (%) 0.135 0.167 0.166
Intraprenener shared ownership (%) 0.257 0.174 0.340
Prior experiences in the labor market
Experience in a large rm (%) 0.178 0.209 0.194
Experience in a foreign rm (%) 0.101 0.100 0.092
Number of di¤erent employers 2.584 2.179 2.267
Recent displacement (%) 0.150 0.120 0.087
Years of experience in the (2-digit) industry 3.240 2.179 2.561
Individual-level characteristics
Male (%) 0.671 0.658 0.659
Age (years) 36.32 36.33 37.84
Less than 9 years of schooling (%) 0.454 0.514 0.519
9 years of schooling (%) 0.128 0.177 0.161
12 years of schooling (%) 0.248 0.208 0.180
College education (%) 0.170 0.101 0.140
Firm-level characteristics
Firm age (years) 10.93 7.745 11.74
Micro rm (%) 0.777 0.853 0.719
Small rm (%) 0.205 0.132 0.229
Medium rm (%) 0.017 0.014 0.043
Large rm (%) 0.001 0.001 0.009
Urban location (%) 0.400 0.426 0.435
Primary sector (%) 0.018 0.015 0.020
Energy & Construction sectors 0.126 0.139 0.114
Manufacturing (%) 0.203 0.209 0.234
Services sector (%) 0.653 0.637 0.632
N 43,967 35,016 78,604
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During the period under study, 72% of BOs have exited their business 
22% have dissolved it and 50% have left the business without closing it down,
by transferring it to other BOs. In line with the CIFs estimated above, we nd
a higher proportion of start-up entrants among those dissolving the business.
In contrast, we nd a larger proportion of shared ownerships among those
leaving by OT (see Table 4).
Survivors present a longer experience (from previous job(s) in paid em-
ployment) in the sector where they currently operate and seem to have more
frequently su¤ered a recent job loss. Higher educational attainments are also
more often among those who survive, and less frequent among those leaving by
dissolving the rm. Lastly, the great majority of BOsrms are micro-sized,
particularly those owned by BOs who end up dissolving the business. These
BOs also own, on average, the youngest rms.
5.2 Estimation results from cause-specic hazard mod-
els
Table 5 reports the results from the estimation of discrete time duration mod-
els for each specic exit mode. Table A.III, in the Appendix, reports the
results obtained for the sub-sample of young BOs. Besides controlling for
BOsunobserved heterogeneity (or frailty), the estimations are also weighted
by the number of BOs in each rm, at entry. Given that the literature has
been suggesting that entrepreneurial teams outperform single entrepreneurs
(see, for instance, Lechler (2001) for a brief review), non-weighted estimations
could produce biased results by over-representing the businesses owned by two
or more BOs. Accordingly, we take this aspect into account, in order to avoid
giving a more relative importance to some observations over others.
By controlling for BOsfrailty, we are supposing that each individual might
belong to one of a number of di¤erent types of BOs (for instance, in terms
of BOsentrepreneurial talent or ability), that each BOs type is unobserved
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and that some types of BOs are more frail (i.e., more likely to exit) than
others. Consequently, neglecting individualsunobserved heterogeneity might
have signicant implications in our results, mainly in the duration dependence
of the two exit modes under analysis. Typically, the non-frailty model tends
to overestimate (underestimate) the degree of negative (positive) duration de-
pendence, besides underestimating the magnitude of the coe¢ cients (Jenkins,
1995, 2005).
Figure 5 illustrates the estimated duration dependence of dissolutions and
OTs, after controlling for BOs entry mode, past experiences in the labor
market, and a number of individual and rm characteristics. We compare
the results obtained from frailty and non-frailty models, as well as weighted
and non-weighted estimations. Figure A.I in the Appendix shows comparable
results for the sub-sample of young BOs.
Our results conrm that BOsunobserved heterogeneity is signicant in
our data, playing a relevant role in the duration dependence of both exit
modes. Exits by dissolution apparently have negative duration dependence
 i.e., the risk of dissolving the business decreases as a BOs spell in the
rm gets longer. However, as expected, neglecting BOsfrailty overestimates
this negative duration dependence. Furthermore, for the whole sample, when
estimations are weighted by the number of business partners at entry, the
dissolution hazard becomes almost at over time.
Ownership transfers, in turn, show a U-shaped duration pattern i.e., BOs
are less likely to exit by OT during their rst years in business, becoming more
prone to transfer the business to other BO(s) about ve years after entering
the rm. Over again, BOsunobserved heterogeneity is shown to play a role
by largely underestimating the positive duration dependence of exits by OT
from the fourth/fth year onwards.
Regarding the main variables of interest, the results conrm that entry
mode signicantly shapes BOspost-entry persistence. On the one hand, after
controlling for BOsobserved and unobserved characteristics, start-up entre-
preneurs entering alone remain signicantly more likely to dissolve the business
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earlier than all other groups of BOs. On the other hand, they also remain the
less likely to exit by OT. So, despite BOs normally become more attached to a
business started by them than to an acquired business, they face signicantly
higher failure risks during rms infancy (Freeman et al., 1983; Brüderl and
Schüssler, 1990). Overall, the results not only conrm that acquiring an ex-
isting rm is less risky than establishing a new start-up, but also that sharing
the ownership of the rm with others contributes to share risks and resources,
which probably reduce liquidity constraints and, consequently, dissolution haz-
ards.
Concerning the e¤ects arising from previous experiences in the labor mar-
ket, a prior job in a foreign and/or large rm is found to accelerate BOsexit,
conrming that individuals with such employment experiences may become
less committed to the rm, as they have higher opportunity costs of staying in
entrepreneurship. Also, a larger number of job shifts in the past signicantly
hastens BOsexit, whatever their exit mode. In contrast, individuals becoming
BOs after losing their job in paid employment persist longer in the business
and show lower exit risks. The e¤ect is even larger for exits by dissolution, so
our results do not support that individuals coming from unemployment are less
able to run a business or more likely to fail as entrepreneurs (Carrasco, 1999;
Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Shane, 2009).16 Industry-specic knowledge
also seems to improve BOssurvival prospects, reducing both exit risks.
16However, we must underline that our analysis is conned to recent job losses. The lit-
erature often argues that nascent entrepreneurs coming from unemployment are more likely
to fail because their human capital, knowledge and skills tend to depreciate during longer
unemployment periods, or because they look at entrepreneurship as a last resort solution
for their problems in nding a job. In contrast, individuals losing their job and immediately
reacting by becoming BOs may correspond to high-ability unemployed individuals. For this
reason, we should not generalize our results, given that we focus on the e¤ect of recent
displacement episodes and our data do not allow an accurate identication of all types of
unemployed individuals (namely long-term unemployed individuals).
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Table 5. Estimation results from the cause-specic hazard models
(Portugal, 1992-2007)
Exit by Exit by
Dissolution Own. Transfer
Entry mode
Start-up entrepren. - shared ownership -0.9158*** 0.1625***
(0.0320) (0.0172)
Acquisition entrepren. - single ownership -0.3326*** 0.8513***
(0.0444) (0.0272)
Acquisition entrepren. - shared ownership -1.2603*** 1.0998***
(0.0414) (0.0228)
Intrapreneur single ownership -0.3350*** 0.7025***
(0.0367) (0.0227)
Intrapreneur - shared ownership -1.2264*** 0.9135***
(0.0389) (0.0209)
Prior experiences in the labor market
Experience in a large rm 0.2770*** 0.1327***
(0.0228) (0.0114)
Experience in a foreign rm -0.0092 0.1109***
(0.0293) (0.0147)
Number of di¤erent employers 0.1149*** 0.1460***
(0.0078) (0.0041)
Recent displacement -0.3630*** -0.2007***
(0.0270) (0.0146)
Years of experience in the industry -0.0434*** -0.0132***
(0.0025) (0.0012)
Macroeconomic environment
Lagged unemployment rate 0.0098** -0.2119***
(0.0046) (0.0028)
Individual-level characteristics
Male -0.1807*** -0.1956***
(0.0174) (0.0087)
Age -0.0641*** -0.1434***
(0.0053) (0.0029)
Age squared/100 0.0770*** 0.1750***
(0.0063) (0.0035)
9 years of schooling -0.1002*** -0.1587***
(0.0197) (0.0105)
(It continues in the next page...)
87
Table 5. Estimation results from the cause-specic hazard models
(Portugal, 1992-2007) Exit by Exit by
Dissolution Own. Transfer
Individual-level characteristics
12 years of schooling -0.1364*** -0.1338***
(0.0193) (0.0101)
College education -0.4849*** 0.0095
(0.0265) (0.0119)
Firm-level characteristics
Firm age -0.0396*** 0.0152***
(0.0014) (0.0005)
Firm age squared/100 0.0085*** -0.0034***
(0.0005) (0.0002)
Small rm -0.7423*** 0.3540***
(0.0229) (0.0091)
Medium rm -0.8524*** 1.1900***
(0.0431) (0.0192)
Large rm -1.9969*** 1.6927***
(0.1218) (0.0350)
Urban location 0.3853*** 0.0024
(0.0177) (0.0080)
Primary sector -0.1298*** 0.5682***
(0.0594) (0.0267)
Energy & Construction sector 0.6954*** -0.0041
(0.0293) (0.0134)
Services sector -0.0355* 0.0968***
(0.0208) (0.0098)
N 444,497 444,497
Log Likelihood -191,455.1 -367,763.6
u 1.4143 1.2550
Rho 0.7799 0.4892
LR test of rho=0 (2) 436.53*** 2305.42***
Notes: *, **, and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Cloglog model
with inverse gaussian frailty, weighted by the number of BOs in the rm at entry. "Start-up
entrepren. - single ownership" are the base category for entry mode. "Less than 9 years of
schooling" is the base category for BOseducation. Micro Firms are the base category for
rm size. Manufacturing is the base category for sector. Both specications also include 16
duration dummies to study the duration dependence of each exit mode.
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Fig. 5. The e¤ects of BOsfrailty and weighted estimation on duration
dependence
Adverse macroeconomic conditions seem to strongly discourage an exit
by OT, in line with the evidence that rms become acquisition targets more
frequently during more favorable economic periods (e.g., Bhattacharjee et al.,
2009). Though the overall risk of dissolution seems to slightly increase when
economic conditions worsen, younger BOs seem to resist to closing down their
rms during periods of higher unemployment, probably because they will not
nd better alternatives in the labor market (see Table A.III).
Regarding the remaining variables, men are found to survive longer than
women. Both exit risks seem to decrease with BOsage, starting to increase
after the forties. Higher levels of education are associated with lower exit rates,
and especially dissolution rates, in line with previous studies that found that
BOs human capital helps to prevent business closure (Bates, 1990; Headd,
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2003). The smaller and the younger the rm, the more likely will be an exit
by dissolution and the less likely will be an exit by OT. BOs operating in
urban areas are also found to face higher risks of dissolution, possibly due to
the pressure of competition.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the entry and exit of over 157,587 BOs, focusing on the
e¤ect of past experiences in the labor market, and identifying di¤erent entry
routes and exit modes for nascent BOs. Concerning entry, our ndings suggest
that the several types of BOs may be driven by di¤erent motivations. Entre-
preneurs seem to enter at younger ages and to be signicantly pushed by more
unstable trajectories in the labor market, namely by recent job losses and by a
larger number of job shifts between di¤erent employers. In contrast, a previous
job in a large-sized and/or a foreign-owned company apparently discourages
transitions from paid employment to entrepreneurship. Intrapreneurs seem to
emerge within very small domestic rms the typical family rm , especially
at middle-ages (around the forties). Adverse macroeconomic conditions are
found to discourage the entry of all BOs in general, though start-up entrepre-
neurs seem to be much more reactive, especially at younger ages, by entering
counter-cyclically.
Regarding BOspersistence and exit, our results show that di¤erent exit
modes can be predicted by BOsentry route. New BOs entering, alone, via
start-up are more likely to dissolve the rm, but much less likely to leave
by transferring the business to others. Industry-specic experience seems to
signicantly increase the persistence of BOs in the rm, supporting the im-
portance of learning-by-doing and informational advantages gained through
the accumulation of specic knowledge. Over again, employment experiences
in large-sized or foreign rms apparently increase the opportunity costs of
90
remaining in business-ownership, accelerating BOs exit decision.
BOsunobserved heterogeneity is also found to play a signicant role in
our estimations. After controlling for BOs frailty, our results suggest that
ownership transfers have a U-shaped duration dependence. Neglecting BOs
unobserved heterogeneity leads to an overestimation of the negative duration
dependence of dissolution hazards.
Finally, our results do not support the widespread belief that nascent en-
trepreneurs coming from unemployment are more likely to fail and leave their
business earlier. We nd that those who have been displaced immediately
before entering entrepreneurship survive longer, being less likely to leave the
business, whatever the exit mode. This may open new lines for future re-
search, as individuals entering entrepreneurship almost immediately after los-
ing their job may be a more reactive and high-ability group that becomes more
attached to the BO position, when compared to long-term unemployed indi-
viduals becoming BOs, who may, instead, be a low-ability group that looks
at entrepreneurship as a last resort solution, being possibly less able to run a
business.
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.I. Description of variables included in the empirical models 
Categories of variables Description of variables 
Prior experiences in the labor market as paid employee 
 Experience in a large firm  Dummy=1 if the individual has ever worked in a large firm (250+ employees) in the past. 
 Experience in a foreign firm Dummy=1 if the individual has ever worked in a foreign firm (foreign capital >=50%) in the past. 
 Number of different employers  Number of different firms where the individual has already worked as paid employee until period t. 
 Recent displacement  Dummy=1 if the individual has exited a previous job in a firm that either closed or suffered a 
downsizing.  
 Years of experience in the (2-
digit) industry* 
Number of years of experience (as paid employee) in the 2-digit industry where the individual has 
entered as business-owner. 
Macroeconomic environment 
 Lagged unemployment rate Annual lagged unemployment rate (one year lag).  
Entry mode* 
 Start-up entrepreneur single 
ownership 
Dummy=1 if the individual becomes an Entrepreneur by establishing a new business alone; 0 
otherwise.  
 Start-up entrepreneur shared 
ownership 
Dummy=1 if the individual becomes an Entrepreneur by establishing a new business with others; 0 
otherwise. 
 Acquisition entrepreneur single 
ownership 
Dummy=1 if the individual becomes an Entrepreneur by acquiring an existing business alone; 0 
otherwise. 
 Acquisition entrepreneur 
shared ownership 
Dummy=1 if the individual becomes an Entrepreneur by acquiring an existing business with 
others; 0 otherwise. 
 Intrapreneur single ownership 
(employee buyout) 
Dummy=1 if the individual becomes the only BO of the employer firm; 0 otherwise. 
 Intrapreneur shared ownership 
(partnership) 
Dummy=1 if the individual becomes one of the BOs of the employer firm; 0 otherwise. 
Individual-level characteristics 
 Male  Dummy=1 for males, 0 for females. 
 Age Age of the individual in years, in period t.  
 Age squared/100 Squared value of the age of the individual in period t, divided by 100.  
 Less than 9 years of schoolinga Dummy=1 if the individual has less than 9 years of schooling completed in period t, 0 otherwise.  
 9 years of schooling  Dummy=1 if the individual has 9 years of schooling completed in period t, 0 otherwise.  
 12 years of schooling Dummy=1 if the individual has 12 years of schooling completed in period t, 0 otherwise.  
 College education  Dummy=1 if the individual has a college degree (including masters and/or PhD degrees) in period 
t, 0 otherwise.  
Previous wage job characteristics 
 Overeducation  Dummy=1 if the individual was overeducated in the previous wage job, 0 otherwise.  
 Tenure  Tenure of the worker in the previous wage job, in months.  
 Tenure squared/100 Squared value of the individual's tenure in the previous wage job, divided by 100.  
 Management position  Dummy=1 if the individual occupied a management position in the previous wage job, 0 otherwise.  
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 Table A.I. Description of variables included in the empirical models (cont.) 
 
Categories of variables Description of variables 
 Hourly wage  Ratio of the base wage and regular benefits over the total number of normal hours worked in the 
reference month, in logs (wages in 2005 euros).  
 Foreign firm Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed had 50% or more of its 
capital held by foreign investors, 0 otherwise.  
 Micro firm  Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed had less than 10 employees, 0 
otherwise.  
 Small firm Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed had between 10 and 49 
employees, 0 otherwise.  
 Medium firm Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed had between 50 and 249 
employees, 0 otherwise.  
 Large firm Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed had 250 or more employees, 
0 otherwise.  
 Urban location  Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed was located in an urban 
center (i.e. districts of Porto and Lisbon), 0 otherwise.  
 Primary sector  Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed was operating in the primary 
sector, 0 otherwise.  
 Manufacturing Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed was operating in the 
manufacturing industry, 0 otherwise.  
 Energy & Construction sector Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed was operating in the energy 
or construction sectors, 0 otherwise.  
 Services sector Dummy=1 if the firm where the individual was previously employed was operating in the services 
sector, 0 otherwise.  
Firm-level characteristics* 
 Firm age Age of the firm in years.  
 Firm age squared/100 Squared value of the firm age, divided by 100. 
 Micro firm Dummy=1 if the BO's firm is micro-sized (less than 10 employees); 0 otherwise. 
 Small firm Dummy=1 if the BO's firm is small-sized (10-49 employees); 0 otherwise.  
 Medium firm Dummy=1 if the BO's firm is medium-sized (50-249 employees); 0 otherwise. 
 Large firm Dummy=1 if the BO's firm is large-sized (250 or more employees); 0 otherwise.  
 Urban location  Dummy=1 if the BO's firm is located in an urban center (districts of Porto or Lisbon); 0 otherwise.  
 Primary sector  Dummy=1 if the BO's firm belongs to the Primary sector; 0 otherwise.  
 Manufacturing Dummy=1 if the BO's firm belongs to the Manufacturing industry; 0 otherwise.  
 Energy & Construction sector Dummy=1 if the BO's firm belongs to the Energy or Construction sectors; 0 otherwise.  
 Services sector Dummy=1 if the BO's firm belongs to the Services sector; 0 otherwise.  
 
Notes: * denotes variables that are only included in the estimations of duration models to study BO's duration in the firm.  
 
Table A.II. Multinomial logit estimation results for the sub-sample of
young individuals ( 30 years old) (Portugal, 1992-2007)
Start-up Acquisition Intrapreneur
Entrepreneur Entrepreneur
Prior experiences in the labor market
Experience in a large rm -0.7319*** -0.6179*** -0.1734***
(0.0187) (0.0257) (0.0326)
Experience in a foreign rm -0.2086*** -0.1518*** 0.0871***
(0.0233) (0.0327) (0.0422)
Number of di¤erent employers 1.1652*** 1.1891*** 0.1210***
(0.0060) (0.0079) (0.0114)
Previous wage job characteristics
Overeducation -0.0328** -0.0656*** 0.1537***
(0.0148) (0.0223) (0.0171)
Tenure 0.0191*** 0.0178*** 0.0020***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Tenure squared/100 -0.0044*** -0.0037*** 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Management position 0.7611*** 0.9100*** 3.3175***
(0.0460) (0.0688) (0.0291)
Hourly wage -0.1093*** -0.2103*** -0.2488***
(0.0222) (0.0349) (0.0264)
Foreign rm -0.0138 -0.0593 -1.1820***
(0.0276) (0.0382) (0.0768)
Small rm -0.5740*** -0.3408*** -1.1534***
(0.0159) (0.0258) (0.0190)
Medium rm -1.1409*** -0.6348*** -2.3283***
(0.0212) (0.0309) (0.0334)
Large rm -1.2982*** -0.7154*** -3.7175***
(0.0239) (0.0325) (0.0675)
Urban location -0.1147*** 0.0082 -0.0370**
(0.0144) (0.0222) (0.0170)
Primary sector -0.2277*** 0.0348 -0.0272
(0.0592) (0.0842) (0.0569)
(It continues in the next page...)
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Table A.II. Multinomial logit estimation results for the sub-sample of
young individuals ( 30 years old) (Portugal, 1992-2007)
Start-up Acquisition Intrapreneur
Entrepreneur Entrepreneur
Previous wage job characteristics
Energy & Construction sectors 0.1696*** 0.0497 -0.0070
(0.0235) (0.0380) (0.0285)
Services sector 0.1769*** 0.1949*** -0.0912***
(0.0178) (0.0269) (0.0215)
Individual-level characteristics
Male 0.6660*** 0.4038*** 0.4488***
(0.0158) (0.0236) (0.0183)
Age 0.4422*** 0.1034*** 0.3367***
(0.0292) (0.0410) (0.0332)
Age squared/100 -1.0841*** -0.4459*** -0.5627***
(0.0585) (0.0832) (0.0669)
9 years of schooling 0.6928*** 0.4994*** 0.5136***
(0.0214) (0.0329) (0.0251)
12 years of schooling 0.9152*** 0.7828*** 0.5667***
(0.0204) (0.0318) (0.0249)
College education 1.8873*** 1.9649*** 0.7400***
(0.0331) (0.0508) (0.0421)
Macroeconomic environment
Lagged unemployment rate 0.0990*** -0.1658*** -0.1254***
(0.0116) (0.0148) (0.0097)
Constant -13.9241*** -8.5841*** -9.8856***
(0.3640) (0.5003) (0.4088)
Time Dummies YES YES YES
N 9,392,808
Log Pseudo-likelihood -316,570.5
Pseudo R2 0.1429
Notes: *, **, and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Worker-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. Micro Firms are used as the base category for rm
size. Manufacturing is used as the base category for sector. An indicator variable for less
than 9 years of schoolingis used as the base category for individuals education.
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Table A.III. Estimation results from the cause-specic hazard models
(sub-sample of young individuals,  30 years old, Portugal, 1992-2007)
Exit by Exit by
Dissolution Own. Transfer
Entry mode
Start-up entrepren. - shared ownership -0.6451*** 0.1517***
(0.0453) (0.0276)
Acquisition entrepren. - single ownership -0.1885*** 0.7491***
(0.0562) (0.0468)
Acquisition entrepren. - shared ownership -1.0011*** 1.0370***
(0.0694) (0.0368)
Intrapreneur single ownership -0.2232*** 0.8136***
(0.0514) (0.0425)
Intrapreneur -shared ownership -0.8775*** 0.9359***
(0.0610) (0.0352)
Prior experiences in the labor market
Experience in a large rm 0.1438*** 0.2052***
(0.0316) (0.0223)
Experience in a foreign rm 0.0412 0.1052***
(0.0404) (0.0287)
Number of di¤erent employers 0.1084*** 0.1637***
(0.0123) (0.0085)
Recent displacement -0.2720*** -0.2281***
(0.0331) (0.0238)
Years of experience in the industry -0.0567*** -0.0296***
(0.0049) (0.0030)
Macroeconomic environment
Lagged unemployment rate -0.0180*** -0.2113***
(0.0065) (0.0048)
Individual-level characteristics
Male -0.2522*** -0.2960***
(0.0241) (0.0157)
Age -0.0377** -0.2073***
(0.0156) (0.0096)
Age squared/100 0.0496* 0.2592***
(0.0262) (0.0153)
9 years of schooling -0.0852*** -0.1609***
(0.0264) (0.0177)
(It continues in the next page...)
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Table A.III. Estimation results from the cause-specic hazard models
(sub-sample of young individuals,  30 years old, Portugal, 1992-2007)
Exit by Exit by
Dissolution Own. Transfer
Individual-level characteristics
12 years of schooling -0.1277*** -0.1432***
(0.0247) (0.0165)
College education -0.4011*** -0.0589***
(0.0383) (0.0219)
Firm-level characteristics
Firm age -0.0366*** 0.0114***
(0.0023) (0.0009)
Firm age squared/100 0.0079*** -0.0024***
(0.0007) (0.0004)
Small rm -0.6269*** 0.3200***
(0.0391) (0.0157)
Medium rm -1.1038*** 1.1780***
(0.0812) (0.0320)
Large rm -1.7400*** 1.7175***
(0.2074) (0.0664)
Urban location 0.2686*** -0.0015
(0.0254) (0.0138)
Primary sector -0.2509*** 0.4931***
(0.0837) (0.0484)
Energy & Construction sectors 0.3134*** -0.0309
(0.0380) (0.0228)
Services sector -0.0353 0.0826***
(0.0263) (0.0171)
N 127,802 127,802
Log Likelihood -59,128.9 -109,477.3
u 1.2441 1.1423
Rho 0.4848 0.4423
LR test of rho=0 (2) 65.47*** 676.75***
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reference
categories: "Start-up entrepreneurs - single ownership" for entry mode; Micro Firms for rm
size; Manufacturing for sector; "Less than 9 years of schooling" for BOseducation. Both
specications also include 16 duration dummies.
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Fig. A.I. The e¤ects of BOsfrailty and weighted estimation on duration
dependence - sub-sample of young individuals ( 30 years old)
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Abstract
It remains a question whether serial entrepreneurs typically per-
form better than their novice counterparts owing to learning by doing
e¤ects or mostly because they are a selected sample of higher-than-
average ability entrepreneurs. This paper tries to unravel these two
e¤ects by exploring a novel empirical strategy based on continuous
time duration models with selection. We use a large longitudinal
matched employer-employee dataset that allows us to identify about
220,000 individuals who have left their rst entrepreneurial experi-
ence, out of which over 35,000 became serial entrepreneurs. We evalu-
ate whether entrepreneurial experience acquired in the previous busi-
ness improves serial entrepreneurssurvival, after taking into account
self-selection issues. Our results show that serial entrepreneurs are
not a random sample of ex-business-owners. Robustness tests based
on the estimation of the person-specic e¤ect, using information on
individualspast histories in paid employment, conrm that serial en-
trepreneurs exhibit, on average, a larger person-specic e¤ect than
non-serial business-owners. Moreover, ignoring serial entrepreneurs
self-selection overestimates learning by doing e¤ects.
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JEL Codes: D83, J24, L26
We are grateful to Francisco Lima, Helena Szrek and José Varejão, as well as to par-
ticipants at the XXVIII Jornadas de Economía Industrial (held in Segovia, in September
2013), in particular to Vicente Salas Fumás, for their valuable comments and suggestions
on previous versions of this paper.
107
1 Introduction
Most of the seminal theories of industry evolution that incorporate entrepre-
neurship as a means of market entry assume that exit is a nal event: once it
has occurred, reentry (into the same or a di¤erent industry) is not an option
(e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994).
Nevertheless, not only there is a growing awareness that entrepreneurship is
not solely conned to the creation of a new business as a single-action event
(Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Plehn-Dujowich, 2010; Sarasvathy et al., 2013), as also
empirical evidence conrms that a signicant part of entrepreneurial activity
around the world is conducted by serial (or renascent) entrepreneurs.1
As a result, serial entrepreneurs have been gaining an increasing attention
of scholars and, especially, policymakers, who have enlarged entrepreneurial
incentives so as to target both experienced and novice entrepreneurs (see West-
head et al., 2003, 2005a, 2005b). Moved by the widespread belief that serial
entrepreneurs will perform better owing to learning e¤ects from past entre-
preneurial experiences (Cope and Watts, 2000; Minniti and Bygrave, 2001;
Cope, 2005, 2011), many European countries in particular have launched new
programs to promote a fresh restart of ex-entrepreneurs, especially of those
who performed poorly in the past and who would, otherwise, feel prevented
to try again due to the so-called stigma of failure(European Commission,
2002, 2011).
However, and despite the early recognized value of studying serial entre-
preneurship (e.g., MacMillan, 1986), empirical research on this topic is still
at the beginning stage due to the lack of suitable data (Zhang, 2011; Parker,
2012; Sarasvathy et al., 2013), as most data collection e¤orts cover only one of
1Serial entrepreneurs have been broadly dened as individuals who have sold or closed
a business in which they had a minority or majority ownership stake in the past, and who
currently own (alone or with others) a di¤erent independent business that is either new,
purchased or inherited (Westhead et al., 2005a). The increasing relevance of this group of
entrepreneurs has been documented in several countries see, for instance, Westhead and
Wright (1998) and Westhead et al. (2005a) for UK, Wagner (2003) for Germany, Hyytinen
and Ilmakunnas (2007) for Finland and Headd (2003) for USA.
108
a series of businesses, or track rms rather than entrepreneurs. Consequently,
the research on serial entrepreneurship conducted so far is mostly descriptive
or particularly concerned with establishing comparisons between serial and
nascent entrepreneurs (e.g., Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Westhead et al., 2005a,
2005b; Li et al., 2009; Ucbasaran et al., 2010; Robson et al., 2012; Kirschen-
hofer and Lechner, 2012).
While a more recent stream of work has been increasingly interested in the
dynamics of serial entrepreneurship process, substantial knowledge about how
(or whether) entrepreneurs e¤ectively learn with past experience is still lack-
ing.2 On the one hand, latest empirical results have o¤ered little condence
on signicant learning by doing e¤ects (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; Nielsen and
Sarasvathy, 2011; Parker, 2012; Frankish et al., 2012). On the other hand, an
emerging concern about self-selection among serial entrepreneurs is blurring
the broad expectations about true entrepreneurial learning (Chen, 2013). Ac-
cordingly, it remains a question whether serial entrepreneurs typically perform
better than their novice counterparts because they have learned about running
a business and have improved their entrepreneurial skills with their past ex-
perience or, instead, mostly because they are a selected sample of high-ability
entrepreneurs. Disentangling the e¤ects of learning by doing from learning
about own ability when assessing the performance of serial entrepreneurs has,
thus, became an empirical challenge.
In this regard, this study contributes to this debate and tries to unravel
these two e¤ects by exploring a novel empirical strategy. Using the methodol-
ogy developed by Boehmke et al. (2006), we estimate continuous time duration
models that account for selection bias to study how previous entrepreneurial
experience inuences the survival of serial entrepreneurs in their second busi-
ness. The analysis is based on a large longitudinal matched employer-employee
dataset for Portugal (Quadros de Pessoal), where serial entrepreneurs already
2See Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas (2007), Stam et al. (2008), Amaral et al. (2011)
and Hessels et al. (2011) for a particular emphasis on the determinants of reentry into
entrepreneurship.
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account for a signicant part of the entrepreneurial activity in the country 
data for the most recent years reveal that more than 20% of all new businesses
were created by renascent (i.e., serial) entrepreneurs.
About 220,000 ex-business-owners are identied, out of which 35,202 have
tried again, by becoming serial entrepreneurs. Our results and robustness
checks seem to conrm that serial entrepreneurs are not a random sample, but
a group of higher-than-average ability ex-business-owners, which signicantly
moderates any learning by doing e¤ects that might be transferred between
sequential entrepreneurial experiences. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the rst comprehensive study that attempts to evaluate entrepreneurial learn-
ing e¤ects using a unique and rich matched employer-employee datatset and
appropriate econometric tools, namely duration models with sample selection.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2
briey presents prior literature on serial entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial
learning and establishes the objectives of the paper. Section 3 describes the
data and the methodological procedures. The empirical results are presented
and discussed in Section 4. Robustness checks are described and reported in
the fth Section. Section 6 concludes.
2 Learning by doing and self-selection: two
sources of serial entrepreneurship dynamics
2.1 Previous literature on entrepreneurial learning
The belief that entrepreneurs learn from experience is not recent (see von
Hayek, 1937), and this idea has been expressed by several highly inuential
models on dynamic industrial organization over the last thirty years (e.g., Jo-
vanovic, 1982; Frank, 1988; Hopenhayn, 1992; Ericsson and Pakes, 1995). As
Minniti and Bygrave (2001: 7) explicitly state, entrepreneurship is a process
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of learning, and a theory of entrepreneurship requires a theory of learning.
Consequently, several theoretical and conceptual attempts were developed dur-
ing the last decade, trying to identify the mechanisms through which entrepre-
neurs learn, update beliefs and, consequently, improve their performance (e.g.,
Cope, 2005; Fraser and Greene, 2006; Parker, 2006; Petkova, 2009; Plehn-
Dujowich, 2010; Ucbasaran et al., 2012).
As a result, the positive relationship between previous entrepreneurial ex-
perience and current business performance became a kind of stylized fact in
entrepreneurship research. Formally, by describing entrepreneursperformance
PF (either measured by business prots, growth or survival, just to name a
few performance measures) as a function of their entrepreneurial experience E,
ability , and a wide set of characteristics of entrepreneurs, rms and indus-
tries X PF (E; ;X) , this learning by doing hypothesishence predicts
that PFE > 0.
Empirical evidence on the observed di¤erences between novice and serial
entrepreneurs has been reinforcing this expectation of signicant learning by
doing e¤ects. By being more able to access nancial resources, more alert to
business opportunities and better endowed with a larger set of entrepreneurial
skills, experienced entrepreneurs tend to o¤er more attractive growth prospects
than rst time entrepreneurs (Wright et al., 1997; Westhead and Wright, 1998;
Westhead et al., 2003, 2005a, 2005b). Additionally, more recent studies have
also showed that experienced entrepreneurs are usually better at developing
networks (Li et al., 2009), more likely to gain access to venture capital (Zhang,
2011), more prone to take risks and pursue innovative activities (Robson et al.,
2012), and also more capable of building more e¤ective and diversied teams
(Kirschenhofer and Lechner, 2012) than their nascent counterparts.
While all these studies have signicantly contributed to our knowledge
about how di¤erent are serial and novice entrepreneurs, they have o¤ered
no systematic empirical evaluation of learning e¤ects resulting from entrepre-
neurspast experience. Only more recent studies have tried to address this
issue, either by comparing the outcomes of entrepreneurs with and without
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experience (Frankish et al., 2012), or by evaluating how serial entrepreneurs
performance in one venture is related to their performance in a subsequent
venture (Gompers et al., 2010; Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2011; Parker, 2012;
Chen, 2013). Nevertheless, none of their results has undoubtedly supported
that serial entrepreneurs perform better owing to the experience accumulated
in previous businesses.
Both Frankish et al. (2012) and Nielsen and Sarasvathy (2011) have an-
alyzed the 3-year survival rate of new businesses for UK and Denmark, re-
spectively. While the former found no signicant survival di¤erences between
novice and experienced entrepreneurs, the latter concluded that some form of
absorptive capacity (in terms of education and prior industry background) is
necessary for entrepreneurs to benet from any learning opportunities. Other
authors have suggested that good performance in one venture tends to be asso-
ciated with good performance in subsequent ventures, though the e¤ects may
be temporary (Parker, 2012) and partly driven by some type of skills exhib-
ited by serial entrepreneurs as their market timing ability, which may help
them to start a company at the right time in the right industry (Gompers et
al., 2010).
These results may, in part, suggest that, on the one hand, entrepreneurial
experience per se may be not enough to improve business performance, as en-
trepreneursexperience and ability are probably complements (i.e., PFE > 0;
PF > 0; PFE > 0)  the more able (or skilled) an entrepreneur is, the
more s/he will benet from past experience and the better will be subsequent
business performance. On the other hand, it is also possible that serial en-
trepreneurs are not a random sample of ex-entrepreneurs, but a higher-than-
average ability group of individuals, so that 
Serial
> 
Non serial
. If that is
the case, and if moreover  and E are signicantly and positively correlated,
serial entrepreneurs higher ability may play a dominant e¤ect on business
performance, while true learning by doing e¤ects (i.e., learning by doing ef-
fects expurgated from serial entrepreneurseventual self-selection e¤ects) are
possibly overestimated (i.e., 0 < PFE j (Serial   Non serial) < PFE) or even
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negligible (PFE j (Serial   Non serial) ' 0).
Despite selection on ability as a source of serial entrepreneurship dynamics
had been early proposed by seminal theories of industry evolution, the liter-
ature on serial entrepreneurs has virtually neglected this aspect for decades.
Theoretical grounds not only suggested that unobserved talent shapes entre-
preneurial entry, but also that individuals learn and update their beliefs about
their entrepreneurial ability as they accumulate experience as entrepreneurs
(Jovanovic, 1982; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990). This phenomenon is expected to
generate a dynamic process where high-skill entrepreneurs tend to shut down
businesses of low quality to become serial entrepreneurs, aiming at nding a
high quality business, while low-skill entrepreneurs are expected to shut down
their businesses of low quality to enter the labor market (Plehn-Dujowich,
2010).
To the best of our knowledge, only the recent work by Chen (2013) has
recognized the importance of self-selection, fostering the discussion about po-
tential misleading interpretations of learning by doing e¤ects among studies
neglecting this second (though closely related) source of dynamics among serial
entrepreneurs learning about own ability. By combining xed-e¤ects panel
data models and IV estimation for a sample of about 3,200 serial entrepreneurs
in the U.S., she actually concluded that self-selection on ability rather than
learning by doing  is the key determinant of the early performance of new
businesses. These results not only challenge the prevalent views that entrepre-
neurship can be learned and that next businesses will always be better than
the previous one owing to past experience, as also claim for further research
on serial entrepreneurship and the sources of learning.
2.2 Research questions and objectives
This paper contributes to this emerging debate by evaluating to what extent
serial entrepreneurs learn with past experience, after controlling for potential
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biases driven by self-selection into serial entrepreneurship. We characterize en-
trepreneurial experience E using three variables: i) the cumulative years the
individual has survived as business-owner in the rst entrepreneurial experi-
ence; ii) previous experience as a start-up founder; and iii) industry-specic
experience. Regarding the performance measure analyzed in this study, we
focus on serial entrepreneurssurvival.
According to prior literature, we would anticipate positive (negative) and
signicant e¤ects from each of these variables on serial entrepreneurssurvival
(exit). First, by running a business, entrepreneurs acquire unique specic
resources, knowledge, skills and contacts that can be used to start and/or
acquire subsequent businesses. For this reason, the longer an individual has
been in a business in the past successful or not the more s/he is likely to have
learned about being an entrepreneur, and the larger the stock of knowledge
that may be accumulated about customers and suppliers, the wider will be the
networks of contacts, as well as market-specic information (Cope and Watts,
2000; Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Frankish et al., 2012; Parker, 2012), which may
constitute important resources when they decide to try again as entrepreneurs.
Second, the particular experience of founding a rm given that not all
individuals become entrepreneurs by creating a start-up venture (see, Parker
and van Praag, 2011; Bastié et al., 2013; Rocha et al., 2013)  may also
deliver greater opportunities to learn about the overall entrepreneurial process.
Starting a rm from scratch requires a wide range of skills, and prior rm-
founding experience is believed to help an entrepreneur to acquire and enhance
such skills (Zhang, 2011). In addition, learning experiences are expected to be
mostly relevant during businessinfancy, i.e., during the rst few years of the
rm (van Gelderen et al., 2005).
Finally, learning by doing may also arise from industry-specic experience
(Frankish et al., 2012; Chen, 2013). Individuals becoming serial entrepreneurs
by establishing a business in the same industry where they operated in the past
may benet from informational advantages and su¤er from lower uncertainty,
which may also contribute to their resilience in their second entrepreneurial
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attempt.
However, performance (in this case, hazard rates) is only observed for ex-
business-owners reentering and becoming serial entrepreneurs. This would not
be a problem if serial entrepreneurs are a random selection of all ex-business-
owners (i.e., if 
Serial
= 
Non serial
). Nevertheless, there may be unobserved
factors related with ability di¤erences among serial and non-serial entrepre-
neurs that simultaneously a¤ect the reentry decision (i.e., the selection in
the sample) and the post-reentry performance (precisely, the hazard rates).
In such case, the previous estimated e¤ects of entrepreneurial experience
may be unreliable  as explained above, the eventual negative association
between serial entrepreneurshazard rates and experience may not be the result
of true learning by doing, but the result of a higher-than-average (unobserved)
entrepreneurial ability of serial entrepreneurs. For instance, it is possible that
some individuals have survived longer in the rst business, or started a new
venture from scratch instead of acquiring an existing rm, mainly because they
are high-quality entrepreneurs. Similarly, those who have chosen to reenter
and remain in the same industry may have made this choice because they
have perceived to be more able to run a business in that particular industry
than in any other one.
Accordingly, the main goal of this paper is to evaluate whether learning by
doing hypothesis is veried in our data (i.e., whether hE < 0, with h(E; ;X)
generally denoting serial entrepreneurshazard rates), taking into account self-
selection issues.
3 Data and Methodological Issues
3.1 Data
This study uses data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal matched
employer-employee administrative dataset from the Portuguese Ministry of
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Employment. QP is an annual mandatory employment survey that all rms in
the private sector employing at least one wage earner are legally obliged to ll
in.3 Requested data cover rms/establishments (e.g., location, employment,
industry, sales, ownership, among others) and each of its workers (for instance,
professional situation, gender, age, education, occupational category and skill
levels). Firms/establishments and individuals (both workers and business-
owners) are identied by a unique identication number, so they can be tracked
and matched over time, thus providing very rich information on individuals
backgrounds, career paths and transitions across rms and industries. All
these characteristics of the dataset make QP a suitable database for a dynamic
analysis of serial entrepreneurship.
Raw QP les are available for the period 1986-2009, though there is a gap
for the particular years of 1990 and 2001, for which there is no available infor-
mation at the individual-level. We restrict our study to serial entrepreneurs
reentering into entrepreneurship between 1993 and 2007, excluding reentries
occurring in 2001 or 2002.4 Data for the period 1986-1992 was only used to
characterize individualsprevious experiences as entrepreneurs or paid employ-
ees.
The entrepreneur denition used in this study corresponds to business-
owners (BOs) of rms with at least one wage earner (i.e., employers). We
identify serial entrepreneurs in particular as those ex-BOs who become BOs
again, in a di¤erent rm, after leaving their rst entrepreneurial experience.
3For this reason, self-employed individuals without employees are not covered by QP.
4To avoid measurement errors on the time spent until reentry into entrepreneurship - one
of the variables to be included in our estimations - we had to exclude reentries occurring in
2002, as we are not able to ensure whether the reentry occurs in 2001 (for which no data
are available at the worker-level) or in 2002. Besides, we exclude reentries occurring after
2007 because, given the criteria adopted to identify business-owners exit, we need at least
two years of available information after his/her reentry to clearly identify individuals exit.
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3.2 Identifying the entry and exit of serial entrepre-
neurs
We started by identifying in QP les all BOs who left their rst business own-
ership experience.5 A total of 219,462 ex-BOs, aged between 16 and 50 years
old, were identied and tracked over time, in order to nd out who has reen-
tered and became BO in a second rm, and who did not.6 About 16% of them
(precisely 35,202 ex-BOs) have tried a second chance by becoming serial en-
trepreneurs during the period 1993-2007. These serial entrepreneurs must be
understood as small businessesowners, given that the great majority of them
own micro or small rms. Over 90% of them either run a limited liability com-
pany (Sociedade por Quotas) or a single-ownership business (Empresário em
Nome Individual), and most of them (about 65%) are established in Services.
For each of those 219,462 ex-BOs, we have retained a set of information
related to the previous business-ownership experience, namely the time (in
years) the individual has survived as BO in the rst business, the entry mode in
5A BO was considered to have left the previous business if s/he has denitely exited
the BO status in the previous rm. To consider that a denite exit has taken place, we
have imposed an absence of the BO from the rm larger or equal to two consecutive years.
Accordingly, the identication of ex-BOsexits had to stop in 2007, as data for 2008 and
2009 were only used to check the presence/absence of each BO in the respective business.
Even so, as this study covers reentries occurring between 1993 and 2007, we must restrict
the analysis to ex-BOs who have left their prior business until 2006. Previous portfolio
BOs were also excluded as we are mainly interested in particular characteristics of the rst
business ownership experience (which must be unique) when taking into account the non-
randomness of serial BOs. Portfolio BOs account for less than 1% of all ex-BOs in the
dataset, so their exclusion has no signicant impact on our results.
6By imposing the upper limit of 50 years old by the time of the exit from the rst busi-
ness we are minimizing the reentries of serial entrepreneurs after attaining the retirement
age. Additionally, in order to avoid any bias caused by eventual entrepreneurial experiences
occurring before 1986 (thus, not identied in the data), we follow Amaral et al. (2011) and
conduct some robustness checks for the sub-sample of ex-BOs who were 30 or younger when
leaving their initial business. Even so, they also found that the probability of reentering
into entrepreneurship is much higher during the years immediately following the exit from
the previous business, also using QP data. So, given that we only consider reentries occur-
ring from 1993 onwards, we believe that those potential left-censoring issues do not pose
signicant problems in our analysis, as those who were BOs prior to 1986 are estimated to
be very unlikely to become serial entrepreneurs so many years later.
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the previous business (start-up versus acquisition) and the respective industry.
Additional information regarding the size of the rm at the moment of exit,
the location of the rm, the ownership structure of the previous business and
the exit mode7 adopted by the BO was also gathered, as those variables may
play a role when explaining the decision of reentering into entrepreneurship
(i.e., the selection process of serial entrepreneurs).
We have then followed each of those 35,202 serial entrepreneurs over time,
since the moment of their reentry until their last record in QP les, which may
either correspond to the moment of their exit from the second business, or to
the last year of available information in the dataset  right-censored cases
(Lancaster, 1990; Jenkins, 2005). Following the same procedures adopted
to identify the exit of the BOs from the rst business, we have required an
absence of each BO from the rm, or from the BO position, larger or equal to
two consecutive years in order to identify serial BOsexit year.
3.3 Econometric Model: Specication and Estimation
As the primary variable of interest is the time spent by serial BOs in their
second business, hazard models were considered. A spell starts when an ex-BO
becomes a serial entrepreneur. The duration of that spell corresponds to the
7Regarding the exit mode followed by BOs in their rst experience, QP dataset allows
us to distinguish those who have left by closing down the rm from those who have exited
by transferring the business to others. However, despite some studies associate an exit by
dissolution to failure and an exit by ownership transfer to a more successful entrepreneurial
experience (e.g., Stam et al., 2008; Amaral et al., 2011; Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2011), we
cannot ensure that this was actually the case, as QP does not provide nancial data at the
rm-level. Actually, as Amaral et al. (2011: 7) also recognize, an unsuccessful entrepreneur-
ial experience may be understood as the failure to attain or exceed a performance threshold
required by the entrepreneur to keep the business running (Gimeno et al., 1997; McCann
and Folta, 2012), which does not necessarily indicate that the business is economically unvi-
able. Consequently, some businesses may be transferred to other entrepreneurs with a lower
performance threshold. Accordingly, we do not associate more (un)successful experiences
to any of these particular exit modes and we use the information on BOs exit mode from
the rst business just as a control variable when studying individualsreentry decisions.
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time elapsed until the exit of the individual from this second entrepreneurial
experience. Single-spell duration data were hence obtained by ow sampling.
The nal dataset was constructed in a continuous survival time format in order
to estimate the continuous time duration models, controlling for individuals
selection bias, proposed by Boehmke et al. (2006).
We started by testing the suitability of semi-parametric and several para-
metric survival models (see, for instance, Lee and Wang, 2003; Jenkins, 2005;
Cleves et al., 2010) accounting as well for individual-level unobserved het-
erogeneity, which may produce biased results when ignored (Hougaard, 1995;
Jenkins, 2005). All the estimated models were evaluated and compared in
terms of their Log-Likelihood, Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Cox-
Snell residuals.8 According to these initial tests, Weibull proportional hazard
model was found to provide a very satisfactory t to the data.
In order to have a rst idea on potential learning by doing e¤ects, we started
by estimating our Naïve Weibull model(as in Boehmke et al., 2006), without
taking into account self-selection issues. Formally, for each serial BO i, the
probability of exit at time tj, j = 1; 2; : : :, given survival until then, can be
dened as
h(tijji; Ei; Xi) = ip exp(E 0i1 +X
0
i2)t
p 1"ij; (1)
where i corresponds to the time invariant individual-level unobserved hetero-
geneity term (e.g., individuals ability); p is a shape parameter determining
the duration dependence of the hazard rates (being positive (negative) when-
ever p is higher (lower) than 1); Ei is the vector of entrepreneurial experience
measures; Xi is a vector of individual and rm time-invariant characteristics,
measured at reentry; 1 and 2 are vectors of unknown parameters to be
estimated; and "ij is the error term. The parameters of interest related to
potential learning by doing e¤ects are those included in 1.
8Conventional wisdom (e.g., Cleves et al., 2010) suggests that the best-tting model is
the one with the largest Log-Likelihood and the smallest AIC value.
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However, this naïve analysis of serial entrepreneursperformance may be
biased if there is signicant self-selection in the sample of serial BOs. As
previously exposed, this problem arises because the outcome of interest 
h(tijji; Ei; Xi) is only observed for those who have become BOs for a second
time. So, formally, we have the following two-equation model:
h(tijji; Ei; Xi) =
(
ip exp(E
0
i1 +X
0
i2)t
p 1"ij
 
if yi > 0
if yi  0
(2)
ci =
(
1 if yi > 0
0 if yi  0
(3)
where yi = 0 + Z
0
i1 + ui represents a latent variable measuring the dif-
ference in the utility (or prot) between reentering and not reentering into
entrepreneurship, and ci is the corresponding observable realization of reentry
decision. Self-selection becomes a problem whenever the error terms of both
equations are signicantly correlated, which means that there might be factors
a¤ecting the survival of serial BOs in their second business that also a¤ected
their decision of reentering and starting a second entrepreneurial experience.
In order to control for these e¤ects, we use the estimator developed by
Boehmke et al. (2006) to estimate a Weibull duration model with selection.
Following the logic of existing models for non-random sample selection, this
method allows us to model simultaneously both processes the selection of
individuals into serial entrepreneurship and their survival while serial entre-
preneurs. The errors of both equations are allowed to be correlated according
to a bivariate exponential distribution. Right-censored durations are also ac-
commodated by this method.
The vector of variables included in the selection equation covers some ex-
BOs characteristics (gender and education), a set of specicities related to
the previous business owned by each individual (location, industry, exit mode
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and ownership structure), as well as the status of each individual in the labor
market before transiting.9
Finally, to overcome potential identication problems, we use as exclu-
sion restriction a variable that, to some extent, proxies individuals risk aver-
sion and entrepreneurial spirit the age at which each individual became a
business-owner for the rst time. We may expect that individuals entering en-
trepreneurship at a younger age are less risk-averse and more entrepreneurial
by nature.10 Consequently, we may also expect that those individuals will be
more likely to reenter into entrepreneurship and become serial entrepreneurs
later on. In contrast, the age at which individuals became entrepreneurs for
the rst time, in itself, is not expected to inuence the performance while ser-
ial entrepreneurs, after controlling for the accumulated experience as BOs and
other specicities of previous entrepreneurial experience, as well as individuals
unobserved characteristics.
The lack of more detailed information at the individual-level for instance
regarding individualswealth or access to nancial resources unfortunately
prevents us to use other suitable exclusion restrictions. Even so, the variable
under consideration may also be a proxy for individualsincome at younger
ages, individualswealth is more likely to be lower.11 Cabral and Mata (2003)
9Regarding the individuals status in the labor market before reentering as serial en-
trepreneurs, QP data allow us to identify whether or not the individual has been in paid
employment after leaving the rst entrepreneurial experience. In QP dataset, whenever
an individual is temporarily absent from the annual records, we cannot be sure whether
s/he is unemployed, self-employed, out of the labor force or whether s/he transited to the
public sector. For this reason, instead of controlling for unemployment spells occurring in
between the two entrepreneurial experiences which cannot be accurately identied we
alternatively control for ex-BOstransitions into paid employment in the selection equation.
10Occupational choice models drawing upon Knights (1921) notion that the individual
responds to the risk-adjusted relative earnings opportunities in both paid employment and
self-employment corroborate this expected e¤ect of individuals age (see, for instance, Rees
and Shah, 1986). More recent studies have been conrming that a successful entrepreneur
needs to be highly adaptable i.e., one needs to be able to learn new skills, to adjust to new
environments and to handle unexpected situations. In general, younger people are more
adaptable, and adaptability decreases with age, so younger individuals are normally more
likely to become entrepreneurs than older ones (Liang, 2011).
11This is supported by the well-established lifecycle hypothesis of saving, developed
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precisely found that entrepreneursage is a very good proxy for liquidity con-
straints, as entrepreneurs become wealthier as they grow older.
In this regard, and from the point of view of the lifecycle theory of entre-
preneurship (see Stangler and Spulber, 2013; Spulber, 2014), the decision of
becoming an entrepreneur may be understood as a form of asset accumulation
that involves an opportunity cost, especially at younger ages when human cap-
ital and nancial assets may be more limited. Accordingly, if those individuals
becoming nascent entrepreneurs at younger ages are also more prone to engage
in serial entrepreneurship albeit their assets are, on average, lower this will
conrm that this variable may be a very satisfactory proxy for individualsrisk
aversion and entrepreneurial spirit. We still perform several robustness checks
in order to show that our results are consistent and are not a¤ected by this
limitation in using alternative exclusion restrictions.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
As a starting point, we provide a simple comparison of the performance in the
rst entrepreneurial experience between individuals who decided to reenter
and became serial entrepreneurs, and those who did not. Figure 1 depicts
the distribution of BOssurvival time in the rst business for each of these
sub-samples. It clearly shows that non-serial BOs had lower survival rates
(more than 60% of them only survived in the rst business for one year), while
serial BOs had a relatively better performance in the previous business, by
surviving for longer periods on average. This may be a rst signal to suspect
that, actually, serial BOs are not a random sample of ex-BOs.
from the seminal theories by Modigliani and Brumberg of consumer expenditure.
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Fig.1. Comparative distribution of BOssurvival time (in years) in the rst
business (All ex-BOs, Portugal, 1992-2006)
Focusing in particular on serial entrepreneurs, we also compare their perfor-
mance in the rst and second businesses. Unconditionally, without controlling
for any observed or unobserved characteristics of serial BOs and their rms,
Figure 2 compares the estimated survivor function of serial entrepreneurs in the
two experiences, using Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator (Kalbeish and Prentice,
1980). In both cases, the unconditional probability of an individual surviving
as BO beyond time t was thus computed as follows:
bS(tj) = tY
j=t0
(1  dj
nj
); (4)
where dj corresponds to the number of exits in each time interval and nj is
the total number of BOs at risk of exit. Table 1 provides a more detailed com-
parison of serial BOsunconditional survival rates according to the similarity
of the industries where both businesses were developed.
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The results clearly suggest that serial BOs performed better in their second
attempt than in the rst one, by persisting for longer periods as BOs in the
rm. In the rst business-ownership experience (i.e., while novice entrepre-
neurs), over 45% of BOs exited after one year in the business and only 13% of
BOs persisted after ve years since their entry. Comparing the performance
of the same individuals in their second business-ownership experience (i.e.,
while serial entrepreneurs), the comparable statistics show that 26% of BOs
only survived for one year in the business, and 41% of BOs remained in the
business ve years later. The median survival time was just two years in their
rst experience, and four years in the second try.
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Fig.2. Comparative KM survivor functions in the rst and second
entrepreneurial experiences (All serial entrepreneurs, Portugal, 1993-2007)
Table 1 additionally shows that serial entrepreneurs who reentered the
same industry where they operated in the past performed even better than
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the average, presenting higher survival rates, which seems to suggest that
industry-specic experience has also played a role on serial BOsendurance.12
Overall, 13% of serial BOs remained in their second business for 15 years or
more. For those who stayed in the same industry, the comparable survival rate
was 14.3%, being somewhat lower for those who tried their luck in a di¤erent
industry (11.3%).
Table 1. Comparative survival rates in the rst and second business
(Portugal, 1993-2007)
Years Serial BOs reentering the Serial BOs reentering a
since same industry (N=20,997) di¤erent industry (N=14,205)
entry First Business Second Business First Business Second Business
1 0.5672 0.7576 0.5199 0.7097
2 0.3959 0.6503 0.3547 0.5905
3 0.2742 0.5634 0.2434 0.4986
4 0.1904 0.4930 0.1681 0.4303
5 0.1322 0.4332 0.1180 0.3758
6 0.0856 0.3882 0.0789 0.3325
7 0.0500 0.3437 0.0476 0.2939
8 0.0309 0.3019 0.0312 0.2584
9 0.0169 0.2687 0.0171 0.2282
10 0.0117 0.2394 0.0106 0.2053
11 0.0066 0.2143 0.0056 0.1829
12 0.0031 0.1873 0.0025 0.1592
13 0.0009 0.1700 0.0011 0.1466
14 0.0002 0.1592 0.0003 0.1368
15 0.0000 0.1430 0.0000 0.1127
12Given some changes in the classication of economic activities (in 1995 and 2007), we
have standardized this classication for every year according to the International Standard
Industrial Classication of economic activities (Rev.2). A list of the 2-digit industries can
be found in Table A.I, in the Appendix.
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In summary, this unconditional analysis points out that serial entrepreneurs
performed relatively better in their second round, especially if they tried their
luck again in the same industry. Overall, these rst results are in line with
the general agreement that there is a positive relationship between past entre-
preneurial experience and future entrepreneurial performance. Whether this
result has arisen because some learning by doing has actually taken place from
one experience to the other still remains unanswered.
Finally, in Table 2, we report some comparative statistics for serial entre-
preneurs who have survived and those who exited their second business during
the period under analysis. The variables listed in Table 2 correspond to the
vector of variables Xi to be included in the estimation of duration models pre-
viously described. Individual and rm-level characteristics are measured by
the time of serial entrepreneursentry.
The data reveal that those who survived in the second business had also
persisted for relatively longer periods in the rst entrepreneurial experience.
Survivors were also, on average, quite more educated than those who have
left the second rm. Besides, the former were less frequently located in urban
centers and restarted, on average, at a relatively smaller scale.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (means) for serial BOs, by exit decision
(Portugal, 1993-2007)
All serial BOs Survive Exit
(N=35,202) (N=13,540) (N=21,662)
Specicities of the rst entrepreneurial experience
Cumulative years as BO 2.698 3.079 2.460
Start-up experience (%) 0.493 0.495 0.491
Experience in the same industry (%) 0.596 0.613 0.586
Years elapsed between experiences 3.377 3.709 3.169
Individual-level characteristics
Male (%) 0.748 0.758 0.741
Age (years) 39.30 39.74 39.03
Less than 9 years of schooling (%) 0.491 0.491 0.492
9 years of schooling (%) 0.159 0.140 0.170
12 years of schooling (%) 0.209 0.213 0.206
College education (%) 0.141 0.156 0.132
Firm-level characteristics
Firm size at reentry 1.480 1.432 1.509
Urban location (%) 0.413 0.399 0.421
Shared ownership (%) 0.439 0.439 0.438
Primary sector (%) 0.020 0.022 0.018
Manufacturing (%) 0.162 0.154 0.168
Energy & Construction (%) 0.169 0.172 0.167
Services (%) 0.649 0.652 0.647
Reenter in a year of crisis (%) 0.098 0.093 0.101
Notes: "Start-up Experience" equals 1 if the individual has established a start-up rm
in the rst experience and 0 if s/he has acquired an existing rm. "Firm size at reentry"
corresponds to the initial employment in the rm, in logs."Urban location" equals 1 if the
rm is located in the districts of Lisbon or Porto, 0 otherwise. "Reenter in a year of crisis"
equals 1 if the individual reentered in entrepreneurship in 1993 or 2003, 0 otherwise.
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4.2 Naïve Weibull Estimation Results
Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of the naïveWeibull pro-
portional hazard model i.e., without taking into account, for now, potential
problems of selection bias in the sample of serial entrepreneurs. Given that
a signicant number of serial BOs decide to share the ownership of their sec-
ond business with other BO(s) (Table 2), all estimations are weighted by the
number of BOs in the rm at the moment of entry.
Empirical results obtained from the estimation of specication (1) suggest
that the experience acquired in the rst business signicantly reduces the
hazard rate in the second business. Those who survived longer in the rst
business and those who try again in the same industry are found to be less
likely to exit in their second entrepreneurial experience.
However, the longer the time elapsed since the rst entrepreneurial ex-
perience, the higher the exit risk in the second experience, suggesting that
potential learning by doing e¤ects tend to vanish over time (see also Parker,
2012). Accordingly, in specication (2), we allow the e¤ect of cumulative ex-
perience as BO and industry-specic experience to vary over the time elapsed
since the exit from the rst business. The results conrm that both variables
reduce serial entrepreneursexit risk, though temporarily. The negative e¤ect
exerted by the cumulative experience as BO on exit rates is found to disappear
four years after leaving the rst business, while the survival advantages gained
through industry-specic knowledge extinguish after eight years.
Regarding the experience as a start-up founder, results show that those who
have established a venture from scratch in the past are actually less likely to
survive than those who have, alternatively, acquired an existing rm. Despite
starting a rm requires and allegedly helps an entrepreneur to acquire and
enhance a wide range of skills (e.g., van Gelderen et al., 2005; Zhang, 2011),
it is also during business infancy that the greatest challenges are posed to the
business-owner the so-called liability of smallness and newness, just to name
a few (e.g., Brüderl et al., 1992).
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Table 3. Estimation results from the Weibull proportional hazard model
(Portugal, 1993-2007)
(1) (2)
Specicities of the rst entrepreneurial experience
Cumulative years as BO -0.0151*** -0.0337***
(0.0052) (0.0068)
Start-up experience 0.0982*** 0.0970***
(0.0208) (0.0208)
Experience in the same industry -0.2290*** -0.3721***
(0.0217) (0.0303)
Years elapsed between 1st and 2nd experiences 0.0407***
(0.0044)
Cumulative years as BO*Years elapsed 0.0073***
(0.0022)
Experience in the same industry*Years elapsed 0.0434***
(0.0071)
Individual-level characteristics
Male -0.1212*** -0.1231***
(0.0240) (0.0239)
Age -0.0883*** -0.0876***
(0.0117) (0.0117)
Age squared/100 0.1171*** 0.1165***
(0.0149) (0.0149)
9 years of schooling -0.0415 -0.0411
(0.0294) (0.0294)
12 years of schooling 0.1731*** 0.1723***
(0.0280) (0.0280)
College education 0.1258*** 0.1275***
(0.0333) (0.0332)
Firm-level characteristics
Firm size at reentry 0.0043 0.0039
(0.0124) (0.0124)
Urban location 0.0852*** 0.0846***
(0.0211) (0.0211)
Shared ownership -0.1254*** -0.1274***
(0.0217) (0.0216)
It continues in the next page...
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Table 3. Estimation results from the Weibull proportional hazard model
(Portugal, 1993-2007) (1) (2)
Firm-level characteristics
Primary Sector -0.1778** -0.1772**
(0.0800) (0.0868)
Energy & Construction 0.0826** 0.0868**
(0.0359) (0.0359)
Services 0.0415 0.0452
(0.0295) (0.0294)
Macroeconomic environment
Reenter in a year of crisis 0.0073 0.0119
(0.0349) (0.0348)
Constant -0.2348 -0.1159
(0.2298) (0.2295)
Number of observations 35,202 35,202
p (duration dependence) 1.8233*** 1.8212***
Log Likelihood -47,926.1 -47,919.4
Theta 5.4457*** 5.4164***
Notes: *, **, and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Huber-
White robust standard errors in parentheses. Both specications include an individual-
level inverse gaussian distributed unobserved heterogeneity term. Theta corresponds to the
variance of this term. "Less than 9 years of schooling" is the base category for individuals
education. Manufacturing is the base category for sector.
As a result, not only may it be more di¢ cult to learn under more un-
stable experiences, as also few business are identical possibly favoring the
accumulation of business-specic rather than general entrepreneurial learning
(Chen, 2013) , so that learning possibilities are modest and di¢ cult to be
transferred across di¤erent experiences (Frankish et al., 2012), which may ex-
plain the results found for start-up experience. In alternative, the choice of the
entry mode may rather reect individualsattitude towards risk, more than
an opportunity to learn. Establishing a start-up rm, instead of acquiring an
existing business, may be a sign of low risk aversion. However, while recent
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research has been supporting a positive correlation between risk attitudes and
entrepreneurial entry decision, the e¤ects on survival are not straightforward,
as high risk attitudes may increase exit rates (e.g., Caliendo et al., 2010).
Regarding the several individual-level characteristics taken into account in
our estimations, results conrm that men survive longer as serial BOs than
women, and that serial BOsage exerts an U-shaped e¤ect on hazard rates.
Higher levels of education seem to be associated with greater exit rates, which
may be related to the higher opportunity costs that highly educated individuals
probably have by remaining in the business, as they may be more likely to
nd more satisfactory alternatives (in the form of less risk-taking and better
remunerated options) in the labor market (Gimeno et al., 1997; Georgellis et
al., 2007), particularly after their previous experience as BOs (see Baptista et
al., 2012).
Being located in an urban center is found to increase exit rates, probably
due to the greater competition characterizing large urban regions (Stearns et
al., 1995). As expected, sharing the ownership of the second business with
other BO(s), by reducing the risk and potentially increasing the sources of
capital and knowledge, is found to reduce entrepreneurs exit rates. Over-
all, reentries occurring in times of crises seem not to signicantly a¤ect the
persistence of serial entrepreneurs.
Finally, our results show that serial entrepreneursexits present positive du-
ration dependence (the estimated value for p is higher than 1), which means
that BOs exit becomes more likely as time goes by. However, this result is
mainly capturing the relatively higher and increasing hazard rates su¤ered
during the initial years in business, when the liabilities of newness and small-
ness play a particularly signicant, and thus dominant, role. If, instead, the
baseline hazard rate was parameterized according to a non-linear distribution,
serial BOsexit rates would rather show an inverted U-shaped dependence, as
expected.13
13Alternative estimations of a loglogistic AFT model showed that the estimated hazard
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4.3 Self-selection and serial entrepreneurspersistence
We now take into account the possibility that some unobserved factors inu-
ence the decision of reentering into entrepreneurship, making serial entrepre-
neurs a non-random group of ex-BOs. Before analyzing this issue, we briey
characterize ex-BOs according to their reentry decision (see Table A.II in the
Appendix).
The data show that those who became serial entrepreneurs correspond to i)
those who survived for longer periods in the rst business; ii) those with more
experience as start-up founders; iii) those with higher levels of education on
average; and iv) those who owned larger rms at the time of exit from the rst
business. All these characteristics shown by serial BOs may also be (positively)
correlated with their unobserved characteristics, namely their innate ability or
entrepreneurial talent. Accordingly, it becomes crucial to understand whether
the unobserved factors that may have inuenced the decision of reentering
into entrepreneurship were also correlated with the performance shown by
serial entrepreneurs after their reentry.
Table 4 presents the results obtained from the estimation of specications
(1) and (2), now using the two-staged Full Information Maximum Likelihood
Weibull duration model with selection developed by Boehmke et al. (2006).14
Over again, the estimations are weighted by the number of BOs in the rm at
entry. The results for the estimated selection equation (reported in Table A.III
in the Appendix, rst column) conrm that those who established a start-up
venture before and those who have survived for a longer period in the rst
business are more likely to try again and become serial entrepreneurs.
rates would be increasing during the rst three to four years of the BO in the rm, starting
to decrease thereafter. The remaining results were not signicantly di¤erent from those
obtained with the Weibull model.
14The estimations were performed with the program DURSEL (version 2.0) for Stata,
for right-censored survival time data, written by F. Boehmke, D. Morey and M. Shannon
(available at: http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html) (see also Boehmke et al.,
2006).
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Table 4. Estimation results from the Weibull proportional hazard
model with selection (Portugal, 1993-2007)
(1) (2)
Specicities of the rst entrepreneurial experience
Cumulative years as BO -0.0003 -0.0156***
(0.0041) (0.0053)
Start-up experience 0.0918*** 0.0912***
(0.0172) (0.0172)
Experience in the same industry -0.1475*** -0.2489***
(0.0175) (0.0250)
Years elapsed between 1st and 2nd experiences 0.0315***
(0.0034)
Cumulative years as BO*Years elapsed 0.0058***
(0.0016)
Experience in the same industry*Years elapsed 0.0304***
(0.0054)
Individual-level characteristics
Male -0.0659*** -0.0674***
(0.0194) (0.0194)
Age -0.0640*** -0.0636***
(0.0097) (0.0097)
Age squared/100 0.0836*** 0.0836***
(0.0121) (0.0121)
9 years of schooling -0.0249 -0.0235
(0.0235) (0.0234)
12 years of schooling 0.1253*** 0.1259***
(0.0228) (0.0228)
College education 0.0915*** 0.0935***
(0.0268) (0.0268)
Firm-level characteristics
Firm size at reentry 0.0036 0.0029
(0.0116) (0.0116)
Urban location 0.0585*** 0.0583***
(0.0173) (0.0173)
Shared ownership -0.0892*** -0.0910***
(0.0174) (0.0174)
It continues in the next page...
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Table 4. Estimation results from the Weibull proportional hazard
model with selection (Portugal, 1993-2007)
(1) (2)
Firm-level characteristics
Primary sector -0.1333** -0.1321**
(0.0627) (0.0627)
Energy & Construction 0.0606** 0.0641**
(0.0288) (0.0288)
Services 0.0243 0.0270
(0.0246) (0.0246)
Macroeconomic environment
Reenter in a year of crisis 0.0083 0.0126
(0.0267) (0.0267)
Constant -1.2500*** -1.1553***
(0.1927) (0.1925)
No. of observations 219,462 219,462
Uncensored Obervations 35,202 35,202
p (duration dependence) 1.1745*** 1.1733***
Log Likelihood -179,835.4 -179,833.4
Rho (error correlation) -0.1421*** -0.1422***
Notes: *, **, and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Huber-
White robust standard errors in parentheses. "Less than 9 years of schooling" and Manu-
facturing are the base categories for individualseducation and sector, respectively.
The estimations also conrm that those who became BOs for the rst time
at younger ages are also more likely to become serial business-owners. In ad-
dition, higher levels of education and a larger size of the previous business,
among other factors, are also associated with a greater likelihood of reentering
into entrepreneurship. Those who (re)entered into paid employment after leav-
ing their rst entrepreneurial experience, in turn, are found to be signicantly
less likely to reenter into entrepreneurship, as they may have better oppor-
tunities in the labor market and, for this reason, higher opportunity costs of
reentering entrepreneurship (Baptista et al., 2012).
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These second results attest that selection should not be overlooked, as a
negative and signicant correlation is found between the error terms of the
two equations (see the estimated values for rho at the bottom of Table 4). In
other words, there are unobserved factors that positively a¤ect reentry into
entrepreneurship and simultaneously decrease subsequent hazard rates. This
nding is in line with the theories predicting that those involved in serial
entrepreneurship correspond to individuals with higher-than-average innate
ability and skills (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; Plehn-Dujowich, 2010).
Additionally, accounting for serial entrepreneursself-selection has impor-
tant implications on the conclusions derived from potential learning by doing
e¤ects. First, results now show that the cumulative experience acquired in the
rst business does not exert any signicant e¤ect on serial BOshazards. The
signicant negative e¤ects previously found are now shown to be irrelevant
(rst specication) or vanishing in a very short period of time (two years after
leaving the previous business, according to the second specication).
The e¤ects of industry-specic experience are also found to be overes-
timated when self-selection is ignored  those who tried their luck in the
same sector have actually around 14% (1   exp( 0:1475) = 0:1371) lower
hazard rates than those who moved to a di¤erent sector, instead of 20%
(1   exp( 0:2290) = 0:2047) lower hazard rates as suggested by the naïve
Weibull model (specication (1) from Table 3). Even so, this comparative
advantage seems to vanish about eight years after leaving the rst business.
Figure 3 compares the marginal e¤ects of both measures of entrepreneurial
experience, by years elapsed between the rst and the second business owner-
ship experiences, obtained from both models i.e., with and without taking
into account serial BOsself-selection. The overestimation of learning by doing
e¤ects when self-selection is ignored is clear-cut in both cases.
The presence of signicant self-selection also changes the magnitude of al-
most all coe¢ cients, which were considerably overestimated in the naïve
Weibull model. The same is applicable to the duration dependence serial
BOshazards are found to increase over time, but at a much lower rate when
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accounting for self-selection (the parameter p is now lower, though still higher
than 1). The constant term also decreases considerably when correcting se-
lection bias, conrming that exit rates of serial entrepreneurs were articially
increased in previous naïve Weibull models. In sum, once we account for the
decision of reentering into entrepreneurship, the estimated exit rates of serial
entrepreneurs decrease, since the negative error correlation biases the baseline
hazard rates upwards, when ignored.
Overall, our results show that neglecting self-selection of serial entrepre-
neurs may produce biased conclusions about learning by doing e¤ects that can
be transmitted from past entrepreneurial experiences to the current ones. The
positive association between prior experience and the performance of serial
BOs in subsequent entrepreneurial attempts seems to be mainly due to selec-
tion on ability, rather than the result of learning by doing. Some learning by
doing is found only through industry-specic experience (see also Frankish et
al., 2012; Chen, 2013). Otherwise, learning e¤ects seem to be really modest.
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5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Estimation results for the sub-samples of start-up
serial entrepreneurs and young ex-BOs
As a rst robustness test, we estimate both models (the naïve model and
the model with selection) for the sub-sample of entrepreneurs entering via
start-up. On the one hand, entrepreneurial activity is more often associated
to new venture creation, so individuals who have established a start-up rm
from scratch in both business-ownership experiences may be considered to
be the most entrepreneurial ones at least regarding the risk-taking and the
comprehensiveness of entrepreneurial steps they were exposed to. On the other
hand, start-up entrepreneurs may be driven by di¤erent motivations and may
have a di¤erent post-entry behavior than those entering by acquisition (e.g.,
Rocha et al., 2013). Finally, our previous results showed that those with a past
experience as a start-up founder have actually higher hazard rates in the second
venture than those without such experience, suggesting that learning from a
past founding experience may be harder than expected. For these reasons, we
test the consistency of our results by repeating the analysis after excluding
ex-BOs who entered the rst entrepreneurial experience through acquisition,
as well as serial entrepreneurs acquiring an existing business in their second
attempt. The nal sample is composed by 81,587 ex-BOs, out of which 9,479
became serial entrepreneurs by establishing, again, a new start-up venture.
Additionally, in order to ensure that our results are not biased by potential
left-censoring issues related to eventual entrepreneurial experiences prior to
1986, we also re-estimate both models for the sub-sample of ex-BOs who left
their prior business at the age of 30 or younger, as in Amaral et al. (2011).15
Table 5 summarizes the results obtained from the estimation of our pre-
15We report the results obtained from the sub-sample of young start-up serial BOs. The
results obtained for all younger ex-BOs, regardless their entry mode in the rst and second
experience, were not qualitatively di¤erent from those here presented.
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ferred specication for both sub-samples. The correlation between the error
terms remains negative and highly signicant in both cases. For start-up se-
rial BOs, both sources of learning by doing (i.e., the cumulative experience
as BOs and industry-specic experience) are conrmed to be temporary and
overestimated when self-selection is ignored. Figure 4 illustrates these results.
For younger BOs, industry-specic experience seems to be the only signicant
source of learning by doing. However, over again, such learning e¤ects are
overestimated under the naïve model, as Figure 5 makes clear.
Table 5. Estimation results for particular sub-samples   Naïve Model
and Weibull model with selection (Portugal, 1993-2007)
Start-up Young Start-up
Serial BOs Serial BOs
Naïve Selection Naïve Selection
Cumulative years as BO -0.0676*** -0.0433*** -0.0164 0.0155
(0.0140) (0.0109) (0.0646) (0.0538)
Exper. same industry -0.3677*** -0.2437*** -0.4693*** -0.2936**
(0.0592) (0.0500) (0.1294) (0.1068)
Cumul. years as BO*Years elap. 0.0108** 0.0093*** 0.0114 0.0096
(0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0149) (0.0113)
Exper. same indus.*Years elap. 0.0412*** 0.0277** 0.0858*** 0.0553***
(0.0144) (0.0111) (0.0281) (0.0211)
No. Observations 9,479 81,587 2,011 16,404
Uncensored observations - 9,479 - 2,011
p (duration dependence) 1.8539*** 1.1914*** 1.8241*** 1.1806***
Log Likelihood -13,049.8 -51,941.3 -2,860.4 -10,968.3
Rho (error correlation) - -0.1319*** - -0.1397***
Notes: *, **, and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Huber-
White robust standard errors in parentheses.
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5.2 Estimating the person-specic e¤ect of ex-BOs
As a second robustness check, and in order to conrm that serial entrepreneurs
are an above-average ability group of ex-BOs, we have tried to obtain a proxy
for workersunobserved ability based on ex-BOspast histories in the labor
market while paid employees. For that purpose a xed e¤ects approach was
used with the aim of estimating the person-specic e¤ect that measures the
returns to time-invariant observed and/or unobserved characteristics.
Thus, using the QP worker les for the 1986-2007 period (which cover
more than 6 million workers), we have followed the approach of Carneiro et al.
(2012) in order to estimate a two high-dimensional xed e¤ects wage equation
that simultaneously accounts for worker and rm observed and unobserved
(permanent) heterogeneity (see also Guimarães and Portugal, 2010). Even if
this is not a perfect measure of individualsunobserved entrepreneurial talent,
we believe that it captures in a very satisfactory way those unobserved di¤er-
ences in individuals innate characteristics that inuenced their wages while
paid employees in the past. However, it is only possible to estimate those
person-specic e¤ects for those with a previous history in paid employment,
as no data on wages are available for BOs in QP les.
The wage levels equation controls for individuals age (and its square),
tenure (and its square), education, skill level, time dummies, as well as for
worker observed/unobserved (permanent) heterogeneity and rm observed/
unobserved (permanent) heterogeneity. This equation was estimated by OLS
using a sample of 34,080,042 observations (years*individuals) for the 1986-2007
period.16
We were able to estimate the person-specic e¤ect for 97,800 ex-BOs and
18,538 serial BOs.17 In Table 6, we provide some summary statistics for this
16The dependent variable was dened as the natural log of real hourly earnings. Hourly
earnings correspond to the ratio between total regular payroll (base wages and regular ben-
ets) and the total number of normal hours worked in the reference period. The wages were
deated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Outliers were removed from the estimations
i.e., the 1% with highest and lowest real hourly wages (in logs), in each year.
17For the remaining entrepreneurs, it was not possible to obtain a measure of their returns
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variable, comparing serial BOs with non-serial BOs, overall and across some
sub-samples. On average, serial BOs exhibit a larger person-specic e¤ect
than non-serial BOs, regardless the sub-sample considered. The di¤erences
are always statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Table 6. Estimated person-specic e¤ect for serial and non-serial BOs
(mean values, N=97,800 ex-BOs)
All ex-BOs Males Females Start-up BOs
Serial BOs -0.2185 -0.1832 -0.3286 -0.2190
Non-serial BOs -0.2906 -0.2440 -0.3728 -0.2785
Figure 6 depicts the kernel density estimates of serial and non-serial BOs
person-specic component of the logarithm of hourly earnings, conrming that
serial entrepreneurs are associated to higher returns to time-invariant charac-
teristics (the kernel density function is slightly more shifted to the right for
the group of serial BOs), in line with our previous result that they are not
a random sample of ex-BOs, but a selection of higher-than-average ability
entrepreneurs. A positive and signicant correlation of 0.0775 is also found
between the person xed e¤ect and the indicator variable distinguishing those
who reentered into entrepreneurship and those who did not.
All these patterns are consistent with the previous nding of a negative
error correlation between the error terms of the selection and hazard equations.
Moreover, the evidence of a larger return to time-invariant characteristics in
paid employment for the group of serial BOs also conrms that they have
a relatively higher opportunity cost of leaving the labor market to become
entrepreneurs.
In order to conrm this result, we have estimated a wage equation for
those ex-BOs with past records in paid employment, prior to their rst entry
to time-invariant characteristics because they were never in paid employment before or due
to missing information on their wages.
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in entrepreneurship, and included a dummy variable identifying those individ-
uals who, in the future, become serial BOs. The results showed that, even
after controlling for a number of individual and job observed characteristics
(namely, age and its square,education, tenure and its square, and skill level),
time e¤ects and rm xed e¤ects, those individuals who became serial BOs
later on earned about 4.8% higher wages in the past than those who did not
reenter in entrepreneurship for a second time. In view of that, if some ex-
BOs still become entrepreneurs for a second time instead of returning to paid
employment, it is likely that that they actually have some unobserved char-
acteristics as a stronger entrepreneurial behavior/talent, a lower risk aversion
and/or a greater taste for independence.
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Fig. 6. Kernel density of estimated person-specic e¤ect
Finally, we report in Table 7 some statistics for the performance shown by
ex-BOs in the rst business across the di¤erent percentiles of individualsxed
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e¤ect distribution. The data suggest that individuals with a larger person-
specic e¤ect have survived longer in the rst business, though the relationship
becomes less evident at the top percentiles.
Table 7. Performance in the rst business at di¤erent levels of
individualsxed e¤ect distribution (N=97,800 ex-BOs)
Individualsxed e¤ects distribution
(percentiles)
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Survival time in the 1st business 2.4650 2.4691 2.4810 2.4869 2.4465
Overall, these robustness checks corroborate the idea that the use of vari-
ables measuring accumulated entrepreneurial experience to study learning by
doing e¤ects among serial entrepreneurs may be misleading if selection issues
are ignored. Actually, individuals who survived longer in the rst business not
only had more time to learn about being entrepreneurs, but also to learn about
their own ability. Consequently, those who perceived to have higher ability
were also more likely to reenter and become serial entrepreneurs. Disentan-
gling the two e¤ects is empirically challenging, but neglecting these unobserved
relationships actually lead to biased conclusions about learning by doing ef-
fects arising from accumulated experience, as our results seem to consistently
show.
6 Concluding Remarks
The topic of entrepreneurial learning has been nurturing a growing debate in
the midst of both scholars and policymakers over the most recent years. Entre-
preneurs are believed to accumulate unique knowledge and skills by creating
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and running new ventures, and by establishing networks with suppliers, cus-
tomers and other business-owners. All this know-how accumulated through
experience is believed to make serial entrepreneurs more able to run successful
ventures than novice (i.e., inexperienced) entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, if on the one hand, the lack of suitable data has prevented in-
depth empirical analyses about entrepreneurial learning for long time, on the
other hand, more recent empirical studies addressing these issues have been
nding limited support for entrepreneurial learning hypotheses (e.g., Frankish
et al., 2012; Parker, 2012). While the signicance of learning by doing remains
a question, a new debate has been emerging regarding the potential selection
bias associated with the reentry of individuals into entrepreneurship. In fact,
do entrepreneurs really learn with their past experience or are those who try
again a selected sample of higher-than-average ability entrepreneurs? Whether
their usual outperformance comes from learning by doing or self-selection ac-
cording to their own innate ability, thus, remains a pertinent query.
This paper contributes to this debate by using a large longitudinal matched
employer-employee dataset that allows us to track individuals and their entre-
preneurial experiences over time. We evaluate how previous entrepreneurial
experience impacts on serial entrepreneurspersistence in the second business,
exploring a novel empirical strategy based on continuous time duration models
that take into account selection bias issues.
Our results seem to conrm that serial entrepreneurs are not a random sam-
ple of individuals. Instead, they possess some unobserved characteristics that
not only make them more likely to try again as entrepreneurs, as also reduce
their exit rates in their second entrepreneurial experience. After correcting this
bias in their selection process, the cumulative experience as business-owners
exerts no signicant persistent e¤ect on their survival in the second business.
Besides, the comparative advantages associated with industry-specic experi-
ence are found to be overestimated when ignoring self-selection problems.
In short, our study does not o¤er a strong support for the widespread
expectations related to signicant entrepreneurial learning. While part of the
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performance shown by serial entrepreneurs may result from the entrepreneurial
knowledge acquired in the previous business, especially when the second en-
trepreneurial try occurs in the same industry, learning by doing e¤ects seem to
be less important than self-selection e¤ects. Instead, individualsunobserved
heterogeneity seems to play an essential, and possibly dominant, role.
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Appendix
Table A.I. Classication of Economic Activities (ISIC-Rev.2, 2-digit)
Primary Sector:
(11) Agriculture and Hunting
(12) Forestry and Logging
(13) Fishing
(21) Coal Mining
(22) Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Production
(23) Metal Ore Mining
(29) Other Mining
Manufacturing:
(31) Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco
(32) Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries
(33) Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, including Furniture
(34) Manuf. of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing
(35) Manuf. of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products
(36) Manuf. of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal
(37) Basic Metal Industries
(38) Manuf. of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment
(39) Other Manufacturing Industries
Energy & Construction Sectors:
(41) Electricity, Gas and Steam
(42) Water Works and Supply
(50) Construction
Services:
(61) Wholesale Trade
(62) Retail Trade
(63) Restaurants and Hotels
(71) Transport and Storage
(72) Communication
(81) Financial Institutions
(82) Insurance
(83) Real State and Business Services
(91) Public Administration and Defense
(92) Sanitary and Similar Services
(93) Social and Related Community Services
(94) Recreational and Cultural Services
(95) Personal and Household Services
(96) International and Other Extra-Territorial Bodies
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Table A.II. Descriptive statistics for ex-BOs, by reentry decision
(Portugal, 1993-2007)
All ex-BOs Serial BOs Non-serial BOs
(N=219,462) (N=35,202) (N=184,260)
Specicities of the rst entrepreneurial experience
Cumulative years as BO 2.288 2.698 2.210
Start-up experience (%) 0.408 0.493 0.391
Individual-level characteristics
Paid employment after BO (%) 0.302 0.184 0.324
Male (%) 0.667 0.748 0.652
Age (years) 36.86 35.96 37.03
Less than 9 years of schooling (%) 0.527 0.512 0.530
9 years of schooling (%) 0.170 0.168 0.171
12 years of schooling (%) 0.185 0.192 0.183
College education (%) 0.118 0.128 0.116
Characteristics of the rst business
Previous dissolved business (%) 0.285 0.384 0.266
Firm size at exit (in logs) 1.553 1.614 1.542
Urban location (%) 0.416 0.418 0.416
Shared ownership (%) 0.537 0.504 0.543
Primary sector (%) 0.024 0.020 0.025
Manufacturing (%) 0.190 0.189 0.190
Energy & Construction (%) 0.140 0.158 0.137
Services (%) 0.646 0.633 0.648
Notes: The statistics reported are the mean values of each variable, observed at the
time of exit from the rst business. "Start-up Experience" equals 1 if the individual has
established a start-up rm in the rst experience and 0 if s/he has acquired an existing rm.
"Paid employment after BO" is an indicator variable assuming the value 1 if the individual
was registered as paid employee in t-1 or t-2, 0 otherwise (with t corresponding to the year of
reentry into entrepreneurship - for those who reentered - or to the last year each individual
is observed in the data - for those never reentering into entrepreneurship (right-censored
cases)). "Previous dissolved business" equals 1 if the individual has left the rst business
by dissolving it, 0 if s/he has left by ownership transfer. "Urban location" equals 1 if the
rst business was located in the districts of Lisboa or Porto, 0 otherwise.
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Table A.III. Reentry into entrepreneurship - Estimation results for
the selection equation (Portugal, 1993-2007)
Probit Model
All Serial Start-up Young Start-up
BOs Serial BOs Serial BOs
Specicities of the rst entrepreneurial experience
Cumulative years as BO 0.0352*** 0.0043** 0.0662***
(0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0149)
Start-up experience 0.1635*** - -
(0.0060) - -
Individual-level characteristics
Age at the entry of the 1st business -0.0125*** -0.0116*** -0.0098**
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0043)
Paid employment after BO -0.3550*** -0.6125*** -0.6167***
(0.0063) (0.0118) (0.0235)
Male 0.1749*** 0.2116*** 0.2355***
(0.0059) (0.0109) (0.0235)
9 years of schooling -0.0115 0.0046 0.0308
(0.0076) (0.0136) (0.0292)
12 years of schooling 0.0049 0.0132 0.0108
(0.0074) (0.0133) (0.0270)
College education 0.0577*** -0.0072 -0.1142***
(0.0088) (0.0168) (0.0371)
Characteristics of the rst business
Previous dissolved business 0.2524*** 0.1661*** 0.1798***
(0.0065) (0.0104) (0.0220)
Firm size at exit 0.0948*** 0.1994*** 0.1786***
(0.0032) (0.0084) (0.0159)
Urban location 0.0082 -0.0213** 0.0249
(0.0055) (0.0101) (0.0220)
Shared ownership -0.3009*** -0.2517*** -0.2481***
(0.0058) (0.0103) (0.0227)
Primary Sector -0.0196 -0.0580 0.0281
(0.0193) (0.0371) (0.0886)
Energy & Construction 0.0316*** 0.0276 -0.0040
(0.0094) (0.0171) (0.0389)
It continues in the next page...
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Table A.III. Reentry into entrepreneurship - Estimation results for
the selection equation (Portugal, 1993-2007)
Probit Model
All Serial Start-up Young Start-up
BOs Serial BOs Serial BOs
Characteristics of the rst business (cont.)
Services 0.0624*** 0.0513*** -0.0103
(0.0076) (0.0149) (0.0320)
Constant -0.5799*** -0.6669*** -1.2906***
(0.0178) (0.0326) (0.1203)
Number of observations 219,462 81,587 16,404
Reentries in serial entrepreneurship 35,202 9,479 2,011
Log Likelihood -179,833.4 -51,941.3 -10,968.3
Wald 2 10,945.1*** 3,731.3*** 987.0***
Notes: These results correspond to the selection equation of global specical of Weibull
model with selection reported in Tables 4 and 5. *, **, and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. "Less than
9 years of schooling" and Manufacturing are the base categories for individualseducation
and sector, respectively.
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Where do spin-o¤s come from? Start-up
conditions and the survival of pushed and
pulled spin-o¤s
Essay 4
May 29, 2014
Abstract
Although previous research shows that spin-o¤s are among the most
successful rms in an industry, outperforming de novo entrants, few stud-
ies have considered the heterogeneous nature of corporate spin-o¤s, as not
all spin-o¤s arise from the identication of a business opportunity. Against
this backdrop, this paper aims at understanding how di¤erently pushed (or
necessity-based) and pulled (or opportunity-based) spin-o¤s survive in the
market, taking into account a number of start-up conditions where they
may di¤er namely, the industrial and geographical relatedness to the par-
ent rm, their initial recruitment strategies, and foundersgeneral and spe-
cic human capital. The analysis is based on a linked employer-employee
dataset for Portugal and covers 50,656 spin-o¤s entering during the period
1992-2007. Unconditionally, pushed spin-o¤s are found to survive longer
than their pulled counterparts. However, as we control for an increasing
number of observed characteristics where these rms di¤er, their survival
gap almost vanishes. We use multivariate decomposition techniques for
hazard rate models in order to understand the sources of pushed-pulled
di¤erences in exit rates. Our results conrm that a great part of pushed
spin-o¤srelative survival advantages come from their larger endowments
of particular human resources at the time of entry, namely the charac-
teristics and the relative importance of their co-workers at entry, and the
human capital endowments of their business-owners.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, corporate spin-o¤s, rm survival, labor
mobility, human capital
JEL Codes: J24, J63, L26, M13
We acknowledge Francisco Lima for his comments on a previous version of this paper.
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1 Introduction
For a long time, corporate spin-o¤s commonly dened as start-ups founded
by a former employee of an existing rm were documented to have great
comparative advantages and to perform better than de novo entrants (Franco
and Filson, 2006; Agarwal et al., 2011; Muendler et al., 2012; Andersson and
Klepper, 2013). By being understood as a particular form of labor mobility
through which knowledge is more easily transferred from an incumbent rm
(Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Boshma et al., 2009), and by beneting from
parent rms contacts and network ties (Agarwal et al., 2004), spin-o¤s are
comparatively better endowed with specic resources and informational ad-
vantages that make them better able to overcome the so-called liability of
newness (Phillips, 2002).
More recently, researchers claimed for further attention to the heterogeneity
of corporate spin-o¤s, and a line of research has been exploring the distinction
between opportunity (pulled) and necessity (pushed) entrepreneurship applied
to spin-o¤ activities (e.g. Buenstorf, 2009; Bruneel at el., 2013; Dick et al.,
2013).1 Opportunity (or pulled) spin-o¤s are broadly dened as spin-o¤s trig-
gered by the discovery of a promising entrepreneurial opportunity. In contrast,
necessity (or pushed) spin-o¤s are, by denition, triggered by events that ad-
versely a¤ect the parent rm and that render future employment at this rm
less attractive or even impossible. As a result, necessity spin-o¤s are very
often launched by employees of incumbent rms to escape deteriorating job
conditions, or as a response to a recent job loss.
However, while the importance of pulled-induced spin-o¤s has increasingly
been recognized in recent years, the role of pushed-nature spin-o¤s has been
far overlooked (Buenstorf, 2009). Moreover, research addressing how di¤erent
are the performance prospects of spin-o¤s according to their type is still scarce.
The few studies conducted so far suggest that pulled spin-o¤s tend to outper-
1The distinction between opportunity and necessity spin-o¤s is solely based on the trig-
gering event driving the actual decision to start the new rm.
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form their pushed counterparts (e.g., Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006; Muendler et
al., 2012; Andersson and Klepper, 2013), though, sometimes, the analyses are
restricted to very particular industries and/or regions (e.g., Buenstorf, 2009;
Cabral and Wang, 2009; Bruneel et al., 2013).
Against this backdrop, the contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly,
di¤erences and commonalities between opportunity spin-o¤s and necessity
spin-o¤s are further explored, using a large longitudinal matched employer-
employee dataset for Portugal. We identify and follow 50,656 spin-o¤s founded
between 1992 and 2007, being our study innovative and rare on this regard. Us-
ing discrete time hazard models that take into account rmsunobserved het-
erogeneity, we analyze whether start-up triggering conditions inuence spin-
o¤shazard rates i.e., whether there are signicant survival di¤erences be-
tween pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, after controlling for a number of observed
characteristics where they di¤er.
Secondly, we aim at understanding how particular start-up conditions 
namely, industry and geographic relatedness to the incumbent rm, the pres-
ence of co-workers absorbed from the parent rm, and the general and specic
human capital of spin-o¤sfounders may moderate pushed-pulled survival
di¤erences.2 We follow the recent decomposition methodologies for hazard
models proposed by Powers and Yun (2009) and Powers et al. (2011) in order
to decompose the survival gap observed between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
into components attributable to their di¤erences in endowments and di¤er-
ences in e¤ects.
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the rst studies comparing the
post-entry performance of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, using a rich matched
employer-employee dataset, taking also into consideration a number of start-
up conditions that can both a¤ect spin-o¤ survival and moderate the survival
di¤erences between necessity and opportunity spin-o¤s. Finally, while most of
2Incumbent rmand parent rmwill be used interchangeably throughout the paper
and should be understood as synonymous.
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the literature concerned with spin-o¤s has restricted their attention to high-
tech spin-o¤s spawned by successful surviving parent rms (e.g., Klepper and
Sleeper, 2005; Franco and Filson, 2006; Agarwal et al., 2011), our study covers
all spin-o¤s established in all industries during the timespan under analysis.
Finally, we provide empirical evidence for a European economy where entre-
preneurship  particularly necessity-driven entrepreneurship may play an
important role, given the large number of bankruptcies and the signicant in-
crease in unemployment rates observed over the most recent years in Portugal,
as a result of the severe economic crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the main lit-
erature on the comparative performance of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, and
discusses how some startup conditions where these two types of rms eventu-
ally di¤er might balance their post-entry performance di¤erences. Section 3
presents the data and the criteria adopted to identify pushed and pulled spin-
o¤s. Section 4 provides a brief description of the sample, in order to highlight
the main sources of observed di¤erences between the two types of spin-o¤s.
Section 5 presents the empirical methodology and discusses the results. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 Prior Literature and Background
2.1 The heterogeneous nature of spin-o¤s: pushed ver-
sus pulled spin-o¤s
Not all spin-o¤s arise from the identication of an opportunity by some em-
ployee(s), or from some strategic action of incumbent rms which frequently
seed spin-o¤s to develop new technologies, to serve new markets, to create com-
plementarities or to focus on their core business (Parhankangas and Arenius,
2003; Iturriaga and Cruz, 2008). Most spin-o¤s also emerge from necessity.
Adverse shocks in the incumbent rm, such as rm closure, massive downsiz-
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ing, changes in management or a takeover, may push an employee (or a few of
them) to leave and create their own company (e.g., Von Grei¤, 2009; Bruneel
et al., 2013).
During the last few decades, most of the western economies have su¤ered
extensive worker displacements (Von Grei¤, 2009), a scenario that has been
even more exacerbated by the recent economic crisis and the consequent large
number of rm closures (ILO, 2013). With entrepreneurship being proposed as
one of the possible routes to exit the crisis and reduce unemployment (OECD,
2013), pushed spin-o¤s which were virtually neglected by researchers until the
most recent years are now recognized to deserve the attention of both scholars
and policy-makers more than ever, given their potential role in absorbing some
of the unemployees coming from declining parent rms.
So far, despite few studies have analyzed the heterogeneity of corporate
spin-o¤s in relation to their post-entry performance, a number of arguments
apparently suggest that pulled (opportunity) spin-o¤s are likely to outper-
form their pushed (necessity) counterparts. First, opportunity spin-o¤s may
have the comparative advantage of being based on a unique, newly discovered
business opportunity and a more controlled timing of entry.
Second, this group of spin-o¤s may keep strong relationships with their
parent rm after entry, which can provide them the access to important infor-
mation, resources, markets and technologies, as well as sources of credibility,
legitimacy, reputation and identication of opportunities (Hitt et al., 2001,
Phillips, 2002; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006). Moreover, by preserving some links
with their parent rms, pulled spin-o¤s may maintain the advantages of oper-
ating at a small scale, while using the existing assets of a larger corporation
(Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003; Wallin and Dahlstrand, 2006). The same
is not possible for necessity spin-o¤s, particularly for those prompted by the
closure of the parent rm.
From a di¤erent perspective, other authors propose that there is a signif-
icant positive correlation between parent and spin-o¤ performances (Bruneel
et al., 2013; Dick et al., 2013), and that spin-o¤s generating from surviving
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incumbents are typically founded by individuals with higher entrepreneurial
talent on average (Cabral and Wang, 2009). Overall, these lines of thought
propose that spin-o¤s driven by pushed-nature factors, as parent rm closure
or massive downsizing, are likely to perform worse than the remaining spin-o¤s
in the market.
However, while the linkages established between pulled spin-o¤s and their
parent rms may give them some comparative advantages, parental inuence
can also generate inertia, dependence and resistance to change (Wallin and
Dahlstrad, 2006; Ferriani et al., 2012). In this regard, necessity spin-o¤s, by
being forced to strive in the market without similar support, may become more
autonomous and more able to adjust to the overall environment. Furthermore,
those creating their own company as a way to escape unemployment despite
their possibly lower entrepreneurial ability (Cabral and Wang, 2009) may
become comparatively more attached to their business (see, for instance, Block
and Sandner, 2009; Rocha et al., 2013). Alternatively, they may also have lower
performance thresholds than those creating a spin-o¤ to explore an identied
opportunity, who may have more ambitious goals and consequently give up
earlier and close down the rm if such performance thresholds are not attained
(Gimeno et al., 1997; McCann and Folta, 2012).
Hence, a deep analysis of post-entry performance of necessity and opportu-
nity based spin-o¤s is still lacking in the literature. Valuable contributions on
this subject have been provided by Buenstorf (2009), Cabral and Wang (2009)
and Bruneel et al. (2013), whose studies have compared the performance of
pushed and pulled spin-o¤s for particular industries or regions. More com-
prehensive studies were conducted by Eriksson and Kuhn (2006), Muendler
et al. (2012) and Andersson and Klepper (2013), though mainly focusing on
the comparative performance of (pushed and pulled) spin-o¤s and de novo
entrants. This study, thus, contributes to the existing literature by evaluat-
ing the survival prospects of over 50,600 new spin-o¤s who were established
in Portugal during the period 1992-2007, paying particular attention to the
potential di¤erences between pushed and pulled spin-o¤sexit rates.
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2.2 Start-up conditions as moderating factors of spin-
o¤ssurvival gap
Besides the heterogeneous nature of spin-o¤s in what concerns the triggering
event driving their entry, pushed and pulled spin-o¤s are also probably dif-
ferent in a variety of aspects, namely in a set of start-up conditions. The
relatedness to the parent rm in terms of industry and geographical location,
the presence of co-workers (i.e., employees who move from the parent rm to
the new spin-o¤) in the initial workforce, and entrepreneurshuman capital
are three dimensions that, according to the literature, are believed to a¤ect
spin-o¤performance and that could either amplify or mitigate the performance
di¤erences between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s.
Firstly, the proximity between the parent rm and the spin-o¤ has been
mostly analyzed at the industry-level, as most of the studies have been dening
spin-o¤companies as new rms founded by former employees in the same (usu-
ally high-tech) industry (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005;
Franco and Filson, 2006). However, many spin-o¤s neither operate in high-
tech industries, nor in exactly the same industry of the parent rm (Eriksson
and Kuhn, 2006; Muendler et al., 2012).
The same applies to the region where spin-o¤s locate. While the inheritance
of routines and the transfer of resources from the parent rm is more likely
when rms operate in the same industry, this is also a local a¤air(Boschma
and Frenken, 2011), as knowledge transfers and labor mobility are believed to
be more successful the greater the proximity (at the industry and geographical
levels) between rms (e.g., Sapienza et al., 2004; Malmberg and Power, 2005;
Boschma et al., 2009). For these reasons, we analyze whether remaining in
the same industry and the same location of the parent rm improves spin-o¤s
survival prospects.
Secondly, the mobility of workers from the parent rm to the spin-o¤ also
constitutes one of the most important mechanisms through which routines,
procedures, knowledge and various forms of human capital may be transferred
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(Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005; Franco and Fil-
son, 2006). Accordingly, rms hiring these co-workers at the moment of entry
are believed to be better able to reduce the initial uncertainty in the mar-
ket and to have a comparative advantage over other rms (Song et al., 2003;
Leung et al., 2006; Tzabbar et al., 2013). Furthermore, not only knowledge
transfers (embodied in co-workers) as well as knowledge spillovers (conditional
on, for instance, co-workersaccumulated experience in the parent rm) may
improve spin-o¤sperformance (Agarwal et al., 2011), but also attenuate the
di¤erences between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s.
In fact, despite pushed spin-o¤s originating from dying companies cannot
maintain any relationship with their parent rms afterwards, workers owing
from the parent rm may constitute a particularly important resource   in
the form of industry-specic, rm-specic or even team-specic human capital
  for those new spin-o¤s, helping them to overcome the initial uncertainty in
the market and the so-called liability of newness. Additionally, hiring some
co-workers from the parent rm may constitute a less costly screening process
for pushed spin-o¤s, whose founders may be more able to identify and attract
some of the best workers, who otherwise would not have great employment
perspectives in the parent rm. For all these reasons, pushed spin-o¤s may play
an important role in reducing unemployment and preventing the depreciation
of the human capital of those who have lost their job due to unfavorable
economic conditions in the previous employer (Buenstorf, 2009). Therefore,
we analyze how the presence and the average quality of co-workers inuence
the post-entry survival of spin-o¤s, and how these factors might moderate the
potential survival di¤erences between spin-o¤s of di¤erent types.
Finally, entrepreneurs characteristics are also increasingly recognized to
signicantly inuence new venture performance. Entrepreneurial talent of
start-up founders being multidimensional (Unger et al., 2011; Mayer-Haug et
al., 2013) and mainly embodied in entrepreneursgeneral and specic human
capital has been shown to be particularly important during rm infancy and
to improve the survival of new rms (e.g., Delmar and Shane, 2006). Given
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that pushed and pulled spin-o¤sfounders may have di¤erent human capital
endowments (Cabral and Wang, 2009), and opportunity and necessity-driven
businesses may be a¤ected by di¤erent dimensions of foundershuman capital
(Baptista et al., 2014), this issue should not be neglected. Most of the studies
have been unable to control for these potential di¤erences among rms due to
data restrictions (e.g., Muendler et al., 2012; Andersson and Klepper, 2013),
so we also contribute to this literature by taking into account the potential
moderating role of foundershuman capital. Business-ownersaverage age and
schooling years are used as measures of general human capital. Founders
specic human capital is measured by the average years of industry-specic
experience and entrepreneurial experience accumulated in the past.
3 Data and Methodological Issues
3.1 Data
Our study uses data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a large longitudinal
matched employer-employee dataset from the Portuguese Ministry of Employ-
ment. All rms in the private sector employing at least one wage earner are
legally obliged to ll in this annual survey and provide information about
each of its establishments and workers. Detailed yearly information at the
rm/establishment-level (e.g., employment, industry, location) and worker-
level (e.g., age, education, gender, qualications, wages, occupational cate-
gory, tenure) is available in QP les. All rms, establishments and workers
are identied with a unique identication number, so they can be followed and
matched over time. QP dataset, thus, allows the identication of entries and
exits of rms and individuals, besides making possible to track individuals
paths and transitions across rms, industries and locations.
Raw QP les are available for the period 1986-2009.3 Entries of new rms
3There is a gap for the particular years of 1990 and 2001 in the worker-level les, for
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are identied by the rst time (year) a rm is recorded in QP les. Firm exit
is identied by the moment when a rm ceases to answer the survey. We have
required an absence of the rm from the les larger or equal to two years in
order to identify its denite closure.4 For this reason, in our empirical analysis
we use data only until 2007, as the last year for which we can identify rm
exits is 2007. Data for 2008 and 2009 are only used to check the presence or
absence of rms in QP les.
3.2 Identication of Pulled and Pushed Spin-o¤s
We started by identifying all new start-up rms entering during the period
1992-2007 (excluding 2001), whose business-owner(s) (BOs) was/were in paid
employment in t 1 or t 2 and who left the previous employer.5 For spin-o¤s
founded by two or more BOs in each year t, we have required that all of them
were employed in the same incumbent rm, and that all of them have left
their previous employer immediately before (in t  1 or t  2) engaging in the
creation of the new start-up rm.
We have then classied these spin-o¤s as pushedor pulledaccording
to the status of the incumbent rm by the time of the employeesexit (see
Table 1). Those spin-o¤s founded by individuals who come from a rm that
either closed or su¤ered a signicant downsizing are classied as pushed spin-
o¤s. In such a case, the creation of the spin-o¤ may actually be a response
which no information was gathered at the individual-level.
4A temporary exit may occur for a number of reasons other than cessation of activity,
a very likely reason being that the data were not received in the Ministry of Employment
before the date when the recording operations were closed. Accordingly, rms that were
temporarily absent from the les for one year were not considered to have denitely closed.
Following the procedures of other studies also using QP data (e.g., Mata and Portugal,
2002; Geroski et al., 2010), rm-level time-varying variables were amended for that year
using data on adjacent years.
5Due to the missing data at the worker-level for 2001, we are not able to identify the
BO(s) of rms entering in this year. As our classication of spin-o¤s into pushed or
pulledrequires detailed information about the origin of BO(s) founding the rm, entries
occurring in 2001 had to be excluded.
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of some employees to an adverse shock in the parent rm, being possibly
closer to necessity spin-o¤s. The remaining spin-o¤s were classied as pulled
spin-o¤s, which may include either corporate spin-o¤s that are the result of
opportunities exploited by an incumbent rm, or spin-o¤s initiated by one
or more employees that identify an opportunity and who decide to explore it
independently of their employer. Though we are not able to distinguish these
two cases in our data, both types of rms are probably closer to opportunity-
based spin-o¤s (Buenstorf, 2009; Bruneel et al., 2013).
We have identied a total of 50,656 spin-o¤s entering during the period
1992-2007 (excluding 2001)  more precisely, 16,001 pushed spin-o¤s and
34,655 pulled spin-o¤s. Out of these, 49% operated in the same 2-digit in-
dustry of the parent rm. By distinguishing pushed from pulled spin-o¤s, this
share changes to 63% and 43%, respectively. Regarding spin-o¤slocation and
their geographic proximity to the parent rm, 53% of spin-o¤s (66% of all
pushed and 47% of all pulled spin-o¤s) were located in the same municipality
of the parent rm.
Table 1. Criteria to identify pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
Firm A closes down in the
The employee i + same year of employees exit = Firm B is
leaves the rm A Firm A su¤ers a signicant classied as a
(parent/incumbent + downsizing (30% of workers, = Pushed Spin-o¤
rm) in t  1 or with 5 or more separations) in
t  2 and becomes the same year of employees exit
BO in the new Firm A continues operating after Firm B is
spin-o¤ rm B in t + the employees exit, without = classied as a
signicant downsizing Pulled Spin-o¤
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4 Pushed and Pulled Spin-o¤s in Portugal
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relative importance of spin-o¤s in the Portuguese
economy. The former depicts the share of both types of spin-o¤s in the total
number of new rm entries identied in QP data. Over 30% of the new rms
founded in the Portuguese private sector in recent years are spin-o¤s. Since
the early 2000s, spin-o¤s have also been responsible for an increasing share of
the total employment created by new rms (Figure 2). Our data show that,
in 2007, spin-o¤s accounted for 34% of all new jobs created by new entrants
in Portugal.
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Fig. 1. Number of spin-o¤s in the total number of new entries
Additionally, these gures conrm that pushed spin-o¤s should not be over-
looked. Despite their lower relative importance comparatively to pulled-nature
spin-o¤s, they already corresponded to 10% of all new start-ups at the end of
the period under observation (Figure 1), absorbing around 14% of new jobs
created by all new entrants (Figure 2). Moreover, while pulled spin-o¤s seem
to occupy a much stronger relative position in number, both types of rms
are apparently becoming closer in terms of the share of employment created
at entry, which may indicate that pushed spin-o¤s are somewhat larger than
pulled spin-o¤s, on average.
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Fig. 2. Relative importance of spin-o¤s in the employment created by new
rms
Table 2 shows the relative importance of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s in dif-
ferent industries.6 Retail trade absorbs over 20% of all spin-o¤s. There is also
signicant spin-o¤ activity in Construction, Restaurants and Hotels, Whole-
sale Trade, as well as Real State and Business Services. In some industries,
spin-o¤s emerge more often in the same industry of the parent rm (see, for
instance, the cases of spin-o¤s operating in Textile Manufacturing Industry
and Construction). In contrast, spin-o¤s in Services (e.g., Wholesale Trade or
Real State and Business Services) are less frequently related with the parents
former industry.
These patterns suggest that industry-specic knowledge may be relatively
more important to enter into some particular industries than in others. Start-
ing a business either driven by opportunity or necessity in certain industries
(especially in Manufacturing) may require some prior specic knowledge about
the industry in order to reduce uncertainty and risk. The lack of specic knowl-
edge about the industry may be understood as less problematic when entering
in other industries (possibly in Trade and some particular Services).
6Industries are classied according to ISIC-Rev.2 (2-digit). Industries 21-Coal Mining,
22-Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas Production, 23- Metal Ore Mining, 96-International
and Other Extra-Territorial Bodies are not included in Table 2, given that no spin-o¤s were
identied in these industries.
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Table 2. Distribution of spin-o¤s by 2-digit industries (values in %)
Pulled Spin-o¤s Pushed Spin-o¤s
All Same 2d Di¤. 2d All Same 2d Di¤. 2d
Pulled as PF as PF Pushed as PF as PF
Agriculture and Hunting 1.12 0.84 1.33 1.08 1.07 1.10
Forestry and Logging 0.23 0.13 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.31
Fishing 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.09
Other Mining 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.30
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 1.39 1.49 1.32 1.74 1.82 1.61
Textile, Wearing, Leather 3.63 6.24 1.70 6.39 9.00 1.85
Wood Products 0.94 0.90 0.97 2.23 2.54 1.70
Paper, Printing, Publishing 1.10 1.30 0.95 1.03 1.13 0.86
Chemic., Coal, Rubber, Plastic 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.44
Non-Metallic Mineral Prod. 0.74 0.86 0.65 1.17 1.38 0.80
Basic Metal Industries 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.14
Metal , Machinery, Equipm. 3.35 4.16 2.75 4.56 5.11 3.59
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.87 0.82 0.90 1.81 1.84 1.75
Electricity, Gas and Steam 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03
Water Works and Supply 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07
Construction 12.90 16.61 10.16 17.04 20.85 10.43
Wholesale Trade 10.10 8.35 11.39 10.43 8.20 14.31
Retail Trade 22.67 22.46 22.83 21.27 20.12 23.26
Restaurants and Hotels 12.92 12.51 13.22 10.64 10.44 10.98
Transport and Storage 5.18 6.21 4.41 4.11 4.39 3.64
Communication 0.23 0.07 0.35 0.20 0.09 0.40
Financial Institutions 0.47 0.25 0.64 0.29 0.17 0.51
Insurance 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.02 0.21
Real State and Business Serv. 15.72 11.78 18.64 10.64 7.78 15.60
Public Administr. & Defense 2.73 2.78 2.68 1.83 1.73 2.01
Sanitary and Similar Serv. 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.08 0.07 0.09
Social & Relat. Commun. Serv. 0.43 0.25 0.56 0.24 0.18 0.35
Recreation. and Cultural Serv. 0.84 0.31 1.22 0.65 0.30 1.24
Personal and Household Serv. 1.49 0.98 1.87 1.37 0.82 2.33
TOTAL (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: PF: Parent Firm.
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Figure 3 plots pushed and pulled spin-o¤ssurvival patterns using Kaplan-
Meier estimator (Kalbeish and Prentice, 1980). Table 3 complements this
analysis, by presenting the survival rates of both groups of rms for selected
periods of time, according to the industry and geographic relatedness to the
incumbent rm.7 These results show that, unconditionally (i.e., without con-
trolling for any observed or unobserved di¤erences between rms), pushed
spin-o¤s survive longer than their pulled counterparts. These di¤erences re-
main statistically signicant across the several subsamples described in Table
3, except for spin-o¤s located in a di¤erent municipality of the parent rm in
that case, pulled spin-o¤s seem to outpace those entrepreneurial rms driven
by more pushed-nature factors.
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Fig 3. Kaplan-Meier survivor function of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
As expected, hazard rates are lower for those spin-o¤s more closely related
to the parent rm i.e., both for those remaining in the same region (county)
and those operating in the same industry of the parent rm. Nonetheless, these
initial results seem to suggest that geographical distance has a larger negative
7The geographical proximity between the spin-o¤ and the parent rm is analyzed at the
county-level. In 2007, Portugal had 308 di¤erent counties.
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impact on spin-o¤s survival prospects than industry-level distance. About
70% of the spin-o¤s established in a di¤erent region from that of the incumbent
rm had already closed down ve years after entry; the corresponding exit rate
for those establishing close to the incumbent rm (i.e., in the same county)
was around 30%. Entering in an industry di¤erent from that of the parent
rm also seems to penalize spin-o¤s in terms of survival. However, the data
show that even 15 years after entry about 36-40% of spin-o¤s operating in a
di¤erent 2-digit industry remained active.
Table 3. Comparative survival rates of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s,
according to the proximity to the parent rm
Years Industry-level (2d) Proximity Geographic Proximity
since Same industry Di¤erent industry Same region Di¤erent region
entry Pushed Pulled Pushed Pulled Pushed Pulled Pushed Pulled
1 0.8957 0.8701 0.8524 0.8408 0.9258 0.9209 0.5296 0.5786
5 0.6939 0.6316 0.6099 0.5869 0.7065 0.6677 0.2954 0.3278
10 0.5488 0.4893 0.4750 0.4379 0.5574 0.5093 0.1952 0.2147
15 0.4652 0.4108 0.3935 0.3637 0.4691 0.4252 0.1518 0.1756
Finally, Table 4 provides additional descriptive statistics for pushed and
pulled spin-o¤s. The variables summarized in the Table correspond to the
vector of variables to include in our empirical estimations. In addition to start-
up conditions related to the presence of co-workers in spin-o¤sinitial workforce
and BOshuman capital, we also control for a number of characteristics of rms
and industries.
Our data reveal that hiring co-workers is a much common practice among
pushed than among pulled spin-o¤s: almost 43% of all pushed spin-o¤s hire
at least one worker who was employed in the parent rm; such hiring scheme
is observed in less than 14% of pulled spin-o¤s. This recruitment strategy
is even more signicant among spin-o¤s located geographically close to, and
remaining in the same industry of, the parent rm.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for pushed (PS) and pulled (PL) spin-o¤s
(Portugal, 1992-2007)
Same Di¤erent Same Di¤erent
industry industry region region
PS PL PS PL PS PL PS PL
Co-workers
Hire co-workers 0.533 0.226 0.241 0.073 0.515 0.193 0.254 0.090
Human capital of BO(s)
BOsage 37.15 35.47 36.83 36.13 37.22 35.53 36.66 36.12
Schooling years 7.559 8.315 8.647 9.254 7.503 8.445 8.839 9.211
Industry exper. 4.104 4.062 0.557 0.386 3.104 2.279 2.218 1.661
Experience as BO 1.544 1.316 1.403 1.228 1.573 1.354 1.336 1.188
Firm & Industry controls
Number of BOs 1.531 1.318 1.350 1.249 1.545 1.316 1.310 1.244
Start-up size 1.372 1.037 1.033 0.884 1.325 0.976 1.098 0.925
College workers 0.055 0.099 0.096 0.137 0.050 0.101 0.109 0.138
Urban location 0.386 0.400 0.422 0.414 0.371 0.369 0.453 0.443
Min. E¢ c. Scale 3.993 3.662 3.419 3.310 3.897 3.550 3.561 3.381
Industry growth 0.027 0.038 0.054 0.051 0.034 0.043 0.042 0.048
Ind. churn rate 0.241 0.243 0.244 0.247 0.241 0.245 0.244 0.245
Notes: BOs human capital variables are measured in years. Start-up size: number
of employees at entry, in logs. College workers: share of workers with higher education.
Urban location=1 if the spin-o¤ is located in the districts of Porto or Lisbon, 0 otherwise.
Minimum E¢ cient Scale (MES): median number of employees in the 2-digit industry in each
year. Industry growth: annual percentage change in 2-digit employment. Industry churn
rate: Ratio (entries+exits)/total number of rms in the 2d sector, by year.
Regarding general and specic human capital of spin-o¤sfounders, these
statistics show that BOs of pulled spin-o¤s are, on average, younger and more
educated, while pushed spin-o¤sfounders are relatively more endowed with
specic human capital, by presenting longer industry-specic and entrepre-
neurial experiences.
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At the rm-level, we observe that pushed spin-o¤s enter at a relatively
larger scale than their pulled counterparts which may be achieved, in part,
by hiring some workers from the parent rm , while pulled spin-o¤s present a
larger share of highly-educated individuals. Following prior studies on rm sur-
vival (e.g., Mata and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Honjo,
2000; Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod, 2008), we also control for the overall
environment in the industry where rms operate, by taking into account the
minimum e¢ cient scale, the employment growth rate, and the churn/turnover
rate of the industry where each spin-o¤ is established.
Overall, these statistics show that pushed and pulled spin-o¤s are di¤er-
ently endowed with particular resources at the start-up, which may contribute
to explain why they may perform di¤erently after entry.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Empirical strategy
To study which factors may a¤ect the survival of spin-o¤s and to test whether
the survival di¤erences of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s are signicant, we em-
ploy discrete time duration models, also controlling for spin-o¤sfrailty(i.e.,
unobserved heterogeneity). With this empirical strategy, we are accounting for
the potential presence of a latent multiplicative e¤ect on the hazard function,
potentially caused by heterogeneous and unobserved times-to-failure among
the rms under study. It is possible that some spin-o¤s are more frail for
reasons left unexplained by the covariates in the model (e.g., foundersmo-
tivations and unobserved ability, or business quality), and hence will have
an increased risk of exit, while other spin-o¤s may be more likely to survive
longer all else being equal. If that is the case, neglecting spin-o¤sunobserved
heterogeneity may produce biased results (Hougaard, 1995; Jenkins, 1995).
We follow each spin-o¤ since the moment of entry until its last record in
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QP les which may either correspond to their closure or to the last year
of available information about the rm (right-censored cases). We then esti-
mate a piecewise constant hazard model, where exit rates are assumed to be
constant within each interval but allowed to be di¤erent between particular
intervals of some years. Such non-parametric modeling has been recognized
to be preferred in order to avoid serious misspecications of the functional
form of baseline hazard rates. Moreover, such exible baseline hazard func-
tion makes an attractive model with which to combine a specic heterogeneity
assumption (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Accordingly, following usual
conventions (e.g., Meyer, 1990), the model to be estimated corresponds to the
Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model, incorporating a gamma mixture distribution
to control for rm-level unobserved heterogeneity. Formally, for each spin-o¤
i, the probability of exit at discrete time tj, j = 1; 2; : : :, given survival until
time tj, is dened as
hij = 1  expf  exp[(t) +Xi(t)0 + log("i)]g; (1)
where hij is the hazard rate of spin-o¤ i after surviving for exactly j years;
(t) is a set of indicator variables for di¤erent duration intervals, thus, describ-
ing the pattern of duration dependence in spin-o¤sexit rates; Xi(t) is a vector
of time dependent and independent variables which are expected to impact on
spin-o¤ssurvival;  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated and "i
is a Gamma distributed random variable with unit mean and variance 2 = .
Conveniently, the survivor function for this model has a closed form expres-
sion (see Meyer (1990) for details), and hence so too does the log-likelihood
function, which may be written as follows:
L(; ; 2) =
NX
i=1
logf[1 + 2
tj 1X
j=0
expf(t) +Xi(t)0g]  2 (2)
 ci[1 + 2
tjX
j=0
expf(t) +Xi(t)0g]  2g;
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where ci is an indicator variable, assuming the value 1(0) whenever the
spin-o¤s spell is complete (right-censored).
Vector Xi(t) includes the main variables of interest in our analysis, namely
an indicator variable for the type of spin-o¤ (pushed versus pulled), the start-
up conditions previously discussed (i.e., indicator variables for parentspin-
o¤ relatedness in terms of industry and location, the presence of co-workers
among spin-o¤s new hires at entry, and founders general and specic hu-
man capital).8 Additionally, it also includes the rm-level and industry-level
characteristics described in the previous section (Table 4), and an indicator
variable controlling for crisis periods.9
5.2 Empirical results on spin-o¤s survival
In Table 5, we present the results obtained from the estimation of several
specications of the discrete time hazard model with gamma frailty described
above. The rst specication only includes an indicator variable distinguishing
pushed from pulled spin-o¤s. The second, third and fourth specications add,
sequentially, the variables related to the start-up conditions under analysis.
The nal specication also controls for other rm and industry characteristics,
as well as for macroeconomic conditions.
Our results show that, as we control for an increasing number of observed
characteristics of spin-o¤s, the survival gap found between pushed and pulled
spin-o¤s tends to vanish. In other words, the several start-up conditions that
we take into account, in addition to other time-varying characteristics of rms,
industries and macroeconomic environment, seem to moderate the di¤erences
initially found between the two groups of rms. Even so, the results from
8For spin-o¤s founded by two or more BOs, we consider their average human capital (in
particular, the average number of schooling years, the average number of years of experi-
ence in the 2-digit industry and the average number of years of entrepreneurial experience
acquired in the past).
9The indicator variable "Crisis Periods" is equal to 1 in the years 1993 and 2003, and 0
otherwise.
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the estimation of our nal specication show that a statistically signicant
di¤erence still exists between the hazard rates of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
pushed spin-o¤s are estimated to face 96% of the exit risk faced by pulled
spin-o¤s (exp( 0:0419) = 0:9590).
In line with the expectations raised from the exiting literature, both in-
dustrial and geographical relatedness to the parent rm improves spin-o¤s
survival. However, the survival bonus from remaining in the same region of
the incumbent rm seems to be much more signicant than that resulting from
industry-level similarities.
Spin-o¤s hiring some co-workers are found to su¤er lower risks of exiting
  they are estimated to face 87% of the hazard faced by those spin-o¤s with
no co-wokers. This conrms that the presence of these workers may be a
source of competitive advantage, as they may be a channel for knowledge
transfers, or even a channel to minimize bad matches at entry, which both
reduce uncertainty and mitigate the so-called liability of newness (Song et al.,
2003; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2004, 2011).
All measures of BOshuman capital are also found to signicantly improve
spin-o¤ssurvival prospects, by signicantly reducing the exit risk. Spin-o¤s
owned by more than one BO also present longer lifetimes and, thus, lower
exit rates than spin-o¤s run by a single BO, which suggests that a larger
entrepreneurial team, by sharing risks and resources, may reduce the liability
of newness of these rms. The results from the global specication additionally
suggest that a larger start-up size and a more educated workforce are both
associated with lower hazard rates, while location in a large urban area seems
to increase rmshazard rates. Finally, industries where the minimum e¢ cient
scale is larger shift rm exit rates upward, as well as industries where entry
and exit rates are higher, and where turbulence and competition tend to be
stronger (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). In contrast, industry growth rate,
by potentially signaling better industry conditions and prot opportunities,
reduces exit rates (see also Honjo, 2000). In line with prior studies (e.g., Varum
and Rocha, 2012), hazard rates are higher during more recessive periods.
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Table 5. Empirical results for the discrete time proportional hazard
model with gamma unobserved heterogeneity (Portugal, 1992-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type of Spin-o¤
Pushed Spin-o¤ -0.2420*** -0.1609*** -0.1286*** -0.1300*** -0.0419**
(0.0186) (0.0177) (0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0169)
Same industry as -0.2012*** -0.1683*** -0.1377*** -0.0495**
the PF (0.0168) (0.0162) (0.0208) (0.0199)
Same region as -0.2580*** -0.2461*** -0.2520*** -0.2340***
the PF (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0148)
Co-workers
Hire co-workers -0.3288*** -0.2828*** -0.1438***
(0.0351) (0.0358) (0.0359)
Human capital of the BO(s)
BOsage -0.0102*** -0.0076***
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Schooling years -0.0194*** -0.0101***
(0.0019) (0.0021)
Industry experience -0.0195*** -0.0305***
(0.0038) (0.0038)
Experience as BO -0.0627*** -0.0261***
(0.0088) (0.0082)
Firm and industry controls
Number of BOs -0.3201***
(0.0156)
Start-up size -0.2473***
(0.0123)
College workers -0.3073***
(0.0377)
Urban location 0.1210***
(0.0154)
Min. E¢ c. Scale 0.0412***
(0.0072)
Industry Growth -0.3827***
(0.0700)
(it continues in the next page)
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Table 5. Empirical results for the discrete time proportional hazard
model with gamma unobserved heterogeneity (Portugal, 1992-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Industry churn rate 4.7314***
(0.1282)
Macroeconomic Environment
Crisis Periods 0.1069***
(0.0220)
Constant -1.7757*** -1.5995*** -1.5857*** -0.9567*** -1.8381***
(0.0157) (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0482) (0.0713)
Observations 250,242 250,242 250,242 250,242 250,242
Log Likelihood -76,388.5 -76,139.8 -76,094.3 -74,673.7 -73,121.9
Unob. Heterogen. 0.7582*** 0.5083*** 0.2886*** 0.5011*** 0.3213***
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Unobserved
Heterogeneityrefers to gamma variance, which is always signicantly di¤erent from zero.
All specications include dummies for rm age, conrming that spin-o¤sexit rates have
negative duration dependence. The nal specication also includes 1-digit industry dum-
mies.
5.3 The relative quantity and quality of co-workers
The literature on spin-o¤s performance has been highlighting the need to
consider both the relative quantity and the quality of labor moving from the
parent rm to the spin-o¤. The better the quality of those workers moving
from one rm to another  in terms of education, ability or experience ,
the more valuable may be their presence in the spin-o¤. In this Section, we
extend the previous analysis in order to study in more detail the characteristics
of co-workers hired at entry and how they may inuence spin-o¤ survival.
Figure 4 conrms, over again, that hiring workers who were previously
employed in the parent rm is a more common practice among pushed spin-o¤s.
Besides, among those rms hiring at least one co-worker at the moment of their
entry, the relative importance of these employees is higher in the subsample
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of pushed spin-o¤s on average, 44% of the pushed spin-o¤sworkforce at
entry was composed by co-workers; in pulled spin-o¤s, they corresponded, on
average, to 37% of the initial labor force.
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Fig. 4. Relative importance of co-workers in total spin-o¤ workforce, at
entry
Figure 5 shows the relative importance of those co-workers subsequently
hired by spin-o¤s in the total workforce of the parent rm. On average, pushed
(pulled) spin-o¤s absorb 38% (21%) of the parent rms workforce. This also
reveals the signicant role played by pushed spin-o¤s in generating new jobs
for those who may have become unemployed due to parent rm closure or
downsizing.
Table 6 provides some descriptive statistics for those co-workers employed
by pushed and pulled spin-o¤s at the moment of their entry, according to
the parentspin-o¤ relatedness at the industry and geographic levels. Some
remarkable patterns arise from the analysis of the data. First, the mobility
of co-workers is more signicant between more related rms (either at the
industry-level or in geographic terms) (cf. Table 4). Second, co-workers em-
ployed by pushed spin-o¤s are, on average, older and have accumulated a
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longer experience in the parent rm. In contrast, co-workers hired by pulled
spin-o¤s are more educated on average, and earned higher hourly wages at the
parent rm.
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Fig. 5. Relative importance of co-workers in total parent rm workforce, at
the moment of spin-o¤sfoundersexit (Note: Spin-o¤s with no-coworkers are
excluded)
Table 6. Description of co-workers moving from the PF to the new
spin-o¤ (Portugal, 1992-2007)
Same Di¤erent Same Di¤erent
industry industry region Region
PS PL PS PL PS PL PS PL
Share of CW (% )a 0.238 0.085 0.103 0.027 0.231 0.075 0.105 0.032
Tenure in PF (m onths)b 54.92 48.28 56.60 53.90 57.03 51.56 48.35 47.08
Schooling yearsb 6.115 6.651 6.777 7.600 6.121 6.699 6.767 7.391
Hourly wage in PF (e)b 2.801 3.042 3.072 3.649 2.729 2.895 3.360 3.846
Age (years)b 35.51 33.69 35.28 33.64 35.45 33.76 35.50 33.52
Notes: aMean values for all spin-o¤s. bMean values for the sub-sample of spin-o¤s
hiring, at least, one co-worker. PS: Pushed Spin-o¤; PL: Pulled Spin-o¤; CW: Co-workers;
PF: Parent Firm.
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We have then extended our previous estimations in order to evaluate how
the relative quantity and quality of co-workers inuence spin-o¤s hazards.
Departing from the global specication presented in Table 5, we have replaced
the indicator variable Hire co-workersby the set of variables summarized in
Table 6, in order to, rst, measure the relative importance of co-workers in the
total spin-o¤s workforce and, second, proxy the general and specic human
capital of these workers. We summarize the main results in Table 7.
Table 7. The e¤ect of relative quantity and quality of co-workers on
spino¤ssurvival (Portugal, 1992-2007)
(1) (2) (3)
Pushed Spino¤ -0.0136 -0.0179 -0.0143
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0177)
Share of co-workers at entry -0.3961*** -0.1699**
(0.0482) (0.0864)
Average schooling of co-workers -0.0130*** -0.0106**
(0.0046) (0.0048)
Averare tenure of co-workers in the PF -0.0019*** -0.0018***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Average age of co-workers -0.0001 0.0012
(0.0011) (0.0013)
Average hourly wage of co-workers in the PF 0.0026 0.0028
(0.0057) (0.0057)
Number of Observations 250,242 250,242 250,242
Log Likelihood -73,094.6 -73,077.8 -73,075.8
Unobserved Heterogeneity (Gamma Variance) 0.3838*** 0.4020*** 0.4013***
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses. PF: Parent Firm. All these specications also control for the rm,
industry and macro variables previously described.
From the rst specication, our results indicate that rms entering with a
larger proportion of co-workers among their initial employees will have lower
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hazard rates. In the second specication, we replace this variable by the four
proxies of co-workershuman capital summarized above. Despite each of them
is found to reduce spin-o¤shazard rates (not reported), when included all
together in the same specication, only co-workerseducation and tenure in
the parent rm remain statistically signicant.
The nal specication controls for both the relative quantity of co-workers
and their average quality. The e¤ect of the relative quantity of co-workers
is now lower in magnitude, but still signicant. Regarding the variables mea-
suring the human capital of these workers, the experience accumulated in the
parent rm seems to be the most relevant source of human capital to reduce
spin-o¤sexit rates (the e¤ect is statistically signicant at the 1% level). This
suggests that co-workersspecic human capital is a particularly valuable asset
to new spin-o¤s hiring these workers. The longer these workers were employed
at the parent rm, the greater might be their knowledge of routines and pro-
cedures, and the resultant knowledge spillovers (Wezel et al., 2006; Agarwal
et al., 2011).
Additionally, a longer tenure in the previous employer may also be a sign of
a good match between the worker and the rm, being also a possible proxy for
workersability. Pushed spin-o¤s seem to have some comparative advantages
in this regard, given that their co-workers are, on average, slightly more expe-
rienced than those hired by their pulled counterparts. They may, thus, benet
from more signicant knowledge transfers and team-specic human capital ow-
ing to the presence of these workers at entry. Alternatively, pushed spin-o¤s
may use these recruitment schemes as a less costly screening strategy, in order
to be able to attract the best workers from the parent rm, where employment
conditions may not be so favourable due to adverse economic shocks.
Finally, these additional estimations show that, when we control for the
relative importance of co-workers and their human capital, the survival dif-
ferences between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s almost vanish, being no longer
statistically signicant. This may suggest that most of the observed di¤erences
in pushed and pulled spin-o¤sexit rates might be explained by di¤erences in
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their initial endowments in particular, those related to co-workers. Next we
conduct a brief multivariate decomposition analysis in order to evaluate this
hypothesis in more detail.
5.4 Multivariate decomposition of pushed-pulled sur-
vival gap
Multivariate decomposition has been widely used by researchers from several
elds to quantify the components of a group (e.g., men and women, black and
white individuals) di¤erence in a statistic (e.g., a mean or a proportion), which
can be attributed to group di¤erences in characteristics and group di¤erences
in e¤ects. Similar decomposition techniques have been extended and improved
for non-linear models  and hazard models in particular during the most
recent years (Powers and Yun, 2009; Powers et al. 2011), making possible to
understand the sources of group di¤erences in (exit) rates.
In this Section, we apply the multivariate decomposition techniques de-
veloped by Powers and Yun (2009) and Powers et al. (2011) to better un-
derstand the link between pushed and pulled spin-o¤ssurvival gap and their
di¤erent start-up conditions. Formally, the method allows the decomposition
of the overall observed di¤erence between pushed and pulled spin-o¤shazard
rates into a rst component E that reects compositional di¤erences between
groups (i.e., di¤erences in their characteristics or endowments), and a second
component C that reects di¤erences in the e¤ects of those characteristics (or
endowments) between groups (i.e., di¤erences in the returns, coe¢ cients or
behavioral responses), as follows:
hPS   hPL =
=
n
F (X
0
PSPS)  F (X 0PLPS)
o
+
n
F (X
0
PLPS)  F (X 0PLPL)
o
= (3)
= E + C (4)
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We have chosen pushed spin-o¤s as the comparison group and pulled spin-
o¤s as the reference group.10 In this case, E reects a counterfactual compari-
son of the di¤erence in hazard rates from pushed spin-o¤sperspective (i.e., the
expected di¤erence if pushed and pulled spin-o¤s had the same distribution of
covariates), and C reects a counterfactual comparison of hazard rates from
pulled spin-o¤sperspective (i.e., the expected di¤erence if pulled spin-o¤s had
the behavioral responses of pushed spin-o¤s to X). The decomposition further
allows to partition both E and C into portions Ek and Ck (k = 1; : : : ; K) that
represent the unique contribution of the kth covariate to E and C, respectively,
which, in turn, make possible the aggregation into groups of components that
might be of interest (e.g., BOshuman capital or co-workerscharacteristics).11
In order to understand how particular start-up conditions may contribute
to explain spin-o¤s survival gap, we have, thus, decomposed the observed
pushed-pulled di¤erence in hazard rates using the global specication of our
complementary log-logistic model presented in Table 5. Additionally, we have
performed a similar decomposition using the alternative specication that con-
trols for both the relative quantity and quality of co-workers (specication 3
from Table 7). Table 8 provides the detailed decompositions for the key vari-
ables under analysis. Figure 6 complements the analysis by illustrating the
relative importance of di¤erent groups of variables in these decompositions.12
The total observed gap in pushed and pulled spin-o¤sexit rates amounts
to 4.2 percentage points. According to the rst decomposition, di¤erences in
pushed and pulled spin-o¤sobserved characteristics account for 69% of this
gap. However, when we also control for the relative quantity and quality of co-
10However, the same di¤erential (with a change in sign) can be obtained from an alter-
native decomposition that switches the roles of the reference and comparison groups (see
Powers et al., 2011).
11The decomposition proposed by Powers and Yun (2009) and Powers et al. (2011) also
solves the problem of path dependence, according to which nonlinear decompositions are
sensitive to the order in which independent variables enter the decomposition.
12The decompositions were performed with the user-written programs mvdcmp and mvd-
cmpgroup for Stata (see Powers et al., 2011), using the options that provide normalized
solutions for dummy variables.
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workers hired at the start-up, the Endowments component represents 90% of
the overall gap. In other words, the results suggest that 90% of the di¤erence
observed between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s in exit rates can be attributed
to di¤erences in their characteristics, and especially to di¤erences in their co-
workers and BOs from Figure 6, di¤erences in these two groups of start-up
conditions account for 64% of the pushed-pulled survival gap (Model 2). The
contribution of regional and industry similarities between the spin-o¤ and the
parent rm are, in contrast, negligible.
In line with our previous results, these decompositions conrm that the
relative quantity and quality of co-workers play a particularly signicant role
in the explanation of rmssurvival di¤erences. From the rst specication
where di¤erences in co-workers are only measured by an indicator variable
distinguishing rms hiring at least one co-worker from rms with no co-workers
(Hire co-workers) the results suggest that if pulled spin-o¤s hired co-workers
with the same frequency as pushed spin-o¤s, their exit rates would be reduced
by 3:3% ( 0:0014= 0:0420). From the second specication, the decomposition
results indicate that if pulled spin-o¤s had the same proportion of co-workers in
their initial workforce as their pushed counterparts, and if their co-workers had
similar characteristics (namely in terms of average education and accumulated
experience in the parent rm) as those hired by pushed spin-o¤s at entry, their
survival di¤erences would be reduced by 41%.
Regarding BOscharacteristics, the detailed decomposition reported in Ta-
ble 8 actually shows that not all BOshuman capital measures are working in
the same direction. While specic human capital measures (namely industry-
specic and entrepreneurial experience) are favoring pushed spin-o¤s thus,
contributing to reinforce the pushed-pulled gap , di¤erences in BOsage and
education apparently attenuate the gap. Even so, overall and in net terms,
the di¤erent endowments of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s in terms of BOshu-
man capital are found to contribute for a superior performance of pushed over
pulled spin-o¤s. A great part of the observed gap in exit rates seems to come
from their di¤erences at BOsindustry-specic experience.
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Table 8. Multivariate decomposition of pushed-pulled di¤erences in
hazard rates
(1) (2)
Endowments Coe¢ cients Endowments Coe¢ cients
Similarity to the PF
Same 2d industry 0.0013*** 0.0002 0.0019*** 0.0018
of the PF (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0021)
Same region -0.0019*** -0.0043** -0.0019*** -0.0053
of the PF (0.0002) (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.0047)
Co-workers (CW)
Hire CW -0.0014*** -0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Share of CW -0.0110*** -0.0066
(0.0018) (0.0053)
Average schooling -0.0044*** -0.0006
of CW (0.0013) (0.0014)
Average tenure -0.0019** -0.0014
of CW in the PF (0.0008) (0.0013)
Human capital of the BO(s)
BOsage 0.0009*** 0.0437*** 0.0010*** 0.0579
(0.0002) (0.0159) (0.0002) (0.0479)
Schooling years 0.0029*** -0.0065 0.0026*** -0.0059
(0.0004) (0.0054) (0.0004) (0.0079)
Industry experience -0.0116*** -0.0040* -0.0107*** -0.0027
(0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0033)
Experience as BO -0.0031*** -0.0020 -0.0027*** 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0028) (0.0004) (0.0033)
Total decomposition -0.0291*** -0.0129*** -0.0378*** -0.0042**
(0.0028) (0.0060) (0.0034) (0.0060)
69% 31% 90% 10%
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses. The results on other rm, industry and macroeconomic variables are
available upon request from the authors.
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In summary, our results do not conrm the expectation raised by the lit-
erature that pulled (or opportunity) spin-o¤s outperform those rms driven
by more pushed-nature factors. Unconditionally, we actually nd that pushed
spin-o¤s survive longer. As we control for a larger number of start-up condi-
tions and other rm and industry dimensions where pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
di¤er, the survival gap becomes less signicant. Our multivariate decompo-
sition conrms that a great part of the relative survival advantages shown
by pushed spin-o¤s comes from their larger endowments of particular human
resources at entry, namely the characteristics and the relative importance of
their co-workers, and the human capital of their BOs.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this study we have used a large longitudinal matched employer-employee
dataset covering all rms in the Portuguese private sector, which allowed us to
identify a total of 50,656 spin-o¤s entering during 1992-2007 (16,001 pushed
spin-o¤s and 34,655 pulled spin-o¤s). Discrete time hazard models, incor-
porating a gamma mixture distribution to control for rm-level unobserved
heterogeneity, were employed to study how di¤erent are the survival prospects
of those two groups of spin-o¤s. Additionally, we have tried to uncover some
of the factors that may help to explain these di¤erences, by taking into ac-
count the parentspin-o¤ relatedness at the industry and geographic levels,
the presence and the characteristics of co-workers, and BOshuman capital.
Our empirical analysis reveals that, unconditionally, pushed spin-o¤s have
lower exit rates than pulled counterparts. However, as we control for a larger
number of observed di¤erences between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, the sur-
vival gap almost vanishes. A multivariate decomposition of the observed di¤er-
ences in their hazard rates showed that about 64% of the gap observed between
pushed and pulled spin-o¤sexit rates can be attributed to di¤erences in their
start-up conditions, namely those regarding the relative quantity and quality
of their co-workers and their BOshuman capital.
Our study also suggests that pushed spin-o¤s may be important employers
and that, for this reason, their signicance should not be neglected. Their
relative importance in the total employment created by new entrants in the
private sector has been growing over the most recent years. Moreover, they also
assume an important role in the absorption of many of those workers who were
recently displaced by the parent rm, consequently allowing the reutilization
of their skills and preventing the depreciation of their human capital. Under
the widespread context of economic crisis in many European countries, marked
by an unusually large number of bankruptcies and massive layo¤s, spin-o¤s of
a more pushed-nature may, thus, become more prominent in the near future,
by working as a possible solution to unemployment.
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Finally, the fact that our results do not conrm that pushed-nature entre-
preneurial rms perform worse than other spin-o¤s in the market also calls for
further research and reection about pushed and pulled spin-o¤sperformance
di¤erences. Despite pushed spin-o¤s may be triggered by more unfavorable
environments at the parent rm, and their creation may constitute an im-
mediate response to foundersjob loss, they still may be able to perform as
well as other rms driven by the identication of a great business opportu-
nity. Actually, by being forced to be more self-su¢ cient comparatively to
those launching opportunity-based businesses, necessity-based entrepreneurs
may become more attached to their rms and, thus, be more resilient in the
market, which may contribute to improve the survival prospects of their rms.
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Abstract
Despite the increasing interest in rm growth and survival over
the last decades, research on how the dynamics of new rms  and
particularly spin-o¤s  is related to the characteristics of their initial
workforce is still scarce. This paper uses a large longitudinal matched
employer-employee dataset to study how spin-o¤spost-entry employ-
ment growth, worker ows and survival are associated to their initial
human capital endowments. We focus on three measures of human cap-
ital at entry: the average skill level of workers, their skill dispersion and
the share of co-workers in the workforce. In order to measure workers
skills, we use a multidimensional skill index that takes into account both
observed and unobserved characteristics of the worker. Our results show
that rms employing a more skilled workforce at the start-up face lower
exit rates. In contrast, skill dispersion at entry increases the risk of exit
and signicantly reduces post-entry employment growth, by increasing
spin-o¤sseparation rates. Finally, spin-o¤s entering with a more sig-
nicant share of co-workers in the initial workforce survive longer and
seem to su¤er less signicant labor adjustments over their lifecycle.
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1 Introduction
Research on rm growth and survival has been accumulating at a remarkable
pace over the last decades, being one of the central topics in the entrepre-
neurship eld (Coad, 2009; Leitch et al., 2010; McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010).
Understanding how entrepreneurs survive in the market, and how their rms
can grow and create sustainable jobs constitutes a well-documented and still
timely debate among scholars, policy makers and business-owners, especially
following one of the worst nancial and economic crisis in decades, marked by
the closure of many rms and massive layo¤s (OECD, 2010; 2013a).
What has been left aside by most of this already vast literature is how the
dynamics of new rms (in terms of survival, growth and labor adjustments over
rmslifecycle) are related to the characteristics specically the skills of
the workers these rms employ at entry. Although a large empirical literature
suggests that workersoutcomes are associated with rmscharacteristics (see,
for instance, the literature on rm size-wage e¤ects), very little is known about
the converse relationship. This neglect of the literature is indeed surprising,
given that any level of employment growth can be achieved by di¤erent combi-
nations of hires and separations (Burgess et al., 2000), so we may expect that a
strong association between rm growth, labor reallocation and initial workers
skills actually exists. Moreover, labor is probably the most heterogeneous of
all inputs in production functions (Lazear and Oyer, 2007), so matching the
right rms to the right workers is expected to create economic value of a mag-
nitude that few other economic processes can, and hence to have important
e¤ects on rm survival.
The lack of proper longitudinal data matching rms and workers partially
explains why the potentially signicant link between rms initial choice of
worker mix and subsequent rms outcomes was overlooked for long time
(Haltiwanger et al., 1999, 2007; Hamermesh, 2008; Iranzo et al., 2008). In this
line, this study aims at understanding how the growth and survival patterns
of new rms are related to the characteristics of the workers they employ at
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the time of entry, using a rich matched employer-employee dataset for Portu-
gal. We focus on a signicant group of new start-up rms that are established
every year spin-o¤s launched by individuals who have recently left their job
either due to the identication of a business opportunity (pulled spin-o¤s), or
by necessity (pushed spin-o¤s) and where hiring strategies and, thus, initial
workforce characteristics, may be particularly relevant to explain their post-
entry performance (see Song et al., 2003; Franco and Filson, 2006; Agarwal et
al., 2011; Muendler et al., 2012; Andersson and Klepper, 2013).
The paper focuses on three particular aspects of spin-o¤sinitial workforce:
the average skill level of the rst employees, their skill dispersion, and the
share of co-workers at entry.1 Regarding skill measurement, we follow the
strategy proposed by Portela (2001) and use a multi-dimensional index of
workers skills, which allows considering both observable and unobservable
characteristics of the workers employed by spin-o¤s at the time of entry. This
approach constitutes a novel contribution to the existing literature, as previous
studies have mostly focused on very particular and observable characteristics
of workers to measure their skills (e.g., Ilmakunnas et al., 2004; Haltiwanger et
al., 1999, 2007; Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2011; Lopez-Garcia and Puente,
2012; Koch et al., 2013).
The main contributions of this study are twofold. First, we follow 50,656
new spin-o¤s established during the period 1992-2007 and analyze how the
aforementioned initial human capital endowments are related to spin-o¤s
growth rates, worker ows (hires and separations) and survival. Second, we
test whether, accounting for a set of rm, industry and entrepreneurs charac-
teristics, any signicant di¤erences remain between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
in terms of employment growth and survival. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst study analyzing how those rm-level outcomes are related to the
characteristics of the workforce hired at the time of entry, focusing particularly
1Co-workers are dened as those workers hired by the new spin-o¤ at the start-up and
who were previously employed in the parent rm where the spin-o¤s founder comes from.
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on pushed and pulled spin-o¤s.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section
2 briey reviews the main literature relating rmsoutcomes with workers
skills, and discusses the human capital measures used in this study. Section
3 describes the data and the methodological details about the computation of
the skill index. Section 4 presents some descriptive and comparative statistics
on the employment dynamics and workersskills for pushed and pulled spin-
o¤s. Section 5 presents the empirical models and discusses the results. Section
6 concludes.
2 Firm-level outcomes and workforce charac-
teristics
2.1 Previous literature and theoretical background
There is an increasing integration and interdependence of the elds of indus-
trial and labor economics (Haltiwanger et al., 1999, 2007; Ilmakunnas et al.,
2004; Mamede, 2008). New rm performance in terms of growth and survival
is a topic where this connection is particularly clear. On the one hand, the
interesting issue from the point of view of industrial economics is how we can
explain rmspost-entry performance with the fact that the quality and
the mix of workers they start with is di¤erent. On the other hand, from
the labor economics perspective, an imperative issue is how new rms might
contribute to job creation, destruction and labor turnover over their lifecycle.
Labor reallocation has been documented to be particularly signicant among
new and young rms (e.g., Abowd et al., 1999a; Burgess et al., 2000; Davis
et al., 2009; Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Imperfect information either in the
form of information asymmetry (Gibbons and Katz, 1991) or matching quality
(Jovanovic, 1979, 1984) is argued to play a key role in this process of work-
ersreallocation at the rm-level (Abowd et al., 1999a). Actually, as rms get
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themselves sorted out and survive in the market, they probably identify their
best workers, or the particular skill mix they require, and gradually move
towards their desired team (Geroski and Mazzucato, 2002; Haltiwanger et al.,
2007). As a result, rm-level employment growth rates and exit decisions may
reect adjustments in rms(and entrepreneurs) perceptions about their own
ability and e¢ ciency.
While much attention has been paid to the role of the human capital of the
founder(s) (Rauch et al., 2005; Koch et al., 2013), the relationship between
workershuman capital and rm performance has been relatively neglected.
However, under the resource-based theory of competitive advantage (e.g., Bar-
ney, 2001), human capital understood as the most universally valuable and
imperfectly imitable resource is believed to explain why some rms outper-
form others (Crook et al., 2011). In times of increasing internationalization
and a continuous acceleration of technological development, human capital
endowments are recognized to be important preconditions to obtain informa-
tion about markets and technologies, to remain connected and reactive in the
market, to maintain and strengthen the competitiveness, and to give satisfac-
tory signals to both clients and competitors (Rauch et al., 2005; Koch et al.,
2013). Furthermore, initial human capital endowments may play an even more
important and strategic role in newborn rms, which typically have less well-
developed resources (e.g., immature internal structures, lack of reputation, and
insu¢ cient access to networks) and face higher exit rates, and which, there-
fore, need to nd specic strategies to compete successfully with incumbents
and to be able to grow.
The existing studies evaluating the role of human capital have mostly fo-
cused on rm productivity and workersobserved characteristics. So far, em-
pirical evidence for U.S. (Haltiwanger et al., 1999, 2007), Finland (Ilmakunnas
et al., 2004) and Spain (Lopez-Garcia and Puente, 2012) conrmed that rms
employing more educated workforces are more productive on average (see also
Crook et al. (2011) for a survey of results on other rm-level outcomes and
for other countries). Similar results were obtained for Italy by Iranzo et al.
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(2008), who alternatively used the person xed e¤ect from an estimated wage
equation (with both worker and rm xed e¤ects) as a measure of workers
skills. Studies analyzing how workersskills may inuence rm employment
and survival dynamics are however much scarcer. The recent study by Koch
et al. (2013), for Germany, has attempted to ll this gap, showing that em-
ploying a larger share of highly educated workers in the year of start-up has a
signicant positive impact on new rmspost-entry growth.
This paper, thus, tries to understand how the growth and survival of new
spin-o¤s is related to their human capital endowments at the time of entry.
Besides, we pay further attention to the heterogeneous nature of spin-o¤s, as
not all spin-o¤s arise from the identication of an opportunity by some em-
ployee(s), or from some strategic action of incumbent rms. Several spin-o¤s
also emerge from necessity (e.g., to escape from unemployment or unstable job
conditions), though only more recent studies started recognizing their impor-
tance (e.g. Buenstorf, 2009; Bruneel et al., 2013; Dick et al., 2013).
Although most of those studies have been suggesting that pulled spin-o¤s
outperform their pushed counterparts by surviving longer, recent evidence has
also found that, after controlling for a number of start-up conditions where
these rms di¤er, pushed and pulled spin-o¤sexit rates are not signicantly
di¤erent (Rocha et al., 2013). Evidence on the role of initial workforce skills
on pushed and pulled spin-o¤s employment dynamics and survival is still
limited, so this paper tries to contribute to this emerging debate by explor-
ing whether a di¤erent worker mix at entry leads to di¤erent adjustments
in pushed and pulled spin-o¤slabor force, and whether the type of spin-o¤
becomes imprinted in these rmsDNA, possibly leading to enduring post-
entry performance di¤erences, even after controlling for the characteristics of
workers, business-owners, rms and industries.
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2.2 Human capital measures
In this paper, we use three variables to measure the human capital endowments
of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s at the moment of start-up: the average skill level
of the initial workforce, the workersskill dispersion at entry, and the share of
co-workers hired at the start-up.
While the literature generally agrees on a positive association between
workersaverage skills and rm performance (usually measured by rm produc-
tivity), the e¤ects potentially arising from skill dispersion are not so clear-cut.
On the one hand, diversity (in tangible and intangible resources) within rms
is often considered to be positively related to performance (Lazear, 1999; Il-
makunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2011; Østergaard et al., 2011; Koch et al., 2013),
as a diversied workforce may raise the rms ability to react and adapt to
external shocks, improve the rms problem-solving routines, besides provid-
ing access to a broader set of resources and increased information about global
markets, potentially making the rm more creative, innovative and open to
new ideas.
On the other hand, workersheterogeneity also increases the need for in-
teraction and communication, as it may lead to conicts, distrust, rivalry, dis-
satisfaction, poor cooperation among workers and increased transaction costs
(Parrotta et al., 2012). Moreover, according to the O-ring theory of production
function (Kremer, 1993), workers are normally sorted out according to their
skills, so people of similar skills are expected to work together and rms tend
to specialize either in low-skill or in high-skill workers.
Empirical results on this relationship are still scanty and ambiguous. For
Finland, Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) found that age (education) diver-
sity is positively (negatively) related to rm productivity, while Østergaard et
al. (2011) and Parrotta et al. (2012) obtained the reverse relationship, both for
Denmark.2 Martins (2008) and Iranzo et al. (2008), instead, measured work-
2The study by Østergaard et al. (2011) however focuses on the relationship between
employee diversity and rm innovation.
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ersskills through the person-specic e¤ect obtained from a wage equation.
The former concluded, for Portugal, that an increase in workersheterogeneity
is associated with a decrease in rm productivity, whereas the latter, using Ital-
ian data and distinguishing between production and nonproduction workers,
found positive (negative) e¤ects from within-occupation (between-occupation)
skill diversity. Hence, we contribute to this literature by analyzing not only
the role of workersaverage skills, but also the e¤ect of workersskill dispersion
at the moment of entry measured by the standard deviation of the average
skill index of the initial workforce.
Finally, regarding the presence of co-workers in the initial workforce, the
literature suggests that this may constitute a possible source of competitive ad-
vantage for the rm. By working as a possible channel through which routines,
procedures, knowledge and various forms of human capital (e.g., industry-
specic, rm-specic, team-specic human capital) may be transferred from
the parent rm (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005; Franco and Filson, 2006),
co-workers may actually be a rm-specic resource  therefore, di¢ cult to
imitate.
Nonetheless, a stronger presence of co-workers at entry may also mod-
erate the post-entry growth of new spin-o¤s. On the one hand, the choice
of the initial workforce is documented to have long-term, persistent, e¤ects,
not only due to the informal ties developed between the rst employees and
rmsfounders (Koch et al., 2013), but also because ring is costly and time
consuming (Messina and Vallanti, 2007), potentially restricting subsequent
labor adjustments at the rm-level. On the other hand, absorbing some co-
workers from the parent rm may be a less costly process of screening the best
workers or matches at entry. Accordingly, information asymmetries between
rms/entrepreneurs and workers may be mitigated (and the match quality may
be improved) in spin-o¤s where co-workers have a more relative importance
at the start-up, thus reducing the need for great labor reallocation after entry
which may be translated into lower hiring and separation rates , though
potentially reducing rm exit risks. Given these mixed arguments and the lack
202
of empirical evidence on this relationship, we also consider the e¤ect of this
measure of human capital in our analysis.
3 Data and Methodological Issues
3.1 Data and identication of spin-o¤s
Our data come from Quadros de Pessoal (hereafter, QP), a large longitudinal
linked employer-employee dataset obtained from the Portuguese Ministry of
Employment. QP covers all rms operating in the Portuguese private sector
and employing at least one wage earner. Every year, each of those rms
is legally obliged to ll in a survey and to report information on each of
its establishments and workers. Available information at the rm-level in-
cludes employment, sales, industry, ownership, location, among others. At the
individual-level, QP reports information about each workers age, education,
gender, qualications, wages, occupational category, tenure, number of hours
worked and type of contract. All rms, establishments and workers are iden-
tied with a unique identication number, so that they can be followed and
matched over time. For these reasons, QP provides very rich and reliable micro
data, allowing the identication of entries and exits of rms, BOs and work-
ers, besides making possible to track individualstrajectories and transitions
across rms, industries, locations, occupational categories, among others.
Raw QP les are available for the period 1986-2009.3 Entries of new rms
are identied by the rst time (year) a rm is recorded in QP les. New spin-
o¤s are identied as a particular group of start-up rms entering in t, whose
founder(s) was/were in paid employment in t   1 or t   2 and who left the
previous employer. For spin-o¤s founded by two or more BOs in each year t,
we have required that all of them were employed in the same incumbent rm,
3There is a gap for the particular years of 1990 and 2001 in the worker-level les, for
which no information was gathered at the individual-level.
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and that all of them have left their previous employer immediately before (in
t  1 or t  2) engaging in the creation of the spin-o¤.
Pushed spin-o¤s were then distinguished from pulled spin-o¤s according
to the potential triggering event driving the individualsdecision to start a
business. Spin-o¤s founded in t by an individual (or a set of individuals)
coming from an incumbent rm that either closed or su¤ered a signicant
downsizing in t   1 or t   2 were classied as pushed spin-o¤s.4 In this
case, the creation of their own business may actually be a response of some
employees to an adverse shock in the parent rm, being possibly closer to
necessity-based spin-o¤s. The remaining cases were classied as pulled spin-
o¤s, which may either include incumbent-backed spin-o¤si.e., corporate
spin-o¤s that are the result of opportunities exploited by an incumbent rm 
or cases closer to opportunity spin-o¤sthat is, businesses initiated by one
or more employees that identify an opportunity and who decide to explore it
independently of their employer (see Buenstorf, 2009; Bruneel et al., 2013).
We are not able to distinguish these two last cases in our data.
We have followed the employment growth and survival patterns of 50,656
spin-o¤s identied in QP data  16,001 pushed and 34,655 pulled , which
entered during the period 1992-2007 (excluding 2001).5 ;6 The analysis stops
at 2007, the last year for which we can identify the exit of rms. Firm exit is
identied by the moment when a rm ceases to answer the survey. Following
previous studies that also use QP dataset (e.g., Mata and Portugal, 2002;
Geroski et al., 2010), we have required an absence of the rm from the les
4Following OECD (2013b), a signicant downsizing corresponds to a reduction in rm
size larger or equal to 30% of the workforce, with a minimum number of separations equal
to ve.
5Due to the missing data at the worker-level for 2001, we are not able to identify the
BO(s) of rms entering in this year. As our classication of spin-o¤s into pushed or
pulledrequires detailed information about the origin of BO(s) founding the rm, entries
occurring in 2001 had to be excluded.
6About 97% of the 50,656 spin-o¤s under analysis are either limited liability companies
(Sociedades por Quotas) or one-person business (Empresário em Nome Individual). From
the 16,001 pushed spin-o¤s identied, 10,161 were established after the parent rm closure
and the remaining 5,840 emerged after a signicant downsizing of the parent rm.
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larger or equal to two years in order to identify its denite exit.7 Data for
2008 and 2009 were only used to check the presence or absence of rms in QP
les.
3.2 Measuring workersskills
Previous studies have already recognized that nding the right measure of
skills is quite controversial (Iranzo et al., 2008). As already discussed, most
of the existing studies constructed human capital proxies based on observed
dimensions as workerseducational attainment, age, earnings or gender (e.g.,
Haltiwanger et al., 1999, 2007; Ilmakunnas et al., 2004; Ilmakunnas and Il-
makunnas, 2011; Koch et al., 2013). However, since the seminal contribution
of Abowd et al. (1999b), it is well known that worker heterogeneity can exceed
considerably the di¤erences across individuals in terms of the observable vari-
ables mentioned above, which only imperfectly reect unobserved di¤erences
as innate ability, informal skills or education quality (see also Iranzo et al,
2008; Martins, 2008).
As a result, we provide a methodological contribution to the existing lit-
erature using the multi-dimensional skill index developed by Portela (2001)
to measure workers skills. This index synthesizes di¤erent observable and
unobservable dimensions of the productivity of workers in this case, school-
ing, experience and unobservable permanent heterogeneity. Accordingly, we
started by computing the skill index of each worker i in each year t as follows:
Sit = mschool  aschool  aexperience  aunobserved ability
where:
7We dene exit as rm closure. Despite the comprehensiveness of QP dataset, it does not
allow the distinction between di¤erent modes of exit. Regarding the exits due to mergers or
acquisitions (M&A), prior studies (e.g., Geroski et al., 2010) have documented that less than
1% of the total number of liquidations in Portugal has been due to M&A, thus suggesting
that our inability to identify mergers in QP is not likely to a¤ect our results.
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 mschool is the average schooling years in the economy in each year;
 aschool is a correction factor taking into account the actual position of the
individual, in each year, in the schooling distribution, being computed
as follows:
aschool = 0:5 +
exp((schooli mschool)=sschool)
1+exp((schooli mschool)=sschool) ,
where schooli stands for the schooling level (in years) of worker i and
sschool represents the standard deviation of schooling in the population;
 aexperience is a correction factor for workers experience, conditional on
their schooling level, calculated as follows:
aexperience = 0:5 +
exp((agei magejschooli)=(sagejschooli))
1+exp((agei magejschooli)=(sagejschooli)) ;
where agei represents the age (in years) of worker i, magejschooli is the
average age of the population within schooling level schooli and sagejschooli
is its standard deviation;
 aunobserved ability is a correction factor for workers unobserved ability, con-
ditional of their schooling level and experience, calculated as follows:
aunobserved ability = 0:5 +
exp((FEi mFEjschooli;agei)=(sFEjschooli;agei))
1+exp((FEi mFEjschooli;agei)=(sFEjschooli;agei)) ;
where FEi denotes the worker-specic e¤ect, mFEjschooli; agei is the av-
erage of those worker xed e¤ects for individuals with the same schooling and
age, and sFEjschooli; agei is the standard deviation of those e¤ects.
In order to estimate the worker xed e¤ect, a two high-dimensional xed-
e¤ects wage equation was estimated using the procedure described in Guimarães
and Portugal (2010). The dependent variable was dened as the natural log of
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real hourly earnings.8 This wage equation controls for individuals age (and its
square), tenure (and its square), education dummies, qualication dummies,
time dummies and, following Abowd et al. (1999b), both worker and rm
unobserved (permanent) heterogeneity.
The computation of the skill index for each worker i in each year t has then
allowed the construction of rm-level measures of workersskills. In particular,
for each rm, at the moment of entry, we have computed the average value
and the standard deviation of their workersskills, two of the key variables to
be included in our empirical analysis Average WorkersSkills and Skill Dis-
persion. With this last variable we aim at measuring the workforce inequality
within the rm, in terms of skills, in the year of start-up. The higher (lower)
the Skill Dispersion, the more heterogeneous (homogeneous) will be the initial
workforce in terms of skills.9
4 Employment dynamics and workers skills
in pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
4.1 Employment growth, job and worker ows over rms
lifecycle
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s growth rates
over the years. On average, pulled spin-o¤s tend to present higher growth
rates (3.9% against 1.3% for pushed spin-o¤s), though the growth rates of
8Hourly earnings correspond to the ratio between total regular payroll (base wages and
regular benets) and the total number of normal hours worked in the reference period.
Earnings were deated using the Consumer Price Index. Outliers (i.e., the 1% with highest
and lowest real hourly log earnings in each year) were removed from the estimations.
9It is possible to have some missing values in particular years at the rm-level, especially
for rms employing only one worker, if some of the components of the skill index have
missing data. Nevertheless, this does not seem to a¤ect our results, given that the overall
conclusions remain unchanged even when we exclude those rms from the dataset.
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both groups of rms seem to converge as they age.10 Growth rates tend to
be higher during rms infancy, becoming lower and even negative as rms
become older, suggesting that most of the jobs are created at younger ages,
while at more mature stages rms tend to stagnate or reduce their average
size. The data actually reveal that average growth rates become negative
relatively early, in part because many spin-o¤s close down and exit few years
after start-up. About 28% of all spin-o¤s exit during the rst three years of
activity and only 64% survive at least ve years. Conditional on survival, the
average growth is found to be positive though also decreasing throughout
the rst eight to nine years of rm activity. The variability of growth rates
also decreases over rmslifecycle (see the right-hand side plot of Figure 1).
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Fig. 1. Employment growth rates over rmslifecycle, by spin-o¤ type
(average and std. dev. of growth rates)
10However, we should notice that pushed spin-o¤s enter at a slightly larger scale the mean
and median start-up size of pushed spin-o¤s in our data is 5 and 3 employees, respectively;
the respective values for pulled spin-o¤s are 4 and 2 employees.
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Figure 2 plots the job reallocation rate, the worker ow rate and the churn-
ing rate over time, comparing, over again, pushed with pulled spin-o¤s. We
follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) and Davis et al. (1996, 2006) in
order to compute these rates.
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Fig. 2. Job and worker ows over rmslifecycle
Job ows refer to the annual change in employment at the rm-level:
JFit = Eit   Eit 1. Accordingly, job creation (destruction) is a positive (neg-
ative) job ow. We dene job reallocation at the rm-level as the absolute
value of job ows (JR = jJF j). Total worker ows are dened as the sum
of hires and separations, WFit = Hit + Sit, so that job ows are also dened
as JFit = Hit   Sit = Eit   Eit 1. Worker ows can thus be rewritten as
WFit = JRit + CFit, where the second term denotes Churning Flowsthe
number of worker ows over and above those necessary to achieve the rms
desired employment change. Hence, worker ows comprise two main compo-
nents: rms simultaneously hiring and ring (i.e., rms churning workers) and
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workers quitting and being replaced (i.e., workers churning rms). The cor-
responding rates are the levels divided by the current average size of the rm
((Eit + Eit 1)=2).
We observe, rst of all, a clear pattern for the worker ow rate to decline
with rm age, deriving from a decline in both job reallocation and churning
rates. The data further show that worker turnover was higher in pulled than
in pushed spin-o¤s. Overall, these patterns conrm that new spin-o¤s su¤er
a signicant reallocation of workers over their lifecycle, especially during the
rst years of activity. As rms evolve over time, they probably have to decide
and adjust the optimal mix of workers to employ. The fact that worker ows
decline over rmslifecycle may actually sign the already discussed behavioral
and learning process at the rm-level as rms age and learn about themselves
and the market, they possibly identify their best workers/matches and/or the
particular skill mix they require, and gradually adjust their workforce towards
their desired team.
Table 1 additionally shows that while job destruction rates and separation
rates were more similar among pulled and pushed spin-o¤s, the former ex-
hibited higher job creation rates, as well as higher hiring rates. In summary,
the data suggest that pulled spin-o¤s make more signicant adjustments in
their workforce after entry, while pushed spin-o¤s probably enter with a more
stable worker mix, in part due to a stronger presence of co-workers and the
potential knowledge advantages that may arise from them. In the year of
start-up, about 19% of the initial workforce of pushed spin-o¤s is composed
by co-workers, while in pulled spin-o¤s only 5% of the employees come from
the parent rm.
In alternative, pushed spin-o¤s may have greater di¢ culties in adjusting
their workforce over the lifecycle, either because their initial worker mix may
be more rigid by nature (as informal ties with the rst hires may create bar-
riers to labor adjustments), or because they may be founded under more un-
favorable conditions (i.e., possibly more driven by necessity) than their pulled
counterparts, which may constrain their post-entry growth.
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Table 1. Labor market ow rates, by spin-o¤ type (mean rates)
Pushed Spin-o¤s Pulled Spin-o¤s
Job Creation Rate 0.1045 0.1297
Job Destruction Rate 0.0910 0.0907
Job Reallocation Rate 0.1955 0.2204
Hiring Rate 0.1962 0.2406
Separation Rate 0.1860 0.2044
Worker Flow Rate 0.3822 0.4450
Churning Rate 0.1928 0.2316
With Figure 3, we try to understand the relationship between worker
turnover and job turnover at the rm-level, by plotting hiring and separa-
tion rates on rmsnet employment growth rates. To construct this gure,
and following Davis et al. (2006), we have used pooled annual data at the rm-
level level from 1992 to 2007 to estimate the mean hiring rate and the mean
separation rate for narrow intervals of spin-o¤sgrowth rate distribution.11
As expected, both hiring and separation rates increase with the magnitude
of the variation of net employment at the rm-level, being almost at for
positive (negative) employment growth rates in the case of separation (hiring)
rates. In particular, hires (separations) increase roughly one-for-one with job
growth (loss) at expanding (contracting) spin-o¤s. In addition, both hiring
and separation rates are lowest for zero-growth spin-o¤s, which imply that
these rms are relatively stable regarding job growth and worker turnover.
Very similar patterns were identied for the subsamples of pushed and pulled
spin-o¤s.
11This method is equivalent to a least squares regression of the hiring (separation) rate
on a large number of dummy variables for growth rate intervals that partition the -200 to
+200 percent range. These OLS estimates are weighted by rmsaverage size.
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Fig. 3. The relationship of spin-o¤shiring and separation rates to
employment growth
Finally, Table 2 provides some information on the persistence of workers
hired at entry. Column 1 summarizes the average share of stayers and
shows that, on average, the proportion of workers hired at the start-up and
remaining in the rm n years later is larger in pushed than in pulled spin-o¤s,
but decreasing over the lifecycle in both groups of rms. This conrms that a
signicant part of the initial workforce leaves the rm over time.
Column 2 provides similar statistics for the subgroup of co-workers. The
data conrm that the persistence rates of this type of workers are comparable
to those of other workers by the fth year of spin-o¤sactivity, about 37%
(31%) of those co-workers hired by pushed (pulled) spin-o¤s at entry still
belong to the workforce. In other words, more than 60% of co-workers initially
hired leave the rm during the rst ve years of activity.
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The last column shows the relative importance of co-workers in the group
of stayers. In pushed spin-o¤s, for each ve stayers one is a co-worker hired
from the parent rm. The relative presence of co-workers is much lower in
pulled spin-o¤s, which also reects the di¤erent importance that this group of
workers assumes in both types of rms since their entry.
Table 2. Workerspersistence in the rm over rmslifecycle
Stayers CW Stayers CW/Stayers
(1) (2) (3)
Pushed Pulled Pushed Pulled Pushed Pulled
Spin-o¤s Spin-o¤s Spin-o¤s Spin-o¤s Spin-o¤s Spin-o¤s
Year 2 80.2% 78.5% 80.7% 77.5% 22.8% 6.1%
Year 3 61.4% 57.4% 60.7% 56.7% 23.8% 5.8%
Year 4 48.9% 44.8% 47.3% 42.2% 24.6% 6.4%
Year 5 39.0% 34.7% 37.4% 31.2% 24.2% 7.0%
(1) Stayers: #Workers entering in year 1 and persisting in the rm in year n/Total #
workers hired in year 1.
(2) CW Stayers: # CW hired in year 1 and persisting in year n/Total # CW hired in
year 1.
(3) CW/Stayers: #CW hired in year 1 and persisting in year n/#Workers entering in
year 1 and persisting in the rm in year n.
4.2 Evolution of workersskills over rmslifecycle
Figure 4 illustrates how the average and the dispersion of the workersskill
index have evolved over time in pushed and pulled spin-o¤s. We observe an
upward trend in both variables during the rst years of activity, which suggest
that both types of spin-o¤s evolve, on average, towards a more skilled and
diversied workforce after entry. However, this evolution seems to slow down
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or even reverse at more mature ages, as rms probably identify the best skill
mix they need to perform their activity in the market.
Pulled spin-o¤s not only present a more skilled, but also a more heteroge-
neous, workforce than their pushed counterparts. On the other hand, while
we observe some patterns of convergence over time between the two groups of
spin-o¤s in what concerns the average skills of their employees, the same does
not apply when we consider the standard deviation of workersskills, as the
di¤erences between rms seem to remain large as they age.
Next we try to understand whether those who persist in the rm for rela-
tively long periods (in this case, ve years or more since the start-up), those
who were recently hired, those who were separated, and those who come from
the parent rm (co-workers) di¤er in terms of average skills. Table 3 summa-
rizes the average skill index and the skill dispersion of these groups of workers,
by spin-o¤ type. Figure 5 complements the analysis by illustrating the distri-
bution of the average skill index for di¤erent groups of workers.
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rmslifecycle
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Table 3. Average skill index and average skill dispersion, by workers
and spin-o¤ type
Pushed Spin-o¤s Pulled Spin-o¤s
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
New Hires 6.401 2.289 6.495 2.330
Separations 6.628 2.377 6.718 2.243
Co-workers 6.716 2.326 7.404 2.518
Stayers (persisting  5 years) 7.268 2.641 7.744 2.648
Co-workers persisting  5 years 7.016 2.451 7.883 2.437
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Fig. 5. Kernel density of average skill index, by worker types
The data conrm that stayers have a higher skill index than those who
are hired over the rm lifecycle and those who leave the rm (voluntarily or
involuntarily). Co-workers (particularly those persisting in the rm for longer
periods) also present a higher skill index than those entering and leaving the
rm over its lifecycle. This, over again, may sign some learning by rms, which
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seem to improve their average skill levels by holding the most skilled workers
in the rm and adjusting their workforce by churning workers with lower skills
on average.
Moreover, co-workers hired and retained by pulled spin-o¤s are much more
skilled, on average, than those absorbed by their pushed counterparts. This
may also suggest that, despite pulled spin-o¤s start with a much lower share
of co-workers in their initial workforce, they seem to choose among the most
skilled ones. In opposition, necessity reasons, more than skill requirements,
may explain the relatively stronger presence of these workers in pushed spin-
o¤s.
Finally, given the average skill di¤erences found between pushed and pulled
spin-o¤s, we explore which human capital components workerseducation,
experience (proxied by age) and unobserved ability matter the most for the
skill gap observed among pushed and pulled spin-o¤s at entry. For that pur-
pose, we use Gelbachs (2009) unambiguous decomposition of the conditional
skill gap observed in the year of their entry. We regressed each rms Aver-
age WorkersSkills on their workersaverage education, age and unobserved
ability (measured by the person-specic xed e¤ect previously obtained from
the wage equation with rm and worker xed e¤ects), controlling as well for
spin-o¤ssize, industry and time e¤ects. Table 4 summarizes the results.
The results conrm that pushed spin-o¤s have a lower average skill index
than pulled spin-o¤s (the gap is negative and statistically signicant), even
after controlling for their size, sector and time e¤ects. The most important
source of these di¤erences seems to be workersunobserved heterogeneity, fol-
lowed by workerseducation. In other words, pushed spin-o¤s enter with a less
skilled workforce on average because their rst workers have a lower person-
specic e¤ect and are less educated than those hired by pulled spin-o¤s at
entry. In contrast, pushed spin-o¤sworkers are relatively more experienced,
which somewhat attenuates the skill gap observed among the two types of
rms.
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Table 4. Conditional decomposition of the spin-o¤saverage skill
index gap, according to spin-o¤stypea
Start-up year
WorkersSchool Years -0.1462***
(0.0087)
WorkersAge 0.1353***
(0.0072)
WorkersUnobserved Heterogeneity (FE) -0.2144***
(0.0132)
Total Gap (Pushed vs. Pulled) -0.2252***
(0.0190)
Notes: a Decompositions based on Gelbach (2009). *** mean signicant at the 1%
level. The baseline model corresponds to an OLS regression with the rms average skill
index as the dependent variable, controlling for time xed e¤ects, spin-o¤sstart-up size,
sector and a dummy for spin-o¤ type. The full model additionally includes the average
workerseducation, age and unobserved ability as independent variables.
5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Empirical Model
The aim of the following empirical analysis is to study the impact of spin-o¤s
initial human capital endowments on their post-entry growth and survival.
For this purpose, we start by estimating the following employment growth
equation:
Growthi;t+1 = 1X1i;0 + 2X2i;t + 3X3i;t + t + "it (1)
where Growthi;t+1 =
Eit+1 Eit
0:5(Eit+1+Eit) is the employment growth rate of each
spin-o¤ i between years t and t+1 (with Eit representing total employment in
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rm i in year t), X1i;0 is the vector of variables measuring the human capital
endowments of spin-o¤s at entry (including a constant term) and 1 is the
corresponding vector of parameters of interest to be estimated.12 Additionally,
we control for a number of characteristics of rms and their BOs, which are
denoted by vectors X2i;t and X3i;t, respectively. Finally, t represents annual
time xed e¤ects, while "it is the error term. To account for the fact that
the observations of the same spin-o¤ over time are not independent, standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the rm-level.
Firm-level variables include the type of spin-o¤ (pushed versus pulled), two
dummy variables indicating whether or not the spin-o¤ is established in the
same location (county) and in the same industry of the parent rm, in addition
to spin-o¤sstart-up size, age (and its square), productivity (measured by the
log of sales per worker) and an indicator variable controlling for rm location
in an urban region.
Regarding BOscharacteristics, we control for their general and specic
human capital (BOsage, education, entrepreneurial experience and industry-
specic experience). Furthermore, we include two dummy variables indicat-
ing whether there are two or more BOs in the rm (shared ownerships) and
whether the spin-o¤ su¤ers any type of ownership change in the subsequent
year. This last aspect has been recurrently neglected by previous studies on
new rm performance, though seminal theories on entrepreneurship and BOs
turnover recognize that ownership transfers may be common, as the entrepre-
neur and the rm are two di¤erent parts that should be perfectly matched
(Holmes and Schmitz, 1995, 1996). In our data, about 30% of all spin-o¤s
under analysis su¤er at least one change in their entrepreneurial teamdur-
12When dening our growth measure, we follow previous inuential studies (e.g., Davis
and Haltiwanger, 1990; 1992; Davis et al., 1996; Burgess et al., 2000; Haltiwanger et al.,
2013) who highlight the importance of taking into account the current average size in the
denominator in order to mitigate the e¤ects of regression to the mean and avoid any bias.
While using base year size could yield a negative bias, using the end year size could produce
a positive bias. The current average size  0:5  (Ei;t+1 + Ei;t)  is, thus, a satisfactory
alternative.
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ing the lifecycle, so we also control for these ownership changes.13 A detailed
description of all these variables can be found in Table A.I, in the Appendix.
However, a relevant problem in new rm growth studies is the possibility
of selection bias, given that selection is a function of the rms e¢ ciency in
competition with other similar rms (Delmar et al., 2013). In particular,
and according to the classic results of Nelson and Winter (1982), the most
e¢ cient (or the ttest) rms normally survive and grow, while less viable
rms (which typically correspond to smaller and more slowly growing rms)
are systematically selected out of the market. Consequently, spin-o¤sgrowth
rates are only observed for the subset of surviving rms and, for this reason,
pooled OLS estimation results may be inconsistent if rm exit and employment
growth are not independent phenomena.
We, thus, specify a two-equation Heckman-type model in order to correct
for selection bias on spin-o¤sexit.14 Formally, we have an outcome (growth)
equation and a selection (exit) equation, as follows:
Growthi;t+1 =

1X1i;0 + 2X2i;t + 3X3i;t + t + "it
 
if yi;t+1 > 0
if yi;t+1  0
(2)
Exiti;t+1 =

0
1
if yi;t+1 > 0
if yi;t+1  0
(3)
13The changes in the entrepreneurial team may take several forms. Either the founder(s)
may have transferred the rm to other BO(s) during the rm lifecycle (this is the most
frequent case, with the founder/current BO being replaced by a new one), or a new BO
may join the current entrepreneurial team after the rm has been established (for instance,
when the rm is established as a single-owned rm and then changes to a status of shared
ownership), or even one of the BOs may leave the current entrepreneurial team, which may
be composed by two or more BOs. Moreover, multiple ownership changes may occur over
rmslifecycle, though this is less frequent. Among the 15,037 spin-o¤s su¤ering ownership
changes in our dataset, 64% of them su¤er only one ownership change during the time period
under observation.
14The Heckmans (1979) procedure has been used by several recent studies on the rela-
tionship between rm growth and survival (e.g., Czarnitzk and Delanote, 2012; Delmar et
al., 2013; Koch et al., 2013; Huber et al., 2014).
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where yi;t+1 = 1X1i;0 + 2X2i;t + 3X3i;t + 4X4i;t + t + it represents a
latent variable measuring the di¤erential in spin-o¤sutility (or prot) between
remaining active or exiting the market. By allowing the error terms "it and
it to be correlated, we are able to correct for the possible non-randomness of
the selected sample of spin-o¤s.
To improve the robustness of our estimation, we follow the two-step es-
timator and use a vector of industry-level characteristics (X4i;t) as exclusion
restrictions for a more robust identication. This vector includes the industrys
minimum e¢ cient scale, concentration, growth, agglomeration and entry rates
(see Table A.I for a detailed description of these variables). While industry-
specic characteristics seem to consistently explain di¤erences in survival rates
across rms, these variables typically add limited explanatory power in rm
growth studies (see the surveys by Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod (2008)
on rm survival, and Coad (2007, 2009) on rm growth). Furthermore, in our
data, industry-level variables can be shown to have a signicant e¤ect on rm
exit and a negligible e¤ect on spin-o¤semployment rates.
We have then repeated this procedure to estimate similar equations for
particular dimensions of spin-o¤sworker ows, namely Hiring Rates and Sep-
aration Rates, aiming at understanding how the characteristics of spin-o¤s
initial workforce may inuence these post-entry labor adjustments.
5.2 Empirical Results
Table 4 reports and compares the results obtained from the estimation of
pooled OLS employment growth equation and Heckman two-step model. Some
descriptive statistics on the variables included in these estimations can be
found in Table A.II, in the Appendix. Besides the di¤erences in their initial
workforce, these statistics also reveal that pushed spin-o¤s are more frequently
established in the same location and in the same industry where the parent
rm operated before. This group of rms also starts at a slightly larger scale
than pulled spin-o¤s, which may be achieved through the absorption of a more
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signicant number of co-workers at entry. Though their BOs are, on average
less educated, they seem to be more experienced than pulled spin-o¤sBOs.
Finally, both shared ownerships and ownership changes are relatively more
frequent in pushed than in pulled spin-o¤s.
The empirical results conrm that there is a signicant selection bias in
the sample due to rm exit. We found a negative and signicant correlation
between the error terms of the two equations, which attests that rm exit and
growth are not independent. Instead, exiting rms tend to su¤er a signicant
downsizing before closing down operations, in line with the so-called "growth
of the tter hypothesis" of evolutionary models (e.g, Jovanovic, 1982; Nelson
and Winter, 1982).
Moreover, the results show that not controlling for spin-o¤sselection on
exit has important implications regarding the impact of the initial human cap-
ital endowments on post-entry growth. When accounting for selection bias in
the sample, only the Skill Dispersion of the initial workforce exerts a signi-
cant e¤ect on spin-o¤semployment growth. The results suggest that starting
with a more heterogeneous workforce in terms of skills reduces employment
growth, besides increasing rm exit rates.
The other measures of initial human capital do not seem to signicantly
a¤ect post-entry growth after controlling for spin-o¤sexit. Pooled OLS esti-
mation results would suggest that pushed spin-o¤s grow less than their pulled
counterparts, and that entering with a larger share of co-workers would penal-
ize rmspost-entry growth. However, the estimation results for the selection
(exit) equation point out that, rst, pushed spin-o¤s have slightly lower exit
rates than pulled spin-o¤s, and second, that the presence of co-workers reduces
the risk of exit. Overall, the e¤ects of these variables on rm survival seem to
cancel out their potential negative e¤ects on post-entry growth.
Regarding the e¤ects of workersaverage skills, starting with a more skilled
workforce seems to decrease rm exit rates, while no important e¤ects seem
to arise in terms of growth. The results, overall, suggest that initial human
capital endowments are more important for rm survival than for rm post-
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entry growth. Though initial workforce characteristics seem to inuence both
rm growth and exit individually, when we control for the fact that both
processes are negatively correlated, most of the e¤ects on spin-o¤s growth
actually vanish.15
The results for the remaining variables included in estimations are, overall,
in line with the literature. Spin-o¤s established in the same location (county)
of the parent rm survive longer and present higher post-entry growth rates,
as they may benet from prior experience in the region and have specic
knowledge, networks and contacts that help them to perform better than those
who are established in a di¤erent region. Firms entering at a larger scale grow
less, but overcome the so-called liability of smallness su¤ering, thus, lower
exit rates. More productive rms (in terms of sales per worker) grow more
and survive longer on average.
Both general and specic human capital of BOs seem to improve spin-o¤s
survival, while the e¤ects on post-entry growth are almost negligible. Shar-
ing the ownership of the business with other BO(s) is found to improve both
growth and survival prospects at the rm-level. Ownership changes, in turn,
seem to have negative e¤ects on both performance measures. While the liter-
ature has been suggesting that founder or BOs turnover are likely to be mo-
tivated by perceived mismatches between business quality and entrepreneurs
ability (e.g., Holmes and Schmitz, 1995, 1996), evidence on the e¤ects of these
ownership transfers is still limited and inconclusive. Chen and Thompson
(2013), for instance, found that business transfers are associated with higher
growth rates among surviving rms, but also with higher rm exit rates.
15As a robustness check, we have estimated the Heckman two-step model for the separate
samples of spin-o¤s operating in Manufacturing and Services, where workers initial skills
might play di¤erent roles or assume a di¤erent importance. The results are summarized in
Table A.III in the Appendix and remain consistent with the results previously obtained for
all spin-o¤s, though the e¤ects of the variables of interest are found to be more signicant
for spin-o¤s operating in Services. We have also re-estimated the Heckman two-step model
with sample weights, using spin-o¤ssurvival time as the weighting variable. The estimated
e¤ects of spin-o¤s initial human capital measures remain qualitatively unchanged, being
summarized in Table A.IV.
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Table 4. Estimation results for employment growth and survival
(Portugal, 1992-2007) Pooled OLS Heckman Two-step model
Employment Employment Firm
growth growth exit
Pushed Spin-o¤ -0.0063*** 0.0112 -0.0265**
(0.0018) (0.0133) (0.0123)
Average skill index at entry 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0145***
(0.0006) (0.0050) (0.0039)
Skill dispersion at entry -0.0020** -0.0181*** 0.0170***
(0.0008) (0.0064) (0.0055)
Share of co-workers at entry -0.0138*** 0.0254 -0.1082***
(0.0041) (0.0364) (0.0280)
Same location of PF 0.0588*** 0.1569** -0.2793***
(0.0062) (0.0629) (0.0230)
Same sector of PF 0.0013 -0.0025 -0.0198
(0.0019) (0.0131) (0.0129)
Start-up size -0.0190*** -0.0718*** -0.0504***
(0.0018) (0.0138) (0.0091)
Urban 0.0007 -0.0215 0.0510***
(0.0017) (0.0156) (0.0111)
Age -0.0185*** -0.0094 -0.0379***
(0.0010) (0.0107) (0.0069)
Age squared 0.0010*** 0.0011** 0.0012***
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Firm sales per worker 0.0388*** 0.0442*** -0.0227***
(0.0011) (0.0072) (0.0053)
BOsage -0.0013*** 0.0008 -0.0019***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0007)
BOsschooling years -0.0006** -0.0004 -0.0037**
(0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0015)
BOsentrepreneurial experience -0.0014*** -0.0006 -0.0060**
(0.0004) (0.0034) (0.0031)
BOsindustry experience 0.0016*** 0.0090*** -0.0058***
(0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0021)
Shared Ownership -0.0125*** 0.1207* -0.2801***
(0.0018) (0.0630) (0.0126)
Ownership Change 0.0066** -0.0911*** 0.1176***
(0.0027) (0.0296) (0.0151)
(It continues in the next page)
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Table 4. Estimation results for employment growth and survival
(Portugal, 1992-2007) Pooled OLS Heckman Two-step model
Employment Employment Firm
growth growth exit
MES - - 0.0382***
- - (0.0038)
HH Index - - -1.5499***
- - (0.5880)
Industry Growth - - -0.0933*
- - (0.0519)
Industry Agglomeration - - 0.6501***
- - (0.1412)
Industry Entry Rate - - 0.4849***
- - (0.1875)
Constant -0.2717*** 0.9530* -1.6814***
(0.0203) (0.5172) (0.0799)
Inverse Mills Ratio - -0.5569** -
- (0.2594) -
Observations 131,734 143,911
Notes: Time-varying independent variables are measured in t-1. All the models include
time dummies. Both employment growth equations also include 2-digit industry dummies.
Firm-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote signicant at
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The estimated correlation between the errors of employment
growth and rm exit equations is negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero (b =-0.8332).
As expected, industry environment signicantly inuences spin-o¤ssur-
vival. Exit rates tend to be higher in industries where the minimum e¢ cient
scale, employment agglomeration and entry rates are also higher and where
competition is stronger. In contrast, rms operating in more concentrated
industries, by probably having higher market power, are found to face lower
risks of exit.
Finally, given that rm-level employment growth is the result of rms
adjustments in their workforce through di¤erent combinations of hires and
separations, we explore how the characteristics of spin-o¤sinitial workforce
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might be associated with these particular worker ows. We present a summary
of the results obtained from Heckman two-step procedure in Table 5.
Table 5. Estimation results for spin-o¤shiring and separation rates,
Heckman two-step model (Portugal, 1992-2007)
Hiring Rates Separation Rates
Pushed Spin-o¤ -0.0105 -0.0111
(0.0073) (0.0117)
Average skill index at entry -0.0016 -0.0020
(0.0028) (0.0044)
Skill dispersion at entry 0.0010 0.0178***
(0.0035) (0.0056)
Share of co-workers at entry -0.0571*** -0.0728**
(0.0203) (0.0320)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.0558 0.4589**
(0.1510) (0.2293)
Observations 143,911 143,911
Notes: All the models include the rm-level and BO-level variables included in the
specication of the employment growth equation presented in Table 4, in addition to time
dummies and industry dummies. *, ** and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. The estimated error correlation between the error terms is equal to -0.2073
in the case of hiring rates (not signicantly di¤erent from zero) and 0.8055 in the case of
separation rates (statistically di¤erent from zero at the 1% level).
As expected, rm exit is negatively (positively) correlated with hiring (sep-
aration) rates at the rm-level. Moreover, these additional results conrm that
the skill dispersion of the initial workforce plays a signicant negative e¤ect
on post-entry growth by increasing rm-level separation rates. In addition,
the estimations also indicate that spin-o¤s hiring a larger share of co-workers
at the time of entry not only tend to hire less new workers, as also present
lower separation rates. Overall, labor adjustments in these rms seem to be
less frequent, either because they start with a more stable (or rigid) workforce
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which may make subsequent adjustments more costly , or because they
identify their best matches earlier than other rms, possibly owing to the past
relationship between co-workers and spin-o¤sfounders at the parent rm.
Finally, despite pulled spin-o¤s unconditionally present more remarkable
adjustments in their workforce over the lifecycle, the di¤erences between pushed
and pulled spin-o¤shiring and separation rates become, over again, insignif-
icant when we correct for rm selection on exit. Actually, after taking into
account several characteristics of workers, BOs, rms and industries, we nd
no evidence that pulled spin-o¤s outperform their pushed counterparts nei-
ther in growth, nor in survival , as some recent studies have proposed (e.g.,
Buenstorf, 2009; Bruneel et al., 2013). Though pushed spin-o¤s may be mostly
established under more unfavorable conditions (i.e., as a reaction to deteriorat-
ing job conditions and without any type of support from the parent company),
these rms seem to be able to perform as well as spin-o¤s driven by pull-nature
factors.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed how the post-entry employment dynamics and
survival of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s were associated to the characteristics
of the workers employed at entry. Our empirical results suggest that spin-
o¤ssurvival is closely related to the human capital endowments presented at
entry. Firms employing a more skilled workforce at the start-up and a higher
share of co-workers absorbed from the parent rm face lower exit rates. In
contrast, skill dispersion at entry increases rm exit rates and signicantly
reduces post-entry employment growth, by increasing rmsseparation rates.
Overall, the data suggest that spin-o¤s adjust their workforce over the
lifecycle by preserving the most skilled workers, and by hiring and separating
the less skilled employees, as those staying in the rm for longer periods are,
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on average, more skilled than those who enter and exit the rm (voluntarily
or not) over time. Additionally, worker ows are lower in spin-o¤s entering
with a more signicant share of co-workers. Pushed and pulled spin-o¤s seem
to have di¤erent post-entry adjustments in their labor force due to, in part,
the di¤erent worker mix they enter with.
In summary, the choice of the very rst employees seems to have long-term
e¤ects on spin-o¤slabor adjustments, either due to informal ties developed
between the initial workers and spin-o¤sfounders, or due to ring restrictions.
Labor adjustments may be di¢ cult, either due to strict employment legislation
or by rm natural inertia. In view of that, start-up conditions namely the
skills of the initial workforce and the rmsearly ability of screening heteroge-
neous workers may play a crucial role in the post-performance of new rms,
especially in countries where strict employment legislation restricts labor ad-
justments and, consequently, rmsability to respond to market changes in a
short-time horizon.
Finally, the paper o¤ers possible avenues for future extensions that may be
of interest for both labor economics and industrial organizations researchers.
From the point of view of labor economics, this study highlights the role that
workershuman capital may play in worker turnover and labor reallocation
processes. From the point of view of industrial economics, the results shed
new light on the signicant link between rm performance and workerschar-
acteristics, and on the relevance of start-up conditions in particular, the role
of spin-o¤s initial human capital endowments  for post-entry employment
growth and survival. Last but not least, the results here presented may also
motivate further research on the post-entry performance di¤erences between
pushed (necessity) and pulled (opportunity) spin-o¤s, as our analysis does not
conrm the belief that pulled spin-o¤s outperform their pushed counterparts.
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Appendix 
 
Table A.I. Description of variables  
Initial human capital endowments 
Workers’ average skills at entry Average level of workers’ skill index, by firm, at the start-up. 
Skill dispersion at entry Standard deviation of workers’ skill index, by firm, at the start-up. 
Share of co-workers at entry 
Total number of co-workers in the workforce in firm i at the start-
up/Total number of employees in firm i at the start-up. 
Firm-level characteristics 
Pushed Spin-off 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a pushed spin-off, 0 
otherwise. 
Firm start-up size Number of employees of firm i at entry, in logs. 
Firm age Years elapsed since the start-up. 
Firm Productivity Sales per worker, in logs. Sales are in constant prices of 2005. 
Urban region 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-off is located in the districts 
of Porto or Lisbon, 0 otherwise. 
Same location of the parent firm 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-off is located in the same 
county of the parent firm, 0 otherwise. 
Same industry (2d) of the parent 
firm 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-off operates in the same 2-
digit industry of the parent firm, 0 otherwise. 
Business-Owners’ characteristics 
BOs’ agea Business-owners’ age, in years, in the reference period.  
BOs’ educationa Business-owners’ schooling years in the reference period. 
BOs’ entrepreneurial experiencea 
Total number of years of experience as BOs in the reference 
period.  
BOs’ industry experiencea 
Total number of years of experience in the 2-digit industry (as BO 
or paid employee) in the reference period. 
Shared Ownership 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-off has 2 or more BOs in the 
reference period, 0 otherwise. 
Ownership change 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-offs’ entrepreneurial team 
changes in the next year, 0 otherwise.  
Industry-level characteristics
b
 
MES (Minimum Efficient Scale) Median number of employees in the 2-digit industry in each year. 
HH index 
Sum of the squared share of each firm’s employment in the total 2-
digit industry’s employment in each year. 
Industry growth Annual percentage change in 2-digit employment. 
Industry agglomeration 
Share of 2-digit industry’s employment in the total employment in 
the country, in each year. 
Entry rate 
Ratio of total firm entries over the total number of incumbent firms 
in the 2-digit industry, by year. 
a Whenever the spin-offs has two or more BOs, these variables measure their average age, education and years of experience, 
respectively as BOs or in the industry. 
b These variables are only included in the selection (exit) equation.  
Table A.II. Descriptive statistics (Portugal, All spin-o¤s, 1992-2007)
All Spin-o¤s Pushed Spin-o¤s Pulled Spin-o¤s
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
WorkersSkills at entry
Workers average sk ills 7 .1255 2.3348 6.8266 2.1824 7.2649 2.3898
Skill d isp ersion 1.6297 1.1594 1.5526 1.0734 1.6717 1.2016
Share of co-workers 0 .0982 0.2016 0.1947 0.2584 0.0536 0.1493
Firm-level Variables
Same lo cation of PF (% ) 0.8679 0.3386 0.9123 0.2828 0.8474 0.3596
Same industry of PF (% ) 0.4908 0.4999 0.6330 0.4820 0.4251 0.4944
Start-up size (logs) 0 .9798 0.7763 1.1913 0.8305 0.8821 0.7296
F irm age (y) 4.5794 3.5117 4.6667 3.5303 4.5354 3.5015
Urban region (% ) 0.4055 0.4910 0.3992 0.4897 0.4085 0.4916
Sales p er worker (logs) 10.513 1.1028 10.495 1.0944 10.521 1.107
BO-level variables
BOs age (y) 39.832 9.1752 40.631 9.2024 39.428 9.1349
Bos education (y) 8.4169 4.2954 7.8060 4.0427 8.7247 4.3851
BOs entrepren . exp . (y) 3.5327 2.7148 3.7756 2.7959 3.4103 2.6646
BOs industry exp . (y) 4.5175 3.8538 5.1302 3.9344 4.2088 3.7749
Shared ownersh ip (% ) 0.3199 0.4665 0.3851 0.4866 0.2871 0.4524
Ownersh ip changes (% ) 0.1385 0.3455 0.1454 0.3525 0.1351 0.3418
Industry-level variables
MES 3.4949 1.6253 3.6682 1.7216 3.4076 1.5674
HH index 0.0031 0.0110 0.0028 0.0097 0.0032 0.0116
Industry grow th 0.0385 0.1521 0.0333 0.1547 0.0412 0.1507
Industry agglom eration 0.0868 0.0404 0.0863 0.0410 0.0871 0.0401
Entry rate 0.1291 0.0410 0.1253 0.0411 0.1310 0.0408
Notes: PF means Parent Firm. y means years. Regarding BOs age, education and
experience variables, whenever the rm has two or more BOs, these variables correspond to
the average years of age, education and experience of all BOs in the rm.
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Table A.III. Heckman two-step estimation results for di¤erent subsamples
Manufacturing Services
Employment Firm Employment Firm
growth exit growth exit
Pushed Spin-o¤ 0.0101 -0.0470* 0.0057 -0.0158
(0.0301) (0.0275) (0.0132) (0.0157)
Average skill index at entry -0.0016 -0.0302*** -0.0014 -0.0179***
(0.0137) (0.0104) (0.0035) (0.0042)
Skill dispersion at entry -0.0093 0.0051 -0.0100* 0.0158**
(0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0053) (0.0063)
Share of co-workers at entry -0.0541 -0.0711* 0.0211 -0.1131***
(0.0574) (0.0348) (0.0334) (0.0378)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.6845** - -0.1577** -
(0.3413) - (0.0805) -
Observations 28,488 90,519
Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The coe¢ cients
on the rm, BOs and industry variables are available upon request.
Table A.IV. Heckman maximum-likelihood estimation results, weighted
by spin-o¤ssurvival time
Employment growth Firm exit
Pushed Spin-o¤ 0.0176 -0.0129
(0.0147) (0.0128)
Average skill index at entry 0.0075 -0.0127***
(0.0046) (0.0039)
Skill dispersion at entry -0.0223*** 0.0201***
(0.0061) (0.0056)
Share of co-workers at entry 0.0255 -0.1059***
(0.0323) (0.0290)
Observations 143,911
Notes: This model corresponds to the same model presented in Table 4, but using
maximum likelihood and sampling weights, as weighted estimation is only possible under
maximum likelihood estimation. *** denotes signicant at 1%. The estimated correlation
between the errors is statistically signicant at the 1%, and equal to -0.8936. The coe¢ cients
of rm, BOs and industry variables are not reported to save space, being available upon
request.
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